Cercar en aquest blog

Compte enrere

17 d’ag. 2017

Reglament Parlament 2017

L'esmena al reglament el Parlament de Catalunya enviada al Tribunal Constitucional

*** Per llegir la resta de l'entrada, cliqueu a "Més informació" *****

16 d’ag. 2017

UCE 2017 8 - Lleis TC


Lleis del Parlament de Catalunya recorregudes per l'Estat davant del Tribunal Constitucional

 

Nota: La Llei d'Educació de Catalunya (2009) també està pendent de la resolució pel Tribunal Constitucional del recurs presentat per més de 50 diputats del PP al Congrés. Text de la Llei
http://dogc.gencat.cat/ca/pdogc_canals_interns/pdogc_resultats_fitxa/?documentId=480169&language=ca_ES&action=fitxa
Titol II, a sota.
 


4 de juliol de 2017

"El Tribunal Constitucional espanyol ha resolt diversos recursos presentats pel PP i per la defensora del poble espanyol contra lleis que protegeixen l’ús del català a Catalunya. Concretament, ha emès sentència sobre els recursos contra la llei del cinema català (un recurs pendent de resoldre des del 2010), la llei de consum de Catalunya, la llei d’acollida d’immigrants i la llei audiovisual de Catalunya.


Els magistrats declaren nul el precepte de la llei d’acollida que estipulava que calia donar als immigrants formació en llengua catalana abans que castellana, adduint que aquest punt de la llei condicionava l’aprenentatge de castellà. 
Pel que fa al codi de consum, el TC considera que la norma és constitucional sempre que no s’exigeixi a les empreses privades el mateix grau de compliment que a les administracions a l’hora d’atendre els ciutadans en la llengua oficial que elegeixin.
Pel que fa al cinema, també avala la normativa sempre que l’obligació de doblatge o subtitulació no superi el 25% de la producció total de films, i no el 50% que constava en la llei, un percentatge que el TC considera ‘desproporcionat’. 
I pel que fa a la llei de l’audiovisual estableix que la preeminència del català als mitjans de comunicació públics és constitucional ‘sempre que no impliqui l’exclusió del castellà’."


Llei d'Educació de Catalunya (2009)

Títol II

Del règim lingüístic del sistema educatiu de Catalunya


Article 9

Règim lingüístic

1. El règim lingüístic del sistema educatiu es regeix pels principis que estableix aquest títol i per les disposicions reglamentàries de desplegament dictades pel Govern de la Generalitat.

2. Correspon al Govern, d'acord amb l'article 53, determinar el currículum de l'ensenyament de les llengües, que comprèn els objectius, els continguts, els criteris d'avaluació i la regulació del marc horari.


Article 10

Dret i deure de conèixer les llengües oficials

1. Els currículums han de garantir el ple domini de les llengües oficials catalana i castellana en finalitzar l'ensenyament obligatori, d'acord amb el Marc europeu comú de referència per a l'aprenentatge, l'ensenyament i l'avaluació de les llengües.

2. Els alumnes que s'incorporin al sistema educatiu sense conèixer una de les dues llengües oficials tenen dret a rebre un suport lingüístic específic. Els centres han de proporcionar als alumnes nouvinguts una acollida personalitzada i, en particular, una atenció lingüística que els permeti iniciar l'aprenentatge en català. Així mateix, els centres han de programar les activitats necessàries per a garantir que tots els alumnes millorin progressivament el coneixement de les dues llengües oficials i que hi hagi concordança entre les accions acadèmiques de suport lingüístic i les pràctiques lingüístiques del professorat i altre personal del centre.

3. Els currículums aprovats pel Govern per als ensenyaments de formació professional i els ensenyaments de règim especial, llevat de l'ensenyament d'idiomes, han de garantir que els alumnes adquireixin la competència lingüística instrumental pròpia de l'ensenyament i l'àmbit professional respectius.

4. El Govern, a fi de facilitar a la població no escolar l'exercici del dret i el compliment del deure de conèixer el català, ha de garantir, d'acord amb el que estableix l'article 6.2 de l'Estatut, una oferta suficient d'ensenyament del català.


Article 11

El català, llengua vehicular i d'aprenentatge

1. El català, com a llengua pròpia de Catalunya, és la llengua normalment emprada com a llengua vehicular i d'aprenentatge del sistema educatiu.

2. Les activitats educatives, tant les orals com les escrites, el material didàctic i els llibres de text, i també les activitats d'avaluació de les àrees, les matèries i els mòduls del currículum, han d'ésser normalment en català, excepte en el cas de les matèries de llengua i literatura castellanes i de llengua estrangera, i sens perjudici del que estableixen els articles 12 i 14.

3. Els alumnes no poden ésser separats en centres ni en grups classe diferents per raó de llur llengua habitual.

4. En el curs escolar en què els alumnes iniciïn el primer ensenyament, les mares, els pares o els tutors dels alumnes la llengua habitual dels quals sigui el castellà poden instar, en el moment de la matrícula, i d'acord amb el procediment que estableixi el Departament, que llurs fills hi rebin atenció lingüística individualitzada en aquesta llengua.


Article 12

Llengües estrangeres

1. Els currículums aprovats pel Govern han d'incloure l'ensenyament de, com a mínim, una llengua estrangera, amb l'objectiu que els alumnes adquireixin les competències d'escoltar, llegir, conversar, parlar i escriure, d'acord amb el Marc europeu comú de referència per a l'aprenentatge, l'ensenyament i l'avaluació de les llengües.

2. El projecte lingüístic ha de determinar, d'acord amb les prescripcions del Departament, quina llengua estrangera s'imparteix com a primera llengua estrangera i quina, o quines, com a segona.

3. El projecte lingüístic pot determinar els criteris per a impartir continguts curriculars i altres activitats educatives en alguna de les llengües estrangeres. En el primer supòsit, es requereix autorització del Departament.


Article 13

Competència lingüística del professorat, dels professionals d'atenció educativa i del personal d'administració i serveis

1. Els mestres i els professors de tots els centres han de tenir la titulació requerida i han d'acreditar, en la forma que es determini per reglament, el domini de les dues llengües oficials, de manera que en puguin fer un ús adequat, tant oral com escrit, en l'exercici de la funció docent. Els mestres i els professors, en l'exercici de llur funció, han d'emprar normalment el català, tant en les activitats d'ensenyament i aprenentatge com en l'àmbit general del centre.

2. El Departament ha d'adoptar les mesures necessàries per a actualitzar la competència lingüística del professorat i ha de promoure la creació i la utilització d'eines didàctiques que facilitin l'ensenyament del català i en català.

3. Els professionals d'atenció educativa i el personal d'administració i serveis dels centres educatius han de conèixer el català i el castellà, de manera que estiguin en condicions de fer-ne un ús adequat en l'exercici de les funcions corresponents. El Departament ha d'establir els mecanismes i les condicions que permetin assegurar el coneixement i el domini del català i del castellà del personal no docent de l'Administració educativa.


Article 14

Projecte lingüístic

1. Els centres públics i els centres privats sostinguts amb fons públics han d'elaborar, com a part del projecte educatiu, un projecte lingüístic que emmarqui el tractament de les llengües al centre.

2. El projecte lingüístic ha d'incloure els aspectes relatius a l'ensenyament i a l'ús de les llengües en el centre, entre els quals hi ha d'haver en tot cas els següents:

a) El tractament del català com a llengua vehicular i d'aprenentatge.

b) El procés d'ensenyament i d'aprenentatge del castellà.

c) Les diverses opcions amb relació a les llengües estrangeres.

d) Els criteris generals per a les adequacions del procés d'ensenyament de les llengües, tant globalment com individualment, a la realitat sociolingüística del centre.

e) La continuïtat i la coherència educatives, pel que fa als usos lingüístics, en els serveis escolars i en les activitats organitzades per les associacions de mares i pares d'alumnes.


Article 15

Programes d'immersió lingüística

1. El Departament, per tal que el català mantingui la funció de llengua de referència i de factor de cohesió social, ha d'implantar estratègies educatives d'immersió lingüística que n'assegurin l'ús intensiu com a llengua vehicular d'ensenyament i d'aprenentatge. La definició d'aquestes estratègies ha de tenir en compte la realitat sociolingüística, la llengua o les llengües dels alumnes i el procés d'ensenyament del castellà.

2. Els centres han d'adaptar els horaris a les característiques dels programes d'immersió lingüística, tenint en compte el nombre d'hores de les àrees lingüístiques que s'hagin d'impartir al llarg de l'etapa.


Article 16

El català, llengua oficial de l'Administració educativa a Catalunya

1. El català, com a llengua pròpia de Catalunya, ho és també de l'Administració educativa.

2. L'Administració educativa i els centres han d'emprar normalment el català tant en les relacions internes com en les que mantinguin entre si, amb les administracions públiques de Catalunya i de la resta del domini lingüístic català i amb els ens públics que en depenen. El català ha d'ésser també la llengua d'ús normal per a la prestació dels serveis contractats pel Departament.

3. Les actuacions administratives de règim interior dels centres s'han de fer normalment en català, sens perjudici del que estableix la Llei de política lingüística.

4. Els centres han d'expedir la documentació acadèmica en català, sens perjudici del que estableix la Llei de política lingüística. La documentació acadèmica que hagi de tenir efectes a l'àmbit de l'Administració de l'Estat o en una comunitat autònoma de fora del domini lingüístic català, ha d'ésser bilingüe, en català i en castellà.

5. Les llengües no oficials es poden emprar en les comunicacions per a l'acollida de persones nouvingudes. En aquest cas, els escrits han d'anar acompanyats del text original en català, que serà sempre la versió preferent.


Article 17

Règim lingüístic als centres educatius de l'Aran

1. L'occità, denominat aranès a l'Aran, és la llengua pròpia d'aquest territori, d'acord amb l'article 6.5 de l'Estatut, i com a tal és la llengua vehicular i d'aprenentatge habitual als centres educatius de l'Aran.

2. Totes les referències que fa aquest títol al català com a llengua pròpia de l'ensenyament a Catalunya, s'estenen a l'occità per als centres educatius de l'Aran.

3. Els projectes lingüístics dels centres educatius de l'Aran han de garantir, així mateix, una presència adequada del català i que els alumnes adquireixin el ple domini del català i del castellà en finalitzar l'ensenyament obligatori.

4. Les referències a la competència lingüística del professorat i altre personal dels centres educatius de l'Aran s'estenen a l'occità.

5. Les disposicions d'aquest títol relatives a programes d'immersió lingüística, a l'atenció lingüística individualitzada i a la llengua de l'Administració educativa s'han d'adaptar a l'Aran a la condició de llengua pròpia de l'Aran i oficial a Catalunya que l'Estatut atribueix a l'occità.


Article 18

Ús i foment del català

1. Amb la finalitat de fer present el caràcter vehicular del català en les manifestacions culturals públiques, en els centres educatius públics i en els centres educatius privats sostinguts amb fons públics el català ha d'ésser normalment el vehicle d'expressió en les activitats de projecció externa.

2. Per tal d'aconseguir la cohesió social i la continuïtat educativa en l'ensenyament i l'ús del català, els centres educatius públics i els centres educatius privats sostinguts amb fons públics han de coordinar llurs actuacions amb les institucions i les entitats de l'entorn.

3. El Govern ha de promoure i donar suport a centres educatius a l'exterior en el marc més ampli de la projecció internacional de la cultura i la llengua catalanes i ha de contribuir a sostenir-los, especialment en els territoris amb vincles històrics, lingüístics i culturals amb Catalunya.

4. Amb la finalitat de promoure els centres educatius a què es refereix l'apartat 3, el Govern pot formalitzar acords de cooperació amb les institucions i entitats dels territoris i països on es trobin aquests centres i, si escau, pot proposar a l'Estat la subscripció de convenis en aquesta matèria.


L´obligació de fer el 25% de classes en castellà arribarà al Tribunal Suprem


El Govern té previst recórrer l'última sentència del TSJC que l'obliga a complir amb la quota

30 d'abril de 2014
"El Govern té previst recórrer al Tribunal Suprem (TS) la decisió del Tribunal Superior de Justícia de Catalunya (TSJC) que obliga a impartir un 25% de les assignatures en castellà en aquelles aules on un sol alumne ho demani. La consellera d'Ensenyament, Irene Rigau, ho ha dit aquest dimecres després de conèixer les interlocutòries del TSJC, sobre les quals s'ha mostrat "sorpresa" per la rapidesa de la decisió. En el recurs, el Departament demanarà que se suspengui cautelarment la decisió, en espera de la sentència del Tribunal Constitucional sobre la matèria."
http://www.diaridegirona.cat/catalunya/2014/04/30/lobligacio-fer-25-classes-castella/667497.html
  


El Suprem avala el 25% de l'ús del castellà a dues escoles on les famílies n'havien sol·licitat un 50%

8 de maig de 2017

El Tribunal Suprem (TS) ha avalat la decisió que va adoptar el Tribunal Superior de Justícia de Catalunya (TSJC) de fixar en un 25% l'ús del castellà a dues escoles catalanes, les Escolàpies de Sabadell i l'institut Alba del Vallès a Sant Fost de Campsentelles. Els familiars dels dos alumnes -el de Sant Fost ja ha acabat l'educació obligatòria- van decidir recórrer al Suprem per demanar que s'incrementessin les classes en castellà fins a un 50% mentre que la Generalitat va sol·licitar que es retirés el 25% fixat per TSJC.

En dues sentències del 23 i 28 d'abril (que es van deliberar el 14 d'abril), els magistrats rebutgen els recursos de les dues parts i argumenten els motius pels què consideren "raonable i proporcionat" el percentatge del 25% d'hores lectives en castellà.  
Segons la Sala, aquest barem s'adequa al contingut de la sentència que va obligar a la Generalitat a impartir classes en castellà i és "ajustat a la consecució de l'efectivitat de l'ensenyament del castellà". 
Per aquest motiu desestima els recursos dels dos pares que demanaven que la proporció fos del 50% perquè considera que conclouen erròniament que en aquella sentència s'establia que la normalització lingüística s'havia assolit plenament a Catalunya, i que per tant les dues llengües s'havien d'impartir en la mateixa proporció. 
El Suprem també desestima el recurs de la Generalitat que considerava que el TSJC havia suplantat les seves competències en fixar un percentatge concret. Segons els magistrats, el TSJC va haver de "suplir" l'incompliment de l'Administració, "que ha desistit d'aquesta potestat i que desatès els successius requeriments de la Sala per executar la sentència". 
Per aquest motiu, segons el Suprem, el fet que el TSJC fixés un percentatge "no constitueix una inaplicació dels preceptes corresponents a l'Estatut d'autonomia i la llei catalana d'educació", sinó que només busca "donar compliment als mateixos en els termes que se segueixen de la doctrina del Tribunal Constitucional". 
En aquest sentit, el Suprem afirma que el TSJC va atorgar a la Generalitat de Catalunya "diverses i reiterades oportunitats per dur a efecte el que s'havia ordenat a la sentència" perquè garantís l'establiment del castellà com a llengua vehicular.  
Recorda que a l'últim requeriment del 14 de novembre del 2013, el TSJC va incidir en la necessitat que l'Administració fixés aquest percentatge i va advertir que, si no ho feia, seria el mateix TSJC qui l'establís, que "és el que finalment va passar".  
El Suprem va més enllà d'avalar el percentatge del 25% i assegura que cal incloure a les aules catalanes "una altra matèria o assignatura de caràcter troncal" en castellà, perquè amb el model actual el castellà queda reduït a "l'objecte d'estudi d'una assignatura més", quan cal que sigui llengua "vehicular".  
Els magistrats també rebutgen l'atenció individualitzada que proposava la Generalitat per donar compliment a la sentència. Recorden que el Suprem ja ha negat aquesta possibilitat "reiteradament" perquè "condueix a una situació de discriminació pràcticament idèntica a la separació en grup per raó de la llengua habitual".
Rigau: "No té impacte sobre tot el sistema educatiu"
La consellera d'Ensenyament, Irene Rigau, que ha conegut la decisió del Suprem mentre realitzava una roda de premsa ha insistit aquest divendres que el que fa el TS és avalar la postura del TSJC  a "dos casos particulars". "No té impacte sobre tot el sistema", ha deixat clar la consellera. A més, Rigau ha matisat que el Suprem li correspon atendre casos particular però en cap cas "pot canviar un model lingüístic fixat per una llei aprovada al Parlament de Catalunya".

Funció pública

1. Catalunya.
Pel que fa a la Generalitat de Catalunya, la sentència del Tribunal Constitucional 46/1991, de 28 de febrer, reconeix la constitucionalitat de l'article 34 de la Llei17/1985, de 23 de juliol, de la funció pública de l'Administració de la Generalitat. Aquest article estableix que l'Administració de la Generalitat selecciona tot el seu personal amb criteris d'objectivitat, en funció dels principis d'igualtat, mèrit i capacitat dels aspirants i que en el procés de selecció s'ha d'acreditar el coneixement de la llengua catalana, tant en l'expressió oral com en l'escrita. La sentència del Tribunal Constitucional reconeix que aquesta exigència és imprescindible perquè el personal de l'Administració pugui exercir adequadament la seva feina i que s'ha d'aplicar amb proporcionalitat...
http://www.raco.cat/index.php/LlenguaUs/article/viewFile/129357/178669

2. "El TC avala que el català no sigui un requisit per als funcionaris balears 
2 d'octubre de 2013
El Tribunal Constitucional (TC) ha tombat el recurs presentat pel PSOE i ha avalat la Llei reguladora de la funció pública de les Illes Balears que elimina l'exigència general d'un determinat nivell de coneixement del català com a requisit per accedir a l'administració. El tribunal considera que no és inconstitucional establir el català com a mèrit i que “no existeix discriminació per la inexistència de tracte preferent del castellà sobre el català”. A més, considera que la reforma de la llei s'ha fet en un context “d'àmplia implantació del coneixement del català en la funció pública”. La decisió s'ha pres per majoria, amb un TC molt dividit, amb el vot discrepant de 4 dels 10 magistrats del ple..."
http://www.elpuntavui.cat/politica/article/17-politica/682154-el-tc-avala-que-el-catala-no-sigui-un-requisit-per-als-funcionaris-balears.html

UCE 2017 7 - Pons.html

LA LLENGUA EN LA SENTÈNCIA DE 28 DE JUNY DE 2010
Eva Pons Parera
http://revistes.eapc.gencat.cat/index.php/rcdp/article/download/149/especial-sentencia-ca.pdf

***** Clica a "Més informació" per a llegir la resta de l'entrada *****

UCE 2017 3 - Revista Catalana de Dret Públic 2010

Especial Sentència 31/2010 del Tribunal Constitucional, sobre l’Estatut d’autonomia de Catalunya de 2006. Revista Catalana de Dret Públic, Escola d'Administració Pública de Catalunya. ISSN 1885-8252
http://revistes.eapc.gencat.cat/index.php/rcdp/issue/view/23

***** Clica a "Més informació" per a llegir la resta de l'entrada *****

UCE 2017 6 - Pla Boix

EL RÈGIM LINGÜÍSTIC EN LA SENTÈNCIA 31/2010, DE 28 DE JUNY
Anna M. Pla Boix
http://revistes.eapc.gencat.cat/index.php/rcdp/article/view/149/especial-sentencia-ca.pdf

***** Clica a "Més informació" per a llegir la resta de l'entrada *****

UCE 2017 5 - Muro

VALORACIÓ DELS ASPECTES RELATIUS A LA LLENGUA EN LA SENTÈNCIA DEL TRIBUNAL CONSTITUCIONAL 31/2010, DE 28 DE JUNY, SOBRE L’ESTATUT D’AUTONOMIA DE CATALUNYA
Xavier Muro Bas

***** Clica a "Més informació" per a llegir la resta de l'entrada *****

UCE 2017 4 - Milian

EL RÈGIM DE LES LLENGÜES OFICIALS. COMENTARI A LA SENTÈNCIA DEL TRIBUNAL CONSTITUCIONAL 31/2010, DE 28 DE JUNY
Antoni Milian i Massana

***** Clica a "Més informació" per a llegir la resta de l'entrada *****

14 d’ag. 2017

UCE 2017 1 - Index i Textos

De manifest en manifest. L'evolució social de la llengua catalana i de les perspectives de normalització.

Miquel Strubell

***** Clica a "Més informació" per a llegir la resta de l'entrada *****

9 d’ag. 2017

APPEAL TO THE UNITED NATIONS 1945


This is the text addressed by the Catalan National Council, in exile, to the United Nations Conference in San Francisco, April 1945. We still await a suitable reply.

*** Click below on "Més informació" to open the rest of the post ***

2 d’ag. 2017

22 de jul. 2017

Editorial, by Vicent Partal (VilaWeb, 21 July)

Let's understand them: they're scared

Yesterday we saw two crossed - and very significant - photographs, about the day that is clearly being set as the most important day in the recent history of Catalonia: October 1st. 


************Click on "Més Informació" to read the rest of this post ****************

14 de jul. 2017

Catalan Referendum Bill

This is an UNOFFICIAL translation into English of the draft Referendum bill disseminated in early July 2017. Author Mark McNaught, with Michael Strubell.
The English translation, in some places (marked in red) is not literal, but rather attempts to convey the information in a more comprehensible way. We invite the drafters to consider these alternatives.

************Click on "Més Informació" to read the rest of this post ****************

10 de jul. 2017

vocabulary

Here is a list of words that keep cropping up in Catalan (and often Spanish) texts, and that need good translations into English, for obvious reasons.

************Click on "Més Informació" to read the rest of this post ****************

23 de juny 2017

Freedom of speech and the 2015 "Copa Del Rey" Final

Catalan football supporters have been booing the King and the National Anthem since the twenties! More recently ....

************Click on "Més Informació" to read the rest of this post ****************

19 de juny 2017

Catalonia and US diplomacy during the Spanish Civil War

Results of search: https://history.state.gov/search?q=Franco&volume-id=frus1945Berlinv01

Here is a selection of relevant texts:

************Click on "Més Informació" to read the rest of this post ****************

Franco and US diplomacy during and after the Spanish Civil War



https://history.state.gov/search?q=Franco&volume-id=frus1945Berlinv01&volume-id=frus1945Berlinv02

n=42


1945
 No. 1177 Proposal by the Soviet Delegation (The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945)
... 1. that the regime of Franco originated not as a result of the ......e fascist regime of Franco; 2. ...... 2. that the regime of Franco constitutes a grave danger to the ...... that in the face of brutal terror instituted by Franco the Spanish people have ...... repeatedly expressed themselves against the regime of Franco and in favour of the ...... to break off all relations with the Government of Franco; 2. ... 
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945Berlinv02/d1177

 No. 1176 The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Acting Secretary of State (The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945) ... as in much doubt how to handle Franco. Franco’s latest moves ......doubt how to handle Franco. Franco’s latest moves considered by...... unencouraging and it seems to be feared Franco by holding on will play Spain into Soviet hands. ...... renewed radio campaign against Franco which now features, Garran s... https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945Berlinv02/d1176

 No. 1179 Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the Central Secretariat (Yost) (The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945)
...l diplomatic relations with the Franco Government and to support the democratic forces ......position that the regime ofFranco was gaining strength, that i...... short of force to oust the Franco regime would not be interven...... intervention in the internal affairs of Spain since Franco had been installed by external ......at it was not the fact that the Franco regime was a dictatorship to......g diplomatic relations with Franco, they urged that the Confere......of the three governments on the Francoregime. They finally accepte......nment had a strong distaste for Franco and that he, Churchill, had ...... however, breaking diplomatic relations with the Franco Government on the grounds that ...... rally the Spaniards behind Franco. Furthermore, we should be i... https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945Berlinv02/d1179

 The Assistant to the Secretary of State (Bohlen) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn) (The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945) ... (4) Franco Regime. ......viet Government the Franco Government was not native to Spain ......sed whereby the FrancoRegime would be ... https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945Berlinv02/d710a-6

No. 1352 The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Acting Secretary of State (The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945)
 ... evidently believes Soviet Govt out to embarrass Franco to fullest and has noted ......lest and has noted anti-Franco Soviet broadcasts recent...
 https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945Berlinv02/d1352

Cohen Notes (The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945)
... government have strong distaste for General Franco and the government of Spain, All I ......nt of Spain, All I said for Franco was that there was more ......han drawing cartoons of Franco. But I view with disgust......five or six years ago. When Franco asked me to line up agai...... difficulty. The course suggested would strengthen Franco’s position, and he has an ...... their internal affairs. At the present time Franco’s powers are undermined. We ......irs. Truman: I have no love for Franco. I have no desire to get ...... in Spain. Truman: No. Franco is weakening. Stalin: Franco......o. Franco is weakening. Stalin: Francois gaining strength. He is encouraging ...
 https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945Berlinv02/d710a-29

No. 663 The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State (The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945)
...a situation from which only Franco can profit. (Sent Dept as ... 
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945Berlinv01/d663

No. 664 The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State (The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945) ... embarrass by every possible means the Franco regime in Spain and to g......subversive campaign against Franco Spain. The Amer delegation believes this ... https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945Berlinv01/d664

Thompson Minutes (The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945)

Another question which the Soviet delegation wished to discuss was that of Franco Spain. The Spanish regime did not originate in Spain but was imported and forced on the Spanish people by Germany and Italy. It was a danger to the United Nations and he thought it would be well to create conditions which would enable the Spanish people to establish the regime they want.
Churchill said they were only discussing the agenda. He agreed that this item should go on the agenda.
Mr. Attlee said he would be very happy to see this item go on the agenda.
...
At 6:55 p.m. See Log, antep. 13. The following manuscript notes by Truman appear on a separate page following the record of this meeting:
...
“Spain. Franco Regime should be ended...
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945Berlinv02/d710a-9

Thompson Minutes (The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945)

The Spanish Question
Mr. Eden said that the next question on the agenda was that of Spain.
Stalin said the Soviet proposals17 had already been submitted and he had nothing to add.
Churchill said that his Government had a strong distaste for General Franco and the government of his country. He had been misrepresented as having been friendly to this gentleman. All he had said was that there was more to Spanish policy than drawing rude cartoons of Franco. The taking out of jail prisoners who had been in jail for years and shooting them for what had happened long before indicated that Spain was not a democracy in accordance with British ideas on that subject. Therefore, when Franco had written him a letter proposing that he and Churchill organize the western states against that terrible country, Russia, he had, with the approval of the British Cabinet, sent him a chilly reply. Mr. Molotov would remember that he had sent him a copy of this reply and a reply [copy?] had also been sent to the President.18 British feeling was against the Franco regime.
Stalin stated that they had received the copy of the British reply.
[Page 123]
Churchill said that he saw some difficulty in Stalin’s proposal, particularly in the first paragraph concerning the breaking off of all relations with Franco Spain. It seemed to him that taking such a step in regard to a nation having a character like that of Spain, which was proud and touchy, might rally around Franco those elements now deserting him and making his position more precarious. The breaking of relations was not a satisfactory process. It would be a pleasure to do so but after that they would have no contact. Ambassadors were needed most of all in times of difficulty. If they took such action as this it would be a shock.
The result might strengthen Franco’s position. He has an army although it was not very good. If this action resulted in strengthening him, it would be necessary to consider whether to take a rebuff or to intervene with force. He was against the use of force. He was against interfering with countries which had a different regime unless we are molested by them. In the countries which we control, we have, of course, set up democratic governments. Insofar as the liberated areas are concerned, we cannot allow a Fascist regime to be set up. With respect to the countries which have not taken part in this war, however, there should be no exchange of cannon fire. His Majesty’s Government would have to give prolonged consideration to Stalin’s proposals to break relations with Spain. He was prepared to take every measure by all proper diplomatic means to speed the departing guest.
The breaking of relations with a state because of its internal conduct of affairs was a dangerous principle. He added that he would greatly deplore anything which would lead Spain to civil war. Spain had suffered terribly from its civil warin which two million people had been killed. The British would be sorry to intervene as a government in an active manner in the Spanish affair at this juncture. Forces there were working for a change for the better.
He pointed out that the World Organization which had just been agreed upon at San Francisco had a provision against interference in domestic affairs.19 While they were preparing to ratify the charter drawn up at San Francisco, it would be inconsistent to resort to action which would be prohibited under it.
The President said that he had no love for Franco. He had no desire to have any part in starting another civil war in Spain. There had been enough wars in Europe. He would be happy to recognize another government in Spain but he thought that Spain itself must settle that question.
[Page 124]
Stalin observed that this meant that everything would be unchanged in Spain. In his opinion, the regime of Franco was gaining strength. It was feeding semi-fascist regimes in other countries. Reference had been made to internal affairs. This was not an internal affair. The Spanish regime had been imposed on the Spanish people by Hitler and Mussolini whose regimes they were in the process of destroying. He believed that his colleagues had no love for Franco but this should be proved in deeds. He was not proposing military intervention nor that civil war be let loose, but he wished the Spanish people to know that the three Governments had taken a stand on the side of the democratic forces among the Spanish people and that the Spanish people should have ground to believe that they were against Franco. There was a diplomatic means of showing that they were against Franco and that they were for the democratic Spanish people. He said that suppose they assumed that the means of breaking relations was too severe. Was there not a more flexible means of letting the Spanish people know that the three Governments are in sympathy with the Spanish people and not with Franco. It was dangerous to let the Spanish regime remain as it was now. Public opinion in Europe and in America was not in sympathy with Franco and if the three Governments were to pass by in silence this cancer in Europe, it might be considered that they sanctioned Franco. That would be a grave charge.
Churchill observed that the Soviet Union had no relations with Spain now.
Stalin replied that he had the right to raise and settle this question. Why should they be silent. People presumed that the Big Three could settle such a question and he was one of them just as Mr. Churchill was. Must they keep silent about what was going on in Spain, as well as to refrain from action against Spain which was giving shelter to Fascists? They could not shut their eyes to the grave danger of Franco Spain.
Churchill said that individuals were not enjoined by governments from expressing opinions. Also the press, to which Marshal Stalin had referred, spoke very freely on this matter in the Soviet Union as did the British and sometimes the American press. His Majesty’s Government had spoken very frequently to Franco and to his Ambassador.20 They did not like, however, to break relations.
Churchill referred also to the valuable trade relations which Britain maintained with Spain. Spain sent them many useful products and received British manufactured goods in return. This was an old and well established trade. Unless he were convinced that it would bring about the desired result, he did not want this trade stopped. [Page 125]He fully understood the feeling of Marshal StalinFranco had had the audacity to send a Spanish Blue Division to Russia. Russia was in a different position, having been molested. Insofar as the British were concerned in this war, they20a had refrained from taking action against the British at a time when such intervention could have been disastrous.
Churchill continued that during the Torch operation merely opening fire on the ships and Air Corps concentrated in the area of Gibraltar would have done them great harm.
Stalin interrupted to say that the Spaniards were afraid. They would have been doomed if they had dared to take such action.
Churchill continued that they had not been specifically injured by the Spaniards. No one doubted that Marshal Stalin had no love for the Franco regime and he had no doubt that the majority of the English people shared this view. Churchill said he only intended to emphasize that the Russians had been injured in a way in which others had not.
Stalin said he thought that Great Britain had also suffered from Spain, which had provided bases on its shores for German submarines. He considered that all Allied Powers had suffered in this way. He did not wish, however, to look at the question from this point of view. What was important was the danger to Europe. This should be remembered. Some steps should be taken even if the breaking of diplomatic relations was too severe. They should say that they thought that the aspirations of the Spanish people were just. They had only to say this and nothing would be left of Franco. He considered that the Foreign Ministers should consider whether a milder statement could not be agreed upon.
The President stated that he agreed.
Churchill said he was opposed. The matter must be settled at the meeting of the Heads of Government.
Stalin pointed out that it would be settled by them. The Foreign Ministers would only give it preliminary study.
Churchill said he did not think this was advisable. It was a question of principle. To interfere in the domestic affairs of other countries was very dangerous. He might not like some things in the United States, but he did not consider it wise to attempt to intervene.
Stalin said that this was not a question of a domestic affair. The regime of Franco was of external origin.
Churchill rejoined to state that anyone could say this about any country.
Stalin replied that no other country in Europe had such a regime.
Churchill observed that Portugal might be accused of being under a dictatorship.
[Page 126]
Stalin replied that it was not the dictatorship that mattered. The regime in Portugal resulted from internal developments, whereas the regime of Franco resulted from intervention by Hitler and MussoliniFranco’s behavior was provocative. He gave shelter to Nazis.
Churchill said he was not prepared that any government in which he participated should interfere in the internal affairs of other states. This has always been their policy. Moreover, to push things might make matters worse. He would be very glad, although he knew this idea would not be received with enthusiasm, if the regime were overthrown and replaced by a constitutional monarchy with free democratic principles, elections, etc. If, however, he or any British Government pushed this proposal, all would turn against it in Spain. No country likes to be told how it is to be run. There was intervention on both sides in the Spanish civil war. The Soviet Union intervened on one side and then Hitler and Mussolini came in on the other. But that was already long ago. Action taken at this meeting was more likely to rivet Franco in his place. The British Government did not give the slightest support to Franco Spain other than trade, which they have always carried on.
The President stated that he would be happy to have the matter sent to the Foreign Ministers to see if agreement could not be reached.
Stalin said he also fully appreciated the British difficulties, but felt that this matter could be facilitated by action here. He proposed that they prepare an appraisal of the regime of Franco, including observations made by Mr. Churchillon the trend of developments in Spain. This would be one of the items in the declaration to be made on Europe. He assumed that they would have some sort of declaration on the results of their work. This statement on Spain should be included in them. It would not be binding on the British Government. It would be a short statement on the situation in Spain which would make clear to public opinion that their sympathies were with the Spanish people. This was a most mild form—milder than the Yalta Declaration on Yugoslavia21 and Greece.22 He suggested that they let the Foreign Ministers consider what form this declaration could take.
Churchill replied that he had not agreed to any declaration on Spain and he gathered that the President had also not agreed.
Stalin said it was not a question of a declaration on Spain alone, but on all countries.
Churchill said that the line he had taken was that in all countries [Page 127]involved in this war that they should not interfere in their domestic affairs. This was a question of principle. There were many things in regard to Yugoslavia and Rumania which he did not like. They were involved in the war which gave us greater freedom there. He repeated that there was great danger in the intervention in the domestic affairs of other countries. If there were to be a declaration of the principles on which democratic governments were founded—he personally had always liked the statement in the American Constitution—and a statement on what governments had not fulfilled these principles, he could consider it, but he pointed out that many governments in Europe now do not fulfill these principles. He did not know what the Spanish people thought. There were many shades of opinion in Spain. Most of them would doubtless like to get rid of Franco without interference from outsiders.
The President said there appeared to be no chance for agreement at the moment. He suggested that they pass on to something else upon which they could reach a decision and that they come back to the Spanish question at a later session.
Stalin suggested that it be referred to the Foreign Ministers to consider.
Churchill said that this was the point on which they were not in agreement. He did not suggest an adverse decision but merely that they leave it for the moment.
The President said that they could return to it at any time.
Stalin said that he agreed.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945Berlinv02/d710a-28

Thompson Minutes (The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945)

Mr. Byrnes pointed out that the only way in which it was proposed to ease the situation of Italy was to give support to the entry of Italy into the United Nations Organization. In an effort to meet the objections of the Soviet delegation, the United States delegation had submitted language which read, “The conclusion of such a peace treaty with the democratic and responsible Italian Government will make it possible for the three Governments to fulfill their desire to support the admission of Italy into the United Nations Organization.” In the next paragraph referring to Finland, Rumania, Hungary, and Bulgaria the same language was used with regard to Italy and the other satellite states. He also drew attention to the fact that this statement had been used to do what Stalin had asked to be done, namely, express a view upon the Government of Franco. This was set forth in the last paragraph of the statement.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945Berlinv02/d710a-93

Thompson Minutes (The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945)

Mr. Byrnes said that he had advised the meeting of Foreign Ministers that the United States had offered its proposal13 originally in order to give some confidence to Italy. We had asked only for a declaration that the Three Powers support the entry of Italy into the United Nations Organization. The British Delegation had asked that we include neutrals and we had agreed. Then the Soviet Delegation expressed opinions with regard to the Franco Government of Spain and in the hope of getting an agreement we had added to the declaration that we would not support the entry of the Franco Government into the United Nations Organization. Then the Soviet Delegation had asked for the inclusion of the paragraph concerning Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Finland and we had agreed to that. Then the Soviet Delegation had asked that the paragraph regarding Italy be modified to accord with the language used in reference to the other satellite states and we had agreed to that.14 Unfortunately, we had found that if we agreed with the Soviet Delegation, the British Delegation did not agree; if we agreed with the British Delegation, the Soviet Delegation disagreed. It was now up to the Soviet and British Delegations to see if they could get together. If not, we would withdraw our modest request for the entry of Italy into the United Nations Organization.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945Berlinv02/d710a-130

No. 239 Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State (The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945)

No. 239
Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State
[Extracts]
Memorandum of Conversation
Participants:The Spanish Ambassador, Sr. Don Juan Francisco de Cárdenas;
Acting Secretary, Mr. Grew.
The Spanish Ambassador, Mr. de Cárdenas, called on me this afternoon and took up the following matters. …
2. The Ambassador then referred to the action taken with regard to Spain at the San Francisco Conference by which there had been placed on the record the understanding that membership in the world organization would not be open to states whose regimes were established with the help of military forces belonging to the states which have waged war against the United Nations as long as these [Page 302]regimes are in power.1 The Ambassador asked if I was aware of some proposed action by Chile and Uruguay by which they would openly assert the application to Spain of this provision and whether Mr. Armour had recently made some statement on this subject in Madrid. I said I had no information regarding any such action by either Chile and Uruguay or by Armour. In this connection the Ambassador said that he was not speaking under instructions and only as from friend to friend.
. . . . . . .
J[oseph] C. G[rew]
The reference is to the following declaration by the Mexican Delegation at the Third Meeting of Commission I of the United Nations Conference on International Organization on June 19:
“It is the understanding of the Delegation of Mexico that paragraph 2 of Chapter III [of the Charter of the United Nations] cannot be applied to the states whose regimes have been established with the help of military forces belonging to the countries which have waged war against the United Nations, as long as those regimes are in power.”
In presenting this declaration, which was adopted by Commission I, which exercised jurisdiction over questions of membership, the Mexican Delegate referred specifically to the Franco regime in Spain. In the course of the discussion of this declaration, Assistant Secretary of State James Clement Dunn made the following statement for the United States:
“The United States Delegation is in complete accord with the statement of interpretation made by the Delegation of Mexico and desires to associate itself with that declaration.”
See The United Nations Conference on International Organization: Selected Documents, pp. 569–578.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945Berlinv01/d239

No. 983 The Acting Chief of the Division of Economic Security Controls (Oliver) to the Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy (Collado) (The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945) 

No. 983
The Acting Chief of the Division of Economic Security Controls (Oliverto the Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy (Collado)1

secret
44. For Collado from Oliver.
Chief development is that British have agreed to join in warnings to neutrals. Madrid reports that Spanish have instructed Ambassador here2 to take up with Department question of German subsidiaries in Spain which Franco, through Instituto Nacional de Industria, a government development corporation, wishes to acquire. (Reurtel 23 July 163) ...
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945Berlinv02/d983

United States Delegation Memorandum (The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945) 

Summary of Meeting of Foreign Ministers Thursday Morning, July 19
i. agenda of meeting of heads of governments
It was agreed that the following subjects should be recommended to the Heads of Governments for discussion this afternoon:
...
4. Spain.
A Russian paper proposing a policy to be adopted by the three Governments toward the Franco regime has been presented for discussion.6
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945Berlinv02/d710a-22

United States Delegation Memorandum (The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945) 

Pending Problems Before the Conference, Close of Business July 27, 1945
i. problems before the big three
...
7. Spain.
(If the U. S. suggestion is approved that the proposed paper on the Admission to the United Nations3 be dropped, the Soviet proposal for a tripartite statement on the Franco regime4 will still be pending before the Conference.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945Berlinv02/d710a-125

 Bohlen Notes (The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945) 

... S—... Re Franco—I should like to explain—Franco regime not result of internal conditions of Spain—imposed on Spain—by German—Italian—thus a danger to United Nations. This regime harmful—by giving shelter to different Fascist remnants—we thought it proper to break off with present regime & give change.
T—I hold no brief for Franco study
S—right.
...
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945Berlinv02/d710a-5

No. 1418 Memorandum by the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State (Bohlen) (The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945) 

Some reference was made by Molotov to the question of relations with the former Axis satellites and also to the problem of the Franco regime in Spain. There seems here to have been a discussion between Secretary ByrnesMolotov, and Stalin as to how the trusteeship item should be worded on the agenda.
...
Stalin then returned to the question of the Franco regime in Spain. He explained that this regime had not come about as a result of internal conditions but had been imposed by the Germans and the Italians. He felt its continuance was a danger to the United Nations, since it would be disposed to give shelter to fascist remnants. The Soviet Government thought it would be proper to break off relations with the present regime and give the Spanish people a chance to select a government of their choice. The President said he held no brief for Franco and agreed that the matter should be studied.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945Berlinv02/d1418

No. 651 Briefing Book Paper (The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945) 

Top secret
Future Status of the International Zone of Tangier
At the invitation of the French and British Governments we are about to begin informal conversations in Paris with representatives of those two powers regarding the future status of the International Zone of Tangier which was occupied on June 14, 1940, by Spanish military forces in pursuance of a unilateral decision of the Spanish Government. The Spanish Government’s justification of this act, as notified to the interested powers, was stated to be its desire to preserve the neutrality of the Tangier Zone during the war. The Spanish Government has now indicated that it is desirous of regularizing the situation in the Zone and, accordingly, the immediate problem to be discussed is the form which the provisional regime will take, following the departure of the Spanish forces and administration and pending the establishment of a permanent regime for the future. It is expected that an international conference of all the interested powers will be called at some future date to consider the permanent regime of the Zone.
The international regime at Tangier was formulated in the Tangier Statute of 19231 to which the following powers adhered: France, Spain, Great Britain, Portugal[,] the Netherlands, Belgium and Sweden. In 1928 the Statute was amended2 to include Italy as a party. The United States, though invited to do so, did not become a party to the 1923 Statute and has never participated in the administration of the Tangier Zone, in as much as this Government did not feel that the limited representation assigned to the United States was commensurate with the responsibility which it would be forced to assume in [Page 981]connection with the administration of the Zone. However, the leading role which the United States has assumed in world affairs as a result of the war as well as its long continued interest in Morocco and its special position there deriving from a series of treaties to which it is a party,3 makes it logical that we should assume responsibilities in respect of the International Zone of Tangier commensurate with our position as a world Power. Moreover, Tangier’s strategic position on the Straits of Gibraltar makes it an important post-war security problem which cannot fail to be of interest to the United States as a great maritime power.
Soviet Russia has never manifested any interest in the Tangier Zone, and has never had a representative stationed at Tangier, although the Russian Imperial Government prior to 1917 had taken an active part in the formulation of various treaties and conventions concerning Morocco, including the Act of Algeciras of 1906.4
Regardless of its position in the past, however, this Government considers it desirable to notify the Soviet Government concerning the conversations between Great Britain, France and the United States and to keep the Soviet Government informed of developments. If, upon notification of our intention to hold these preliminary conversations with regard to the International regime for Tangier,Russia should express a desire to participate, it should be our policy to admit that country into the discussions on an equal basis. The British Government appears to favor this view also, but there is some hesitation on the part of the French to admit Soviet Russia to the conversations and to active participation in the administration of the Zone, apparently for fear that Russia’s admission will operate to weaken the predominant position that France held prior to the Spanish occupation, and which it hopes to regain. The Spanish Government, in the tradition of the Franco regime, has already voiced its unconditional opposition to Soviet participation in the organization of the International Zone.
The conclusions reached during these conversations will be communicated to the Spanish Government at an early date, when appropriate steps can be taken to effect the transition to a provisional international regime.
 [Washington ,] June 29, 1945.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945Berlinv01/d651 

 No. 671 The Ambassador in Spain (Armour) to the Acting Secretary of State (The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945)

confidential 
us urgent

1475. Although I well understand and thoroughly agree that Soviet Govt should not be permitted to obtain impression that western powers are acting in unilateral manner with regard to Tangier, fail to see how invitation to that govt actively to participate in Tangier conversations at this stage can be justified so long as small powers having legitimate interest [as?] parties to Tangier statute are excluded. (Your 1140, July 52Dept’s statement that it sees “no reason why the small nations should wish to be invited at this time” to participate in conversations I find difficult to understand in light of inescapable interest of such nations in any change in status of a zone in administration of which they were active participants prior to Span occupation, an interest which would moreover be considerably enhanced should it become apparent to them that in their absence conversations would be conducted inter alia by great powers having little or no direct interest in Tangier.
Numbered paragraph 3 of ref teleg would seem to indicate it is Dept’s view Russians should participate as well in proposed interim occupation of Tangier zone. If this is in fact the case 1 feel strongly Dept should be fully aware of possible consequences of such participation on position of Span Govt vis-à-vis Tangier settlement and on our relations with Spain. Although as Dept is well aware 1 hold no brief for present Span regime I consider it unrealistic to overlook fact [Page 1002]that Spain is country with preponderant natural interest in Tangier and that without Span cooperation no solution of Tangier question can be enduring. While Span Govt is willing to terminate its unilateral occupation of Tangier under circumstances which would avoid embarrassment to it, Soviet participation in proposed reoccupation would arouse non-Partisan popular resentment in Spain and preclude possibility of voluntary Span withdrawal, alternative to which might well be serious incident resulting in rapid deterioration of relations between occupying powers (including US) and Spain and strengthening of hand of Falange Extremist elements. In view of increasing tendency on part of our Govt to use Spain as source of supply and base for ATCand other related operations and in view also of importance of Span cooperation in attainment of Safehaven objectives, I assume that neither drastic deterioration of our relations with Spain nor serious internal disorders in this country would be considered to be in our interest.
Although I am hardly in position to pass judgment on Span Govt’s fearful contention that Russia’s entry into Tangier would be opening wedge in campaign to establish Soviet influence in North Africa and western Mediterranean and to replace other foreign spheres of influence in Morocco by means of Communist penetration and unscrupulous use of Moroccan nationalist sentiment, I do consider it entirely probable that as suggested by head of Brit delegation (Paris 4005, July 4 to Dept 3) Russians would take advantage of presence in Tangier at least to carry on activities designed to embarrass and weaken Franco regime. Regardless of dismal view we may take of latter such activities would inevitably contribute to world instability at time when stability is at a premium.
I realize importance of our relations with Russia outweighs that of our relations with Spain but I do not see that that justifies our working to bring about a situation which might in the end place both in jeopardy. I appreciate also that Russia’s vast contribution to victory in Europe entitles her to a major voice in reorganization of liberated Europe but feel it might well be pointed out that Tangier, an integral part of Shereefian Empire, is in no sense a prize of war and is not therefore subject to disposition as such. Should Soviet Govt persist in demanding active participation in interim Tangier regime I believe it would be in our ultimate interest to offer to renounce our own right to such participation in return for similar action on part of Russia, thus leaving actual reoccupation of zone to those powers most directly concerned as parties to Tangier statute.
Rptd London 440, Paris 381, Tangier 81.
Armour
 https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945Berlinv01/d671 

United States Delegation Memorandum (The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945)

ii. problems pending for consideration before the heads of governments or foreign ministers



5.
Admission to the United Nations. A paper10 has been under consideration by the Foreign Ministers and the Big Three expressing the support of the three Governments to the admission to the United Nations Organization of Italy, Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Finland, when peace treaties have been concluded with the recognized governments of those countries, and of neutral countries when they can comply with the requirements for admission to the United Nations, but opposition to the admission of Franco Spain as long as the present regime remains in power. Though general agreement on this paper seems to have been reached it has been referred back to the Foreign Ministers for reexamination.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945Berlinv02/d710a-107

 Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the Central Secretariat (Yost) (The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945)

vi. spain
28. Spain. The Soviets presented a proposal that the Conference recommend to the United Nations that they break off all relations with the Franco Government and support the democratic forces in Spain.
Disposition—The action of the Conference in regard to Spain was limited to the final paragraph of the section of the communiqué entitled “Conclusion of Peace Treaties and Admission to the United Nations Organization”.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945Berlinv02/d710a-166

Cohen Notes (The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945)

Stalin: It would be well for the three delegations to set forth the [Page 61]questions they would like to discuss. Russia would like to discuss (1) the question of the division of the German merchant fleet and navy; (2) the question of reparations; (3) trusteeships for Russia under the San Francisco Charter; (4) relations with the Axis satellite states; (5) Franco regime imposed on Spain by the Axis. This regime should be changed. It harbors great danger to the United Nations.
Churchill: We are only discussing things to go on the agenda. I agree that the matter of Spain should be discussed.
Stalin: (6) the question of Tangier.
Churchill: Mr. Eden has advised me we can reach only provisional agreement on Tangier in the absence of the French.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945Berlinv02/d710a-10

Cohen Notes (The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945)

Byrnes: We submitted the whole paper in amended form. I should like it translated and read to the Marshal. It is an effort to treat Italy and the other satellites on the same basis, and to find a vehicle to condemn Franco’s Spain.
Stalin: The reference to “responsible and democratic government” should be deleted.

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945Berlinv02/d710a-94

Cohen Notes (The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945)

Byrnes: At the meeting of foreign ministers, ... Soviet delegation asked express rejection of Franco’s admission. We agreed. 

No. 1177 Proposal by the Soviet Delegation (The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945)

[Translation]
Spain
Soviet Proposal Presented to Foreign Ministers July 19, 19451
The Soviet Government present for consideration by the Conference the following suggestion.
In view of the fact:
1.
that the regime of Franco originated not as a result of the development of the internal forces in Spain but as a result of the intervention by the principal axis-countries—Hitler Germany and fascist Italy which imposed upon the Spanish people the fascist regime of Franco;
2.
that the regime of Franco constitutes a grave danger to the freedom-loving nations in Europe and South America;
3.
that in the face of brutal terror instituted by Franco the Spanish people have repeatedly expressed themselves against the regime of Franco and in favour of the restoration of democratic government in Spain,
The Conference deems it necessary to recommend to the United Nations:
1.
to break off all relations with the Government of Franco;
2.
to render support to the democratic forces in Spain and to enable the Spanish people to establish such a regime as will respond to their will.
  1. Attachment 2 to the minutes of the Second Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, July 19. See antep. 106.

 List of persons mentioned (The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945)
... Franco y Bahamonde , Generalissimo Fran... https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945Berlinv01/persons

List of Persons Mentioned (The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945) ...retary, American Embassy, Belgrade. Franco y Bahamonde, General... https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945Berlinv02/persons-mentioned

List of Papers (The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945)
... of diplomatic relations with the Franco government in Spain and the rendering of support ... https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945Berlinv02/toc-papers 


***********************

No. 1176The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Acting Secretary of State (The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945)

... as in much doubt how to handle Franco. Franco’s latest moves ......doubt how to handle Franco. Franco’s latest moves considered by...... unencouraging and it seems to be feared Franco by holding on will play Spain into Soviet hands. ...... renewed radio campaign against Franco which now features, Garran s...

No. 1179Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the Central Secretariat (Yost) (The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945)

...l diplomatic relations with the Franco Government and to support the democratic forces ......position that the regime ofFranco was gaining strength, that i...... short of force to oust the Franco regime would not be interven...... intervention in the internal affairs of Spain since Franco had been installed by external ......at it was not the fact that the Franco regime was a dictatorship to......g diplomatic relations with Franco, they urged that the Confere......of the three governments on the Francoregime. They finally accepte......nment had a strong distaste for Franco and that he, Churchill, had ...... however, breaking diplomatic relations with the Franco Government on the grounds that ...... rally the Spaniards behind Franco. Furthermore, we should be i...

The Assistant to the Secretary of State (Bohlen) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn) (The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945)

... (4) Franco Regime. ......viet Government the Franco Government was not native to Spain ......sed whereby the FrancoRegime would be ...

No. 1352The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Acting Secretary of State (The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945)

... evidently believes Soviet Govt out to embarrass Franco to fullest and has noted ......lest and has noted anti-Franco Soviet broadcasts recent...

Cohen Notes (The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945)

... government have strong distaste for General Franco and the government of Spain, All I ......nt of Spain, All I said for Franco was that there was more ......han drawing cartoons of Franco. But I view with disgust......five or six years ago. When Franco asked me to line up agai...... difficulty. The course suggested would strengthen Franco’s position, and he has an ...... their internal affairs. At the present time Franco’s powers are undermined. We ......irs. Truman: I have no love for Franco. I have no desire to get ...... in Spain. Truman: No. Franco is weakening. Stalin: Franco......o. Franco is weakening. Stalin: Francois gaining strength. He is encouraging ...

No. 636 Briefing Book Paper (The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945)

...g progress toward a general Franco-British treaty of alliance. ...... treaty regulating Franco-Levantine relations. ......ted. that a solution to the Franco-Levant problem be sought in conversations ...... settlement could not be sought in exclusively Franco-British conversations, a...... represented at any conference convened to settle the Franco-Syrian dispute. Our repl......ted. The French desire: (1) Franco-British negotiations on the immediate aspects of the pro...

No. 663 The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State (The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945)

...a situation from which only Franco can profit. (Sent Dept as ...

No. 664 The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State (The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945)

... embarrass by every possible means the Franco regime in Spain and to g......subversive campaign against Franco Spain. The Amer delegation believes this ...

Thompson Minutes (The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945)

...strong distaste for General Franco and the government of hi......rawing rude cartoons of Franco. The taking out of jail ......at subject. Therefore, when Franco had written him a letter......feeling was against the Franco regime. Stalin stated that t......g off of all relations with Franco Spain. It seemed to him ...... touchy, might rally around Franco those elements now deserting him and making ......ck. The result might strengthen Franco’s position. He has an army although it was ......that he had no love for Franco. He had no desire to hav...... would be unchanged in Spain. In his opinion, the regime of Franco was gaining strength. It ...

No. 239Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State (The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945)

... specifically to the Franco regime in Spain. In the ...

No. 983The Acting Chief of the Division of Economic Security Controls (Oliver) to the Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy (Collado) (The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945)

...idiaries in Spain which Franco, through Instituto Nacio...

No. 639 The Minister in Lebanon (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State ad interim (The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945)

... was that basic issue of future Franco-Levant treaty relations could ...

United States Delegation Memorandum (The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945)

...hree Governments toward the Franco regime has been presented for ...

United States Delegation Memorandum (The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945)

... proposal for a tripartite statement on the Franco regimeDocument No. ...

Bohlen Notes (The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945)

... T—on ours M—Spain Franco regime T—ready— ...... S—ours in Berlin could not attend. Re Franco—I should like to explain—F. regime not result ......ve change T—I hold no brief for Franco study ...

No. 220 Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff (The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945)

...vy and merchant marine, the Franco regime in Spain, the Polish question, ...

No. 1418 Memorandum by the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State (Bohlen) (The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945)

... and also to the problem of the Franco regime in Spain. There seems......returned to the question of the Franco regime in Spain. He explaine......t said he held no brief for Franco and agreed that the matter s...

No. 651 Briefing Book Paper (The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945)

... Government, in the tradition of the Franco regime, has already voic...

No. 671 The Ambassador in Spain (Armour) to the Acting Secretary of State (The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945)

... activities designed to embarrass and weaken Franco regime. Regardless of di...

Thompson Minutes (The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945)

... Soviet Delegation expressed opinions with regard to the Franco Government of Spain and in ...... that we would not support the entry of the Franco Government into the United ...

United States Delegation Memorandum (The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945)

... United Nations, but opposition to the admission of Franco Spain as long as the ...

Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the Central Secretariat (Yost) (The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945)

... off all relations with the Franco Government and support the democratic forces ...

Thompson Minutes (The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945)

...shed to discuss was that of Franco Spain. The Spanish regim......Austria “Spain. Franco Regime should be ended ...

Contents (The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945)

...e crisis in Franco-Levantine relations ...

Cohen Notes (The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945)

... Axis satellite states; (5) Franco regime imposed on Spain ...

Cohen Notes (The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945)

... asked express rejection of Franco’s admission. We agreed. ...

Cohen Notes (The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945)

... on the same basis, and to find a vehicle to condemn Franco’s Spain. Stalin: The ref...

Index (The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945)

[Back of book index: too many hits to display]

Thompson Minutes (The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945)

... be done, namely, express a view upon the Government of Franco. This was set forth in ...

Index (The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945)

[Back of book index: too many hits to display]

List of persons mentioned (The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945)

... Franco y Bahamonde , Generalissimo Fran...

List of Persons Mentioned (The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945)

...retary, American Embassy, Belgrade. Franco y Bahamonde, General...

List of Papers (The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945)

... of diplomatic relations with the Franco government in Spain and the rendering of support ...