Los Sres. Puigdemont (MEP), Ponsatí (MEP) i Comín (MEP) demandan al Parlamento Europeo, por ocho motivos (18 MAY 2021)

Ha sido comentado una decisión del Tribunal General de la UE, maliciosamente mal interpretada por la prensa española. He aquí los motivos de la demanda inicial.

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Twitter thread by Albert Royo (20 JUL 2021)

A dramatic call by one of the 30+ politicaians and high ranking officials of the Government, who have to pay exorbitant sums of money ahead of the final decision of the highly politicized "Tribunal de Cuentas", equivalent to Courts of Auditors elsewhere, though with very few economists and accountants among its members, who include at least one former minister. 

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Cataluña como "Peligro para la democracia"

Una selección de textos

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Incredulidad por el discurso de Sáenz de Santamaría sobre Cataluña y el Diplocat (17 DIC 2017)

Incredulidad por el discurso de Sáenz de Santamaría sobre Cataluña. Críticas a la vicepresidenta por alardear de haber "descabezado" a ERC y Junts per Catalunya. Huffington Post, 17 DEC 2017.

Clica aquí, si hace falta, para acceder al texto entero

El MH President Artur Mas, el 9N i el Tribunal de Comptes (3 JUL 2021)

He llegit que el "Tribunal de Ajuste de Cuentas" subhastarà un habitatge del MH president Artur Mas. Però també llegeixo que TOTA la fiança que se li reclamava (a ell i les altres víctimes) s'havia recollit pel per la Caixa de Solidaritat, i dipositat al Tribunal. No és així?

Clica aquí si cal per llegir el text sencer.

AE

This has ben copied and pasted from https://www.ae-info.org/ae/Acad_Main/News/Andreu%20Mas-Colell

TO ALL MEMBERS OF ACADEMIA EUROPAEA

Our distinguished colleague the international Economics scholar Professor Andreu Mas-Colell, is facing legal action by the Spanish authorities for events during his time serving the community in Catalonia as a Minister of Economy. (Andreu Mas-Colell is a former winner of the AE Erasmus Medal, a former AE Trustee, a former Secretary General of the European Research Council and he was a driving force behind the world class ICREA and establishment of the University Pompeu Fabra).

• Tweet post

• Article in the London Times newspaper

• Article in The Guardian

• Petition in support of Professor Andreu Mas-Colell

• Regarding Spain’s Court of Auditors and Professor Andreu Mas Colell

• Former Section chair of the Economics, Business and Management Sciences section, Professor Klaus Zimmermann has signed the petition and published a statement at his website: http://www.klausfzimmermann.de/due-process-for-professor-andreu-mas-colell

From Prof. Jose Domingues Abrascal (sent 26 June 2021)

Dear Executive Secretary, dear Professor Coates,

I want to express my stronger opposition and condemnation to the use of the Academia Europaea for the purpose of questioning the rule of law in a democratic country which is member of the EU. It is hard to believe for me that you ask us to sing something without sending complete information about the activities for which Prof Mas-Colell is under investigation and what is the court that is investigating him. For your information it is the “Tribunal de Cuentas” (Public Accounts Court) of Spain.

I am not only surprised but strongly opposed to an action of support of someone under investigation by a court of a democratic country.

1. If you see the Democracy Index published by the Economist Intelligence Unit of the Economist Group (publisher of the weekly newspaper The Economist), Spain is one of the not so many Full Democracies in the world. In the said index Spain is in a higher position than France, Japan, United States or Israel.

2. There is a political wish of part of the population of a region of Spain ( 45% of the population aprox. according to several sources) that would like to be independent.

3. Due to the representation system of the Catalonian parliament (rural areas have more representers than urban areas) political parties for independence control the regional parliament.

4. Spanish constitution does not allow for referendums of independence of different regions. When the Spanish constitution was written in 1978, the German Constitution was taken as a reference for this part of the text. The German constitution that does not allow for such a referendum. Many other democratic countries like the United States have similar treatment of regional referendums a do not allow for such kind of referendum.

5. The United Nations do not recognize self-determination right to regions of democratic countries as Catalonia.

6. The “Tribunal de Cuentas” is in charge a auditing the accounts of the different public administrations and administrators.

7. What the “Tribunal de Cuentas” is analyzing is how much public money was spent in the organization of an illegal referendum that was specifically forbidden by the Constitutional Court of Spain. The referendum and other illegal activities forbidden by the Spanish Constitutional Court was organized in 2017 with the support of the regional government in which Prof. Mas-Colell was responsible for its economic department.

8. Obviously, Prof Mas-Colell is an eminent scientist but the auditing of the accounts of which he was responsible in the government of Catalonia should be out of any doubt. That is the reason why he is under investigation.

9. Catalonia is one of the richest regions of Spain and among the rich regions of the EU. It is well known in economy that unity of market should go together with fiscal solidarity. The basic reason for independence is that since the EU now guaranties the unit of market, any rich region would be better off by not shearing their taxes with other no so rich. The same could be said for municipalities or even neighborhoods.

10. Catalonia is not under any kind of prosecution by the rest of Spain. The political autonomy of Catalonia within Spain is larger than that of any other European region.

I would like to beg you to stop using the Academia Europaea for questioning a democratic country and stop asking its members to sign letters without sending a complete, clear and non- biased information. Any other thing is simply a political activity that should be absolutely outside of the activities of the Academia Europaea.

Yours

Prof. José Dominguez

URGENT: Please sign this petition, to send to Spain's Court of Auditors in protest against repression of 41 Catalans. (27 JUN 2021)

Here is a hasty English translation of this petition to protest against a repressive measure that is unimaginable process in any modern democracy. Please sign the petition!

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Spanish pardons will do little to contribute to solving Spain's conflict with Catalonia (23 JUN 2021)

A comment on Nicholas Casey's article about the "pardons" in NYT.

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Jordi Barbeta writes about the "Operation Soraya" as explained by Albert Rivera (20 JUN 2021)

An article by Jordi Barbeta on the moves by the PP to control the power to ruin leading Catalans, including Prof. Andreu Mas-Colell. Translation: MS

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A strong article by Jordi Amat on Prof. Andreu Mas-Colell (17 JUN 2021)

A strong article by Jordi Amat on the attempts by Spain to ruin distinguished Prof. Andreu Mas-Colell 

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Petition: "In Support of Professor Andreu Mas-Colell"

"In Support of Professor Andreu Mas-Colell". This petition has also been published in El País, in a Spanish translation. (16 JUN 2021)

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Should politicians be prosecuted for statements made in the exercise of their mandate? Documents. (PACE, 21 JUN 2021)

'Should politicians be prosecuted for statements made in the exercise of their mandate?', Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly Report, rapporteur Boriss Cilevičs (LT). Documents.

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Vicent Partal: editorial on the Prof. Andreu Mas-Colell case (16 JUN 2021)

An editorial by Vicent Partal (VilaWeb) on the shocking case of Prof. Andreu Mas-Colell and his colleagues, all of whose assets Spain wants to confiscate.

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Thread by prestigious journalist Miguel Ángel Campos on Spanish police and media lawfare against Catalans (17 JUN 2021)

 This thread, by Miguel Angel Campos speaks for itself. Lawfare against Catalans involved in the independence movement are being lynched by the Spanish police and by most of the Spanish media, who disseminate these police reports that are pure fantasy.

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What strings have Spanish officials pulled to try and influence judgments of European courts? The author, Xavier X. Domènech, has authorized this translation (15 JUN 2021)

What if European courts rule that Spanish courts have reached judgments that violate international treaties and universal human rights? What strings have Spanish officials pulled to try and influence these judgments? Xavier F. Domènech has authorized this translation (by M. Strubell) of his thread on the subject.

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Council of Europe report on prosecution of Catalan politicians (4 JUN 2021)

Report by Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights: "Should politicians be prosecuted for statements made in the exercise of their mandate?" On Turkey and Spain.

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This is an English rendering of a tweet thread by Aleix Sarri on why Catalonia will never fit comfortably inside Spain (3 May 2021)

This is an English translation of a tweet thread by Aleix Sarri explaining why Catalonia will never fit comfortably inside Spain. He has kindly given me permission to publish it.  

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An article by Montserrat Nebreda, on a dissenting vote in the Constitutional Court (2 MAY 2021)

An article by Montserrat Nebreda, on the dissenting vote in the Constitutional Court, as regards Sr. Jordi Turull's request for the protection of his fundamental rights.

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An article by Quico Sallés on Pres. Puigdemont's 2018 arrest in Germany (2 MAY 2021)

An article by Quico Sallés, on the Spanish secret service's involvement in the capture of President Puigdemont in Germany, on charges of "rebellion, terrorism and homicide [sic]". The German court later refused his extradition. The author has kindly authorized the publication of this English translation.

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Interview with Neus Torbisco: "And meanwhile, the Spanish state is laughing"

Neus Torbisco: "And meanwhile, the state is laughing"

An interview with the lecturor and researcher on human rights and member of the governing council of the Council for the Republic

By: Josep Casulleras Nualart and Albert Salamé (photographs)

25.04.2021 01:50

Source: https://www.vilaweb.cat/noticies/entrevista-neus-torbisco-consell-republica-onu-estrasburg/

Neus Torbisco-Casals is probably the first person to activate the international front against the repression of independence.  She was in Geneva, as a visiting professor and researcher at the prestigious Graduate Institute, when she was struck by the imprisonment of Jordi Cuixart and Jordi Sànchez. She is one of the greatest human rights experts in our country, and immediately moved the contacts she had to activate the way of defence and denunciation before the UN.  And since then, her commitment has continued in the Council for the Republic, as a member of the governing council. Neus Torbisco considers that the Council can be the space for consensus on independence in which to design a strategy for confrontation with the Spanish state.

She talks about it in this interview we held with her in a cafeteria in Poblenou, a few metres from her children's school, the school where she went to defend the ballot boxes on the 1st of October, after a lightning trip from Geneva.

Q. Who is Neus Torbisco?

 A. I'm the daughter of a father from Extremadura and a Catalan mother, so I could be calked a "xarnego", and I have always been proud to be one, this mixed family home where we lived in Catalan and Spanish, but with a very strong Catalan consciousness. I married a German from Berlin and at home we speak English, German and Catalan. I am Catalan, yes, but also very cosmopolitan and I thought that identities had to be compatible. You see, I wasn't a pro-independence activist, I've been a pro-independence person since the [2010] Statute ruling. I was a friend of Carme Chacón when we were students in Canada and we dreamed of a similar Spain, with a model of asymmetric federalism capable of recognizing Catalonia as a nation. A state where different peoples could feel comfortable and respected, able to develop their culture. That wadsn't so long ago. What has happened?

Q. What has happened?

A. Well, in 2006 I came to the conclusion that Spain could never be like Canada and that as Catalans we could not devote all our energies to convincing Spaniards that we deserve to be as free and to have as much recognition for our language and culture, for our collective rights, as they have. Neither more nor less. The only way to be free and to be represented in the institutions is to have a state of your own.  Since then, the Spanish state has done nothing but ratify my current position. I have moved far away from Spain, I have long since become emotionally separated from this belongingness, although I love Seville, the province of Badajoz where my father is from and also the energy of Madrid.

 Q. When you were in Geneva, the imprisonment of Jordi Cuixart and Jordi Sànchez made a big impression on you.

 A. Yes. That day I was in my office at the Graduate Institute. I had only lived in Geneva for two years and followed very closely what was happening in Catalonia. I was very impressed by it, for two personal reasons: on the one hand, because I had had an important link with the Bofill Foundation, which Jordi Sànchez had chaired and whom I admired and knew from several events. The Bofill Foundation gave me a studentship in the late 1990s to study in Canada, and I’ve always been very grateful for that, because it was a very important stay and it marked my academic career a lot. And on the other hand, I have been a member of Omnium for many years and throughout my life I have been in contact with people of various generations who are members of it, especially in Igualada, where I was born.

 Q. And you immediately launched the first international response.

A. I was immediately upset. So much so that I canceled an impending teaching appointment and, together with my husband, Nico Krisch, who is a professor of international law, we contacted a colleague of ours, Andrew Clapham, now commissioner of the commission m set up by the UN Human Rights Council in South Sudan and with extensive experience in serious human rights conflicts and abuses. And then we made contact with Ben Emmerson, moved by the conviction that a lawyer of undoubted prestige would be needed in international courts.

 Q. To be able to do what? 

A. Because we knew that prisoners would undoubtedly need to go to these courts to achieve an international condemnation that would have an impact to relegitimize the movement for the right to self-determination. Then I got in touch with people I indirectly knew about Omnium Cultural to help with everything I needed from Geneva. Thus began the collaboration that ended in the collective complaint to the UN Working Group and the various suits against Spain in the United Nations Human Rights Committee.

 Q. How did you know right away that you had to follow this path?

 A. I had been working in cases related to human rights and minority rights for many years and I was also a temporary lawyer at the European Court of Human Rights, and I have seen and explained in the master's programs where I teach many similar cases in countries that are in democratic transition or that have made incomplete transitions or that are directly failed democracies. It is a fairly common pattern. When civil society is imprisoned in similar contexts, the state crosses a red line, and this step is part of a strategy that invokes a paradigm of "security" in order to limit the human rights of dissident minorities.

Q. "They won't dare", many people said.

A. The state clearly opted for the imposition of force despite the cost in terms of democracy and human rights.  Unfortunately, despite the disbelief of many people in Catalonia (including the prisoners themselves and the lawyers in the early stages of criminalization) I was not mistaken. In my opinion, nothing would have changed the outcome of the judicial process or the oral trial in the Spanish Supreme Court. Once judges stand up as defenders of Spain’s territorial unity backed by seemingly constitutionalist reasoning, the law just serves as a justification for a sentence that has already been drafted. Nothing would have changed if rubber dolls had sat in the Supreme Court in Madrid instead of the lawyers.

Q. Do you mean there was no possible defence?

A. The failed attempt at defence gave the process an appearance of “institutional normalcy” that in the end distorted the fact that the trial was a farce to politically condemn the leaders of a peaceful and democratic movement that presented an existential challenge to the state.  So the only defence, in my opinion, that was appropriate to the situation was that of Jordi Cuixart. But it is logical that criminal lawyers as brilliant as Melero would resist the idea of ​​an absolute failure of the rule of law. The reaction of the state cannot be understood rationally and jurists tend to be rationalists.

Q. Were they naive?

A. I think there was confidence in criminal law, in the rule of law in general; the confidence to say "obviously there has been no violence, how do you want them to be remanded in custody?"  The lawyers didn't expect it.  I remember conversations with one, who then told me it was like they’d split it in half, because everything we knew about criminal law was no longer relevant.  The goal of the state is not to govern independence.  And the instrument for doing so is the subversion of law, trying to maintain an appearance of neutrality enshrined in a theory of the division of powers that, in Spain, is pure appearance.  I saw, and continue to see, a pattern consistent with that of some political regimes in unconsolidated democracies.

 Q. For example?
 

A. I now teach and research cases such as Ethiopia and Kurdistan. In Spain this pattern is much softer, but clearly identifiable in features that are common. For example, the fact that the Spanish institutions acted with such force against the Jordis, the unabated application of Article 155, and that the state at no time opened the door to dialogue, even in the most critical moments, were very clear indications that, from a state perspective, all the mechanisms had been activated to deal with a state of emergency that, in fact, remains in force and will continue to do so as long as they do not achieve their intended purpose: impose a non-pro-independence government in Catalonia and to behead the political and social leadership. It's sad to say, but to some extent they are getting away with it. We all know: Divide et impera.

Q. And what did you think when you saw all this?

A. I watched in horror as in my country the patterns of repression of human rights that I explain in class, the use of the criminal law of the enemy to prevent free expression and political dissent, were reproduced. Many of the trials I saw while working as an interim lawyer at the European Court of Human Rights in 1998 were reproduced with startling similarities. And when I spoke to fellow lawyers or jurists at UPF, where I am a lecturer on leave, I was surprised by the more or less negativist relativism. "It can't be, woman, this will be unsustainable, Spain is in the EU, they will be home for Christmas." Then I hung up the phone and wanted to think that maybe it was me who was exaggerating - maybe I was suffering from cognitive impairment from my professional specialization or I was anxious about everything that was happening. I wouldn’t have wanted anything as much as to be proved wrong.

Q. And are the Strasbourg Court and the UN all we have left?

A. Well, the only ones that can stop the Spanish judges in their tracks are the international courts and quasi-judicial instances, both regional (ECHR) and universal instruments (Human Rights Committee, working group on arbitrary detention, etc.). And combating this judicial policy of revenge is not only crucial to restoring the honour and dignity of the victims of these reprisals, but also to legitimizing the defence of the collective right to self-determination. Without correct diagnoses it is difficult to have proper legal-political strategies.

Q. But international bodies have already been borne in mind.
 

A. Yes, but what was done with the UN arbitrary detention working group should have been done much more, and in a united way, which is they way we saw it with Ben Emmerson and the other international lawyers. And not with everyone going one by one to the Human Rights Court, filing appeals and more individual appeals probably with different factual accounts and without much expertise, which can cause confusion in court and discredit the general cause. It should be borne in mind that the Strasbourg Court is now a court saturated with claims with a high degree of discretion in admissibility. Other instruments, such as the Human Rights Committee, are mechanisms that must be used seriously because the resources available to UN bodies are limited and the frivolity or misuse of these mechanisms is not welcome in these organizations.
 

Q. Has the independence movement misused it?

A. If the intention is to communicate that we are facing an attempt to persecute and criminalize the defenders of a legitimate political movement in favor of independence, there should be a coherence and solidity that would grant integrity to all the demands. There were crucial ones, which were not pursued, and others that were superfluous or with very little chance of success that were presented "to try and see". This approach indicates a disturbing ignorance of international mechanisms for the protection of human rights and of how to use strategic litigation to pursue legitimate political goals. There are demands made as if they were an individual complaint against the state, and people who, as I said, believe that filing a lawsuit in Strasbourg is filling out the form on the website and marking with a cross the violated human rights.

Q. Isn't that so?

A. No! I am a lecturer in two master’s degrees where there are students who specialize in international law and human rights for a year or two (depending on the programme); there is a pool of expertise in criminal law and international litigation and, as in other areas of law, professionals of recognized prestige. Instead, in Catalonia and Spain there is still very little expertise in international human rights law, when dealing with norms and jurisprudence as complex as those of other branches of law. Moreover, an idea which I saw again reproduced in the series El judici, on TV3, according to which there is a political defence and a model of technical defence, is taken on board. I haven’t come across that anywhere else.

Q. A political defence and a technical defense. Is the distinction not correct?

A. Wrll, I find it based on a fallacious idea. It is one thing to say that there are political trials when people are tried for political reasons and that democracy is incompatible with the existence of these unjust trials. Quite another thing is to suggest that technical defenscs cannot be based on substantive arguments related to the defence of human rights. It implies assuming that human rights are not law, and that Spanish law is not intrinsically linked to an international legal order. In actual facts, human rights, and the protection of these rights by the international treaties that Spain has ratified, are automatically part of domestic law and are immediately applicable, as well as prevailing over internal rules that may contradict them.

Q. We think we can convince the state with the tools of the state.

A. Tne fact is we are adoptinmg a totally inward perspective, and not an internationaloner at all. When you fight for a cause, you want to explain your reasons, so that your opponent understands you. We want to be understood in Madrid, we act as if the state should act rationally and morally. As if this process was guided by reason, not force or emotions. But this not the case. And until we understand this, we will continue to crash into a wall immune to our "reasons." The state has its own and they are clear: to keep Catalonia as part of Spain despite sacrifices in terms of democracy and human rights. Its strategy is consistent with this and is legitimized by the Constitutional chant. With the PSOE in power nothing has changed, only the forms.

Q. Will it be useless to try to negotiate?

A. When trying to negotiate with the state, one must be very aware that any predisposition to dialogue will be purely strategic and not based on principles, the product of a conjunctural need (as at the time of the investiture of Pedro Sánchez). So it will be an unstable dialogue and the agreements that can be reached will not be true commitments in a political culture that, in itself, is not very liberal and where many leaders are not characterized by the practice of public virtues such as compliance with pacts.

Q. What can force them to sit down and negotiate?

A. The incentives to promote the real will to resolve a conflict by making significant concessions, allowing an agreed independence referendum to be held, do not exist. They will only exist as a result of an increase in domestic and international pressure. But at the same time, a smart confrontation with the state will be needed. That is why I think that the 1-O referendum was a great victory that must be vindicated and that is unrepeatable as the culmination of a collective process of exercising democracy that dignifies us as a people. Whether it was legal or not is secondary, asd any revolution entails a legal rupture and the important question is not that of legality but that of substantive legitimacy. 

Q. Do we find it difficult to decide in confrontation? 

A. It so happens that we Catalans, in part, are very civilized to confront the Leviathan with the right weapons: we aspire to make a peaceful revolution, with dialogue, with creative and spectacular manifestations, without any break, so that other states and even the adversary may understand us, and not think we do not love them… And that after the rupture no one will be angry. But very few political divorces are mutually agreed upon or completely peaceful, which is why the state continues to practice maximum institutional violence. They understand that ithis is a war and that we are the adversary.

Q. Have we wanted to explan ourselves too much?

A. Yes, and we didn't see where the counterweight was. That it is not in Madrid. The trial was lost because letting us win is not part of the script. On 1-O we were too close to victory and the state wants to make sure that, despite beloved Cuixart's motto, we will not do it again. However, the diagnosis they made was also wrong. Independence is not a breath of fresh air, people have shown resilience, patience and hope that we do not find in the political class right now. Needless to say, they are obviously the priority fotr persecution and not everyone should be or want to be a hero, which is also understandable. That is why repression works, baffles, divides us and creates insecurity. So much so that some are willing to sacrifice the 1-O as the collective heritage and founding moment of a new country, and have begun to see the referendum as a failure because of the harsh consequences it has had. But we need to persevere and rethink strategy and tactics.

Q. How? 

A. We must never lose sight of the fact that it is Spain that has failed by sacrificing the rule of law, democracy and human rights. If it were a serious state and without mediocre people, they would have seen that the diagnosis they made ten or twelve years ago was wrong: that if we did not get to understand the good way, then we would the bad way, and in four days there would be no pro-independence supporters left.

Q. Did they think we would understand this on the basis of trials?

 A. Yes, and that if we needed punishment and imprisonment, we would get the message. And if we don’t get it, they won’t let us out of jail. It is such an easy resasoning, straight out of a manual on repression, and that not even the lawyers understood this after having had their clients behind bars for two or three years… And there are still some lawyers who say that their client is not a political prisoner… What world do they live in? It's like thinking that it reality doesn't correspond to my ideas: "so much the worse for reality". Well no, gentlemen. May they are recognize that they were wrong in evaluating the possibilities offered by the trial. The trial is a small anecdote on a much broader battlefield. And without leadership or collective strategy, no war has ever been won. Spain followsd the script step by step. It is the politics of fear, intimidation and repression that make you gradually weaken, that make you doubt your people, that make you challenge your people. In the current conditions of demobilization and internal division, they have paved the way for their goal.

Q. In the meantime, there is no plan and we are stuck. 

A. Now we are in a pure state of modus vivendi, and that is why I see that it is very difficult to form a government. Political philosopher John Rawls said that it is one thing to have a modus vivendi, to survive, in which some rules of the game are established with the other in order to survive and coordinate minimally and solve problems that inevitably require collective action. But an overarching consensus is needed to define a true political community. And right now we continue to hold dialogues with a wall and we see internal criticism as a threat, organizations are turning into small sects of single-mindedness to reduce complexity. Either you are with me or you are my enemy.

Q. How do we get out of this?

A. This overlapping consensus needs to be found, and it’s not that easy. You have to get away from the wall that forces you to have to react every day to the news, to what happens to us, to what Spain does to us... We need to pacify the debate, also in the social networks. We need to give our opinion with respect, and to value all the victims of reprisals. We must speak again, probably with professional mediation and try not to give up a policy of truth, of the recognition of the First of October, of the legitimate president we have in exile, of the members of his government in prison. We need each and every leadership. Spain has managed to get us to have an internal struggle for the discourse and meanwhile repression is dragging us down. And many movements fail because of thid.

Q. Should the Council for the Republic be this space for consensus?

A. I continue to defend the Council for the Republic as an ideal space to create this consensus, with all the necessary governance reforms. The government is very limited, it has to work and manage with the few resources we have precisely because we are not a state, and it has to do so in a situation of a brutal social and health crisis. That is why the leaders of the main political organizations and civil society need to be in a protected framework and to pacify the internal conflict, rethinking strategies and reaching agreements in a discreet way, and not just making partial commitments andmeeting just because a government needs to be formed or in order to respond to an immediate situation.

Q. But everyone should see the Council in the same way, and that's not the case.

A. I insist that the Council for the Republic can offer institutional refuge. And if it has no more legitimacy it is because some actors have wanted it that way. In actual fact, President Puigdemont is one of the people most willing to transform this space, a leader with a vision and vocation very clearly focused on continuing to fight for the culmination of this process in a collective way. It is frustrating to project an image of the Council and its President that I, who have been linked to from the very outset, consider profoundly biased. We need an inclusive space that can reflect and define strategies outside the turmoil, that allows a calm discussion. It is legitimate for some people to say that we have failed and that we cannot do this, but they have to tell the truth and confront it openly.

Q. At one point it seemed that Junts also took political advantage of the Council.

A. I think the Council is a symptom of the strategic discrepancy that is perhaps not as disabling as it seems to us. The Council was created as a result of a government agreement between Junts and ERC and an institution had to be created abroad, and it is the least dignification you can do of the work that the president does in exile, which it has been very important in shaping European public opinion, in relocating it. We cannot jettison this political asset. But as the division consolidated, it affected the Council. This transversal commitment that it initially had was weakening. In this country everything is categorized; it is not the issues that are debated, but rather the person that raises them. Everyone assumes that if you say something it is because you are with me or against me or because you do or don't belong to this institution. This is done by institutions that are sectarian, political parties where there is no internal discrepancy. The parties, in a situation as serious as the one we live in, become more sectarian, as I said. And instead of opening up to dialogue with others, they think that doing so makes you weaker, and you end up repeating the sing-song. And some say that 1-O was this, and some that it was that. Meanwhile, the state is laughing.

Q. Nor has it been possible to explain what the Council for the Republic is.

A. It is not understood in the first place because the infrastructure it has is very fragile. We don’t have many resources. The Council for the Republic can only unleash its potential if the commitment is not really fictitious, but real. If its potential is really believed in. That is why internal confrontation dynamics need to be overcome,  but they cannot be overcome in the electoral or post-electoral context. Right now, the Council sees itself as an advocate of a strategy, which is the "Let's get ready" strategy. This strategy is neither so radical nor so idealistic; those of us who believe in the Council for the Republic think that there must be a confrontation with the state. A clever confrontation.

Q. What does a "clever confrontation" mean?

A. It can mean a lot of things, and it’s a framework. That is why we need an in-depth debate that incorporates, for example, issues such as whether it is worth the Speaker of Parliament beind barred from public office, and on which selective fronts we need to put our resources. We must bear in mind that resources and leadership are scarce assets. And from what I've learned from a few conflicts, when your leadership is liquidated, it takes years to recover. If you go into a confrontation with the state, you can't keep bumping into a wall because you don't have a strategy. You may decide to sacrifice your life, but you need to know for what purpose. And that’s why we need a strategy that takes us somewhere. Otherwise, people will not want to sacrifice anything, with every reason in the world. People already sacrificed a lot on October 1st and now they want to know where we are going. We must prepare for a constant and selective confrontation on several common fronts, we must be prepared to transform the current situation and not remain stagnant

Q. But milestones are needed.

A. Yes, in the short and medium term. That is why we need the Council. Because it now represents a strategy of confrontation with the state. Some see it as an opposition to the dialogue strategy. And I think the two strategies can be complementary. Over the years I have seen in similar processes that the state will only sit down in real negotiation - not a dialogue with the wall - when it sees that there is a very serious confrontation.

Q. There already was a confrontation in October 2017.

A. Exactly, but we needed allies we didn’t have at that time. Europe did not support us. At the international level, which is what I know, diplomatic networks are needed, with strategic disputes that have not been continued because there has been no shared political strategy. If there had been, we would already have a strategic and legal centre to decide collectively how we deal with these cases in the European Court of Human Rights, with what discourse... There should be a collective strategy. of the First of October lawyers, and we should have already gone to the UN. We need international tools to fight with, to set goals, to say, for example, that we want the state to have thirty convictions for human rights violations in three or five years, not just one. Convictions that reflect the image of repression that exists. We must also combat for the violation of cultural and linguistic rights in order to visualize Spain's assimilationist policies and the discrimination of Catalan in the public sphere. The Strategic Consumption campaign fits into the "Let's get ready" strategy.

Q. I thought that somehow this was already being done.

A. Very little has been done. Not much priority has been given to accusing the state. We need resources and the will to expand.

Q. If there were numerous convictions against the state, could this force it to sit down and negotiate?

A. Yes. An example is Kurdistan. In the late 1990s Turkey imprisoned many mayors, from many municipalities. And the Kurds organized themselves internally, created a kernel of defence lawyers, without many resources. But they were advised by international jurists ’organizations, support structures were set up... And there came a time when they had dozens of very well-written cases in the ECHR. At the time, Turkey wanted to join the EU, and was required to have a clean human rights record. And the Kurdish question was very important, to the point that there were deveral ECHR convictions and Turkey ended up agreeing to negotiate and to release prisoners on condition that no more lawsuits were filed before the Court of Human Rights.

Q. With Spain now the situation is different.

A. Yes, but note that the state reacted when it was confronted, especially from exile. Right now the Spanish state has internally devastated us and and has seen that it has divided us internally; that people have been imprisoned for three years and that nothing has happened here. And Sanchez openly walks around Europe; moreover, he is a golden boy, as seen in Europe, a left-wing feminist guy who rules thanks to the support of the pro-independence movement. Here's a little bit of Hegel's dialectic of the master and the slave. That is, we make a policy based on a rationality that does not exist, which is based on I'll support you if you support me. I recognize you and you in return recognize me too. But I don't that will happen. The independence movement has to accept hat we are the enemy of the state, and the state, which is very primitive in this case, will not pact with enemies.

Q. Not everyone in the independence movement sees things the same way, right now.

A. One of the things that an êtat majeur needs to discuss - not the parties or the government - is whether or not this gentleman should be invested in a critical circumstance for the movement, and whether or not we should withdraw support for him. Let us discuss it calmly, in a protected space. The Council for the Republic does not want to influence everyday politics, we already know that everyone does all they can. But if we want to manage something more than autonomy, we have reach on the fundamental things and reach strategic agreements. Today I would venture to say that the main problem is not the state, but ourselves.

 ...ooo000ooo..

Neus Torbisco: “I mentrestant, l’estat va rient”

Entrevista a la professora i investigadora sobre drets humans i membre del consell de govern del Consell per la República    
Per: Josep Casulleras Nualart i Albert Salamé (fotografies)

25.04.2021 01:50

Neus Torbisco-Casals és segurament la primera persona que va activar el front internacional contra la repressió de l’independentisme. Era a Ginebra, com a professora visitant i investigadora al prestigiós Graduate Institute, quan va quedar colpida per l’empresonament de Jordi Cuixart i Jordi Sànchez. És una de les més grans expertes en drets humans del nostre país, i va moure de seguida els contactes que tenia per activar la via de defensa i de denúncia a l’ONU. I des d’aleshores el seu compromís ha tingut continuïtat també al Consell per la República, com a membre del consell de govern. Neus Torbisco considera que el Consell pot ser l’espai de consens de l’independentisme des d’on dissenyar una estratègia de confrontació amb l’estat espanyol.

En parla en aquesta entrevista que li fem en una cafeteria del Poblenou, a pocs metres de l’escola dels seus fills on va anar a defensar les urnes del Primer d’Octubre, després d’un viatge llampec des de Ginebra.

—Qui és Neus Torbisco?

—Sóc filla de pare extremeny i mare catalana, d’això que en diuen xarnega, i sempre he estat orgullosa de ser-ho, d’aquesta família mixta on han conviscut a casa el català i el castellà, però amb una consciència catalanista molt forta. Em vaig casar amb un alemany de Berlín i a casa parlem anglès, alemany i català. Sóc catalana, sí, però també molt cosmopolita i pensava que les identitats havien de ser compatibles. Mireu, jo no era independentista, ho sóc des de la sentència de l’estatut. Era amiga de Carme Chacón quan érem estudiants al Canadà i somiàvem una Espanya semblant, amb un model de federalisme asimètric capaç de reconèixer Catalunya com a nació. Un estat on diferents països poguéssim sentir-nos còmodes i respectats, capaços de desenvolupar la nostra cultura. No fa tant d’això. Què ha passat?

—Això, què ha passat?

—Doncs que el 2006 vaig arribar a la conclusió que Espanya mai no podria ser com el Canadà i que com a catalans no podíem dedicar totes les nostres energies a convèncer els espanyols que ens mereixem ser tan lliures i tenir tant de reconeixement de la nostra llengua i cultural, dels nostres drets col·lectius, com tenen ells. Ni més ni menys. L’únic camí per a la llibertat plena i per a tenir representació a les institucions és tenir un estat propi. Des d’aleshores l’estat espanyol no ha fet sinó ratificar-me en la meva posició actual. Jo m’he allunyat molt d’Espanya, ja fa temps que emocionalment m’he separat d’aquesta pertinença, malgrat que m’encanta Sevilla, la província de Badajoz d’on era el meu pare i també l’energia de Madrid.

—Quan éreu a Ginebra, us va marcar molt l’empresonament de Jordi Cuixart i Jordi Sànchez.

—Sí. Aquell dia jo era al meu despatx al Graduate Institute. Feia tan sols dos anys que vivia a Ginebra i seguia molt de prop què passava a Catalunya. Vaig quedar-ne molt impactada, per dues raons personals: d’una banda, perquè havia tingut un vincle important amb la Fundació Bofill, que en Jordi Sànchez va presidir i a qui admirava i coneixia d’uns quants actes. La Fundació Bofill em va donar una beca a final dels anys noranta per estudiar al Canadà i sempre n’he estat molt agraïda, perquè va ser una estada molt important i que va marcar molt la meva carrera acadèmica. I d’una altra banda, feia molts anys que era sòcia d’Òmnium i de tota la vida m’he relacionat amb gent de diverses generacions que en són socis, sobretot a Igualada, on vaig néixer.

—I vau impulsar immediatament la primera acció de resposta d’àmbit internacional.

—Vaig quedar trasbalsada en aquell moment. Tant, que vaig anul·lar un compromís docent imminent i, juntament amb el meu marit, Nico Krisch, que es catedràtic de dret internacional, vam posar-nos en contacte amb un col·lega nostre, Andrew Clapham, avui comissionat de la Comissió establerta pel Consell de Drets Humans de l’ONU al Sudan del Sud i amb molta experiència en conflictes i abusos greus de drets humans. I tot seguit vam establir contacte amb Ben Emmerson, moguts per la convicció que seria necessari un advocat de prestigi indubtable als tribunals internacionals.

—Per a poder-hi fer què?

—Perquè sabíem que els presos sens dubte necessitarien recórrer a aquests tribunals per assolir una condemna internacional que tingués impacte per a relegitimar el moviment a favor del dret d’autodeterminació. Després vaig posar-me en contacte amb persones que indirectament coneixia d’Òmnium Cultural per ajudar en tot allò que calgués des de Ginebra. Així vam començar la col·laboració que va acabar en la denúncia col·lectiva al Grup de Treball de l’ONU i les diverses demandes contra Espanya al Comitè de Drets Humans de les Nacions Unides.

—Com és que teníeu tan clar de seguida que s’havia de seguir aquesta via?

—Fa molts anys que treballo en casos relacionats amb els drets humans i els drets de les minories i també vaig ser un temps lletrada interina al Tribunal Europeu dels Drets Humans, i he vist i explico als programes de màster on imparteixo docència molts casos semblants en països que estan en transició democràtica o que han fet transicions incompletes o que són directament democràcies fallides. És un patró força comú. Quan s’empresona la societat civil en contextos semblants, l’estat travessa una línia vermella, i aquest pas forma part d’una estratègia que invoca un paradigma de “seguretat” per tal de limitar els drets humans de minories dissidents.

—No s’hi atreviran, deia molta gent.

—L’estat va optar clarament per la via de la imposició a la força malgrat el cost en termes de democràcia i drets humans. Lamentablement, tot i la incredulitat de molta gent a Catalunya (inclosos els presos mateixos i els advocats a les primeres etapes de criminalització) no em vaig equivocar. En la meva opinió, res no hauria canviat el resultat del procés judicial ni del judici oral al Suprem espanyol. Una vegada els jutges s’erigeixen en defensors de la unitat territorial d’Espanya emparats en arguments aparentment constitucionalistes, el dret tan sols fa una funció de justificació d’una condemna que ja és escrita. Res no hauria canviat si en lloc d’advocats s’haguessin assegut ninots de goma a la sala del Suprem a Madrid.

—Voleu dir que no hi havia defensa possible?

—L’intent fracassat de defensa va atorgar al procés una aparença de “normalitat institucional” que al final desvirtua el fet que el judici fos una farsa per a condemnar políticament els dirigents d’un moviment pacífic i democràtic que presenta un repte existencial a l’estat. Per això, l’única defensa, en la meva opinió, que va ser adequada a la situació va ser la de Jordi Cuixart. Però és lògic que advocats penalistes tan brillants com Melero es resistissin a la idea de fracàs absolut de l’estat de dret. Racionalment no es pot entendre la reacció de l’estat i els juristes tendim a ser racionalistes.

—Van ser ingenus?

—Crec que hi havia una confiança en el dret penal, en l’estat de dret en general; la confiança de dir “evidentment que no hi ha hagut violència, com vols que els retinguin en presó provisional?” Els advocats no s’ho esperaven. Recordo converses amb un, que després em deia que era com si l’haguessin partit per la meitat, perquè tot allò que sabíem sobre dret penal havia deixat de ser rellevant. L’objectiu de l’estat és que no governi l’independentisme. I l’instrument per a fer-ho és la subversió del dret, mirant de mantenir una aparença de neutralitat emparada en una teoria de la divisió de poders que, a Espanya, és pura aparença. Jo hi veia, i hi continuo veient, un patró consistent amb el d’alguns règims polítics en democràcies no consolidades.

—Per exemple?

—Jo ara ensenyo i faig recerca sobre casos com el d’Etiòpia i el Kurdistan. A Espanya aquest patró és molt més tou, però clarament identificable en trets que hi són comuns. Per exemple, el fet que les institucions espanyoles actuessin amb aquesta contundència contra els Jordis, l’aplicació sense matisos del 155, i que l’estat en cap moment no obrís la porta a dialogar, ni tan sols en els moments més crítics, eren indicis molt clars que, des de la perspectiva estatal, s’havien activat tots els mecanismes per fer front a un estat d’excepció que, de fet, continua vigent i hi continuarà en la mesura en què no aconsegueixin l’objectiu que pretenen: imposar un govern no independentista a Catalunya i escapçar el lideratge polític i social. Resulta trist dir-ho, però d’alguna manera se’n van sortint. Tots ho sabem: Divide et impera.

—I què pensàveu quan vèieu això?

—Observava amb horror com al meu país es reproduïen els patrons de repressió dels drets humans que explico a classe, l’ús del dret penal de l’enemic per a evitar la lliure expressió i la dissidència política. Molts dels processos que vaig veure mentre treballava com a lletrada interina al Tribunal Europeu dels Drets Humans el 1998 s’hi reproduïen amb similituds esgarrifoses. I quan parlava amb companys advocats o juristes de la UPF, on sóc professora en excedència, em sorprenia el relativisme més o menys negacionista. “No pot ser, dona, això serà insostenible, Espanya és a la UE, per Nadal seran a casa.” Llavors penjava el telèfon i volia pensar que potser era jo que exagerava –potser patia un prejudici cognitiu derivat de la meva especialització professional o estava angoixada per tot allò que succeïa. No hauria volgut res tant com equivocar-me.

—I el Tribunal d’Estrasburg i l’ONU són l’única cosa que ens queda?

—És que els únics que poden aturar els peus als jutges espanyols són els tribunals i instàncies quasi judicials internacionals, tant regionals (TEDH) com instruments universals (Comitè de Drets Humans, grup de treball sobre les detencions arbitràries, etc.). I combatre aquesta política judicial de revenja no tan sols és crucial per a restablir l’honorabilitat i la dignitat dels represaliats, sinó per a legitimar la defensa del dret col·lectiu a la lliure determinació. Sense diagnosis correctes és difícil de tenir estratègies jurídico-polítiques adequades.

—Però les instàncies internacionals ja s’han tingut en compte.

—Sí, però allò que es va fer amb el grup de treball de detencions arbitràries de l’ONU s’havia d’haver fet molt més, i d’una manera unida, que és com ho vèiem amb Ben Emmerson i els altres advocats internacionals. I no anar cadascú pel seu compte al Tribunal de Drets Humans, presentant recursos i més recursos individuals probablement amb relats fàctics diferents i sense gaire expertesa, que poden generar confusió al tribunal i desprestigiar la causa general. S’ha de tenir present que el Tribunal d’Estrasburg és ara mateix un tribunal saturat de demandes que té un elevat grau de discreció en l’admissibilitat. Uns altres instruments, com el Comitè de Drets Humans, són mecanismes que s’han de fer servir de manera seriosa perquè els recursos a l’abast dels òrgans de l’ONU són limitats i la frivolitat o el mal ús d’aquests mecanismes no és benvist en aquestes organitzacions.

—N’ha fet un mal ús l’independentisme?

—Si es pretén de comunicar que som davant d’un intent de perseguir i criminalitzar els defensors d’un moviment polític legítim en favor de la independència, hi hauria d’haver una coherència i una solidesa que atorguessin integritat al conjunt de les demandes. N’hi havia de crucials, que no es van perseguir i unes altres de supèrflues o amb molt poques possibilitats d’èxit que s’han presentat “per provar-ho”. Aquesta manera de procedir indica un desconeixement preocupant dels mecanismes internacionals de protecció dels drets humans i de com utilitzar la litigació estratègica per fer efectius objectius polítics legítims. Hi ha demandes fetes com si es tractés de posar una queixa individual contra l’estat i gent que, com he dit, creu que presentar una demanda a Estrasburg és omplir el formulari que hi ha a la pàgina web i indicar amb una creu els drets humans vulnerats.

—No és així?

—No! Sóc professora a dos màsters on hi ha estudiants que s’especialitzen en dret internacional i drets humans durant un any o dos (segons el programa); hi ha una borsa d’expertesa en dret penal i litigació internacional i, com passa a més àmbits del dret, professionals de reconegut prestigi. I en canvi a Catalunya i a Espanya continua havent-hi molt poca expertesa en dret internacional dels drets humans, quan es tracta d’unes normes i jurisprudència tan complexes com la de les altres branques del dret. A més, s’assumeix aquesta idea que vaig tornar a veure reproduïda a la sèrie El judici, a TV3, segons la qual hi ha una defensa política i un model de defensa tècnica. Això no ho he sentit enlloc més.

—Una defensa política i una de tècnica. No és correcta la distinció?

—És que trobo que es basa en una idea fal·laç. Una cosa és dir que hi ha judicis polítics quan es jutgen persones per raons polítiques i que la democràcia és incompatible amb l’existència d’aquests processos injustos. L’altra cosa és suggerir que les defenses tècniques no es poden basar en arguments substantius relacionats amb la defensa dels drets humans. Implica assumir que els drets humans no són dret, i que el dret espanyol no és intrínsecament vinculat a un ordre jurídic internacional. En realitat els drets humans, i la protecció d’aquests drets per part dels tractats internacionals que ha ratificat Espanya, formen automàticament part del dret intern i són immediatament aplicables, a més de prevaler sobre les normes internes que els puguin contradir.

—Pensem que podem convèncer l’estat amb les eines de l’estat.

—És que tenim una mirada cap endins, totalment, i gens internacional. Quan lluites per una causa vols explicar les teves raons, que el teu adversari t’entengui. Volem que a Madrid ens entenguin, actuem com si l’estat hagués d’actuar racionalment i moralment. Com si aquest procés estigués guiat per la raó, i no la força o les emocions. No és així. I mentre no ho entenguem continuarem estavellant-nos contra una paret immunitzada contra les nostres “raons”. L’estat té les seves i són clares: retenir Catalunya com a part d’Espanya malgrat els sacrificis en termes de democràcia i de drets humans. La seva estratègia és coherent amb això i es legitima amb la cantarella constitucional. Amb el PSOE al poder res no ha canviat, tan sols les formes.

—No servirà de res intentar-hi negociar?

—Quan s’intenta negociar amb l’estat s’ha de ser molt conscient que qualsevol predisposició al diàleg serà purament estratègica i no pas basada en principis, producte d’una necessitat conjuntural (com en el moment de la investidura de Pedro Sánchez); per tant serà un diàleg inestable i els acords a què es pugui arribar no seran tampoc veritables compromisos en una cultura política que, ja per si, és poc liberal i on molts dirigents no es caracteritzen pel fet de practicar virtuts públiques com ara el compliment dels pactes.

—Què els pot forçar a seure i negociar?

—Els incentius per a promoure la voluntat real de resoldre un conflicte fent concessions significatives, permetent de fer un referèndum d’independència pactat, no existeixen. Tan sols existiran com a producte d’un augment de la pressió domèstica i també internacional. Però caldrà alhora una confrontació intel·ligent amb l’estat. Per això penso que el referèndum de l’1-O va ser una gran victòria que cal reivindicar i que és irrepetible com a culminació d’un procés col·lectiu d’exercici de la democràcia que ens dignifica com a poble. Si va ser legal o no és secundari perquè tota revolució comporta trencament jurídic i la qüestió important no és la de legalitat sinó la de legitimitat substantiva.

—Ens costa de decidir-nos a la confrontació?

—Als catalans en part ens passa que som molt civilitzats per a confrontar-nos al Leviatan amb les armes adequades: nosaltres aspirem a fer una revolució pacífica, amb diàleg, amb manifestacions creatives i espectaculars, sense cap trencament, que els altres estats i fins i tot l’adversari ens comprenguin, que no es pensin que no els estimem… I que després de la ruptura no s’enfadi ningú. Però molt pocs divorcis polítics són de mutu acord o totalment pacífics, i per això l’estat continua practicant violència institucional màxima. Ells entenen que és una guerra i som l’adversari.

—Ens hem volgut explicar massa?

—Sí, i no hem vist on era el contrapès. Que no és a Madrid. El judici es va perdre perquè deixar-nos guanyar no forma part del guió. L’1-O vam ser massa a prop de la victòria i l’estat vol assegurar-se que, malgrat el lema de l’estimadíssim Cuixart, no ho tornarem a fer. Tanmateix, el diagnòstic que van fer ells també era erroni. L’independentisme no és un suflé, la gent ha demostrat una resiliència, paciència i esperança que no trobem ara mateix en la classe política. Cal dir que òbviament ells són l’objecte prioritari de persecució i no tothom ha de ser ni vol ser un heroi, cosa que també s’entén. Per això la repressió funciona, desconcerta, ens divideix entre nosaltres i ens genera inseguretat. Fins al punt que alguns estan disposats a sacrificar l’1-O com a patrimoni col·lectiu i moment fundacional d’un nou país, i han començat a veure el referèndum com a fracàs per les conseqüències tan dures que ha tingut. Però cal perseverar i repensar l’estratègia i la tàctica.

—Com?

—Mai no hem de perdre de vista que és Espanya qui ha fracassat sacrificant l’estat de dret, la democràcia i els drets humans. Si fos un estat seriós i sense gent mediocre, haurien vist que el diagnòstic que van fer fa deu anys o dotze era erroni: que si no ho enteníem per les bones seria per les males i en quatre dies no quedarien independentistes.

—Es pensaven que a cop de tribunal ho entendríem?

—Sí, i que si calia càstig i presó, ho acabaríem entenent. I si no ho entenem, no ens deixen sortir de la presó. És un discurs tan fàcil, tan de manual de la repressió, i que no ho hagin entès ni tan sols els advocats després d’haver tingut els seus clients dos o tres anys tancats… I que encara hi hagi algun advocat que digui que el seu client no és un pres polític… En quin món viuen? És allò de si la realitat no es correspon amb les meves idees “pitjor per a la realitat”. Doncs no, senyors. Reconeguin tots plegats que es van equivocar en avaluar les possibilitats que oferia el judici. El judici és una petita anècdota en un camp de batalla molt més ampli. I sense direcció ni estratègia col·lectiva mai no s’ha guanyat cap guerra. Espanya compleix el guió fil per randa. És la política de la por, de la intimidació i de la repressió, que aconsegueix que de mica en mica et vagis afeblint, que dubtis dels teus, que t’enfrontis als teus. En les condicions actuals de desmobilització i divisió internes tenen el camí aplanat per a assolir l’objectiu.

—Mentrestant, no hi ha pla i restem encallats.

—Ara som en una situació de pur modus vivendi, i per això entenc que sigui molt difícil de formar govern. El filòsof de la política John Rawls deia que una cosa és tenir un modus vivendi, per a sobreviure, en què s’estableixen unes regles del joc amb l’altre per poder sobreviure i coordinar-se mínimament i resoldre problemes que inevitablement requereixen acció col·lectiva. Però cal un consens superposat (overlapping consensus) per a definir una veritable comunitat política. I ara mateix continuem tenint diàlegs amb una paret i veiem la crítica interna com una amenaça, les organitzacions es van reconvertint en petites sectes de pensament únic per reduir la complexitat. O estàs amb mi o ets el meu enemic.

—Com en sortim d’aquí?

—Cal trobar aquest consens superposat, i no és pas tan fàcil. Cal sortir de la paret que t’imposa haver de reaccionar cada dia a les notícies, a allò que ens passa, a allò que ens fa Espanya… Cal pacificar el debat, també a les xarxes. Cal opinar amb respecte, i valorar tots els represaliats. S’ha de tornar a parlar, segurament amb una mediació professional i intentar no renunciar a una política de la veritat, de reconeixement del Primer d’Octubre, del president legítim que tenim a l’exili, dels membres del seu govern a la presó. Necessitem tots els lideratges. Espanya ha aconseguit que tinguem una lluita interna pel relat i mentrestant la repressió va arrossegant-nos. I molts moviments fracassen per això.

—El Consell per la República hauria de ser aquest espai de consens?

—Continuo defensant el Consell per la República com a espai idoni per a crear aquest consens, amb totes les reformes de governança que calguin. Perquè el govern és molt limitat, ha de treballar i gestionar amb els pocs recursos de què disposem justament perquè no som un estat, i ho ha de fer en una situació de crisi social i sanitària brutals. Per això cal que els dirigents de les principals organitzacions polítiques i de la societat civil es trobin en un marc protegit i que pacifiquin el conflicte intern, repensin les estratègies i arribin a acords de manera discreta, i no tan sols adquireixin compromisos parcials i es trobin perquè cal formar govern o respondre a una situació immediata.

—Però tothom hauria de veure’l, el Consell, de la mateixa manera i no és així.

—Insisteixo que el Consell per la República pot oferir un refugi institucional. I si no té més legitimitat és perquè així ho han volgut alguns actors. De fet, el president Puigdemont és una de les persones més disposades a la transformació d’aquest espai, un líder amb una visió i vocació molt clarament enfocades a continuar lluitant per la culminació d’aquest procés d’una manera col·lectiva. Resulta frustrant que es projecti una imatge del Consell i del seu president que, jo que hi he estat vinculada des de molt a l’inici, considero profundament esbiaixada. Necessitem un espai inclusiu, que pugui reflexionar i definir estratègies al marge de les turbulències que permeti una discussió assossegada. És legítim que hi hagi gent que digui que hem fracassat i que no ho podem fer, però que diguin la veritat i la confrontin obertament.

—En algun moment ha semblat que Junts també aprofitava políticament el Consell.

—Penso que el Consell és un símptoma de la discrepància estratègica que potser no és tan inhabilitant com ens sembla. El Consell es va crear fruit d’un acord de govern entre Junts i ERC i s’havia de crear una institució a l’exterior, i és la mínima dignificació que pots fer de la tasca que fa el president a l’exili, que ha estat importantíssima per a configurar l’opinió pública europea, per a resituar-la. No podem renunciar a aquest actiu polític. Però a mesura que es consolidava la divisió, afectava el Consell. Aquest compromís transversal que inicialment tenia es va anar debilitant. En aquest país es categoritza tot; no es discuteixen els arguments, es discuteix qui els diu. Tothom assumeix que si dius alguna cosa és perquè estàs amb mi o contra mi o perquè pertanys a aquesta institució o no hi pertanys. Això ho fan institucions que són sectàries, partits polítics on no hi ha discrepància interna. Els partits, en una situació tan greu com la que vivim, se sectaritzen més, com he dit. I en comptes d’obrir-se al diàleg amb els altres es pensen que fer-ho et fa més dèbil, i acabes repetint cantarelles. I uns diuen que l’1-O va ser això i uns altres, que va ser allò. Mentrestant, l’estat va rient.

—Tampoc no s’ha sabut explicar què és el Consell per la República.

—No s’ha entès en primer lloc perquè la infrastructura que té és molt fràgil. No tenim gaires recursos. El Consell per la República tan sols podria desplegar el seu potencial si realment el compromís no fos fictici, sinó real. Si realment es creu en el seu potencial. Per això s’han de superar dinàmiques de confrontació interna que no es poden superar en el context electoral ni en el postelectoral. Ara mateix el Consell es veu com a defensor d’una estratègia, que és l’estratègia del “preparem-nos”. No és una estratègia ni tan radical ni tan idealista; els que creiem en el Consell per la República pensem que hi ha d’haver una confrontació amb l’estat. Una confrontació intel·ligent.

—Què vol dir una confrontació intel·ligent?

—Pot voler dir moltes coses, i això és un marc. Per això necessitem un debat profund que incorpori, per exemple, qüestions com ara si paga la pena que ens inhabilitin la presidenta del parlament i en quins fronts selectius cal posar-hi els recursos. Hem de pensar que els recursos i el lideratge són béns escassos. I, d’acord amb allò que he après d’uns quants conflictes, quan et liquiden el lideratge trigues anys a refer-te. Si vas a una confrontació contra l’estat, no pot ser que vagis topant contra una paret perquè no tens una estratègia. Pots decidir de sacrificar la teva vida, però has de saber per quin objectiu. I per això cal una estratègia que ens porti a algun lloc. Si no, la gent no voldrà sacrificar res, amb tota la raó del món. La gent ja vam sacrificar molt el Primer d’Octubre i ara volen saber on anem. Ens hem de preparar per a una confrontació constant i selectiva en diversos fronts comuns, hem d’anar preparats per a transformar la situació actual i no continuar estancats.

—Però sí que calen fites.

—Sí, a curt termini i a mitjà termini. Per això ens cal el Consell. Perquè representa ara una estratègia de confrontació amb l’estat. N’hi ha que ho veuen com una oposició a l’estratègia del diàleg. I jo crec que les dues estratègies poden ser complementàries. De cap a cap dels anys he comprovat en processos similars que l’estat tan sols s’asseurà en una negociació real –i no un diàleg amb la paret– quan vegi que hi ha una confrontació molt seriosa.

—Ja n’hi va haver, de confrontació, l’octubre del 2017.

—Exacte, però necessitàvem aliats que no teníem en aquell moment. Europa no ens va donar suport. En l’àmbit internacional, que és el que jo conec, calen xarxes diplomàtiques, amb litigis estratègics que no han tingut continuïtat perquè no hi ha hagut una estratègia política compartida. Si n’hi hagués hagut, ja hauríem de tenir un centre estratègic i jurídic per a decidir col·lectivament com fem front a aquestes causes al Tribunal Europeu dels Drets Humans, amb quin relat ho fem… Hi hauria d’haver una estratègia col·lectiva dels advocats del Primer d’Octubre, i ja hauríem d’haver anat a l’ONU. Calen eines internacionals per a lluitar, per a fixar uns objectius, per a dir, per exemple, que volem que en tres anys o cinc l’estat tingui trenta condemnes per violacions de drets humans, i no una. Unes condemnes que reflecteixin la imatge de la repressió que hi ha. També hem de combatre la vulneració de drets culturals i lingüístics per tal de visibilitzar les polítiques assimilacionistes de l’estat espanyol i la discriminació del català a l’esfera pública. La campanya del Consum Estratègic encaixa en el “preparem-nos”.

—Em pensava que d’alguna manera ja s’anava fent això.

—S’ha fet molt poc. No s’ha prioritzat gaire aquesta via d’acusació a l’estat. Calen recursos i voluntat que s’expandeixi.

—Si hi hagués nombroses condemnes contra l’estat, això el podria forçar a seure i negociar?

—Sí. Un exemple, el Kurdistan. A final dels noranta Turquia va empresonar molts batlles, de molts municipis. I els kurds van organitzar-se internament, van crear un nucli d’advocats defensors, sense tenir gaires recursos. Però van ser assessorats per organitzacions internacionals de juristes, es van crear estructures de suport… I va arribar un moment en què tenien desenes de demandes molt ben redactades al TEDH. En aquell moment Turquia volia entrar a la UE, i se li exigia un expedient sobre drets humans net. I la qüestió kurda va ser molt important, fins al punt que hi va haver unes quantes condemnes i Turquia va acabar acceptant de negociar i d’alliberar presos amb la condició que no interposessin cap demanda més al Tribunal de Drets Humans.

—Amb Espanya ara la situació és diferent.

—Sí, però fixa’t que l’estat va reaccionar quan el van confrontar, sobretot des de l’exili. Ara mateix l’estat espanyol internament ha arrasat i ha vist que ens ha dividit internament; que fa tres anys que té la gent empresonada i que aquí no ha passat res. I Sánchez es passeja per Europa tan tranquil; encara més, és un golden boy, així és com el veuen a Europa, un paio feminista, d’esquerres i que governa gràcies al suport dels independentistes. Aquí hi ha una mica la dialèctica de l’amo i l’esclau de Hegel. És a dir, fem una política basada en una racionalitat que no existeix, que es basa en allò de si jo et dono suport tu em donaràs suport. Jo et reconec i tu a canvi també em reconeixes. Però això no passarà, crec. Hem d’assumir des de l’independentisme que som l’enemic de l’estat, i l’estat, que és molt primitiu en aquest cas, no pactarà amb enemics.

—Dins l’independentisme no tothom ho veu igual ara això.

—Una de les coses que hauria de discutir un estat major –no els partits ni el govern– és si en una circumstància crítica per al moviment cal investir aquest senyor o no, o si li retirem el suport o no. Discutir-ho tranquil·lament, en un espai protegit. El Consell per la República no vol influir en la política quotidiana, ja sabem que tothom fa tant com pot. Però si volem gestionar quelcom més que una autonomia, ens hem d’entendre en les coses fonamentals i arribar a acords estratègics. Avui m’atreviria a dir que el problema principal no és l’estat, sinó nosaltres mateixos.