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16 de jul. 2019

Banca Privada d’Andorra 2015-2016

La Banca Privada d'Andorra va ser objecte de nacionalització per pressió dels EE.UU el 2015. Segons declaracions de l'excomissari Villarejo, l'Estat espanyol després d'intentar sense èxit fer xantatge amb el directiu Higini Cierco per aconseguir que falsifiqués comptes bancaris de dirigents catalanistes, va ...
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... aconseguir que els Estats Units s'ensorressin.

15/1/2018: Primer judici del cas de Banca Privada d'Andorra, intervinguda ara fa gairebé 3 anys. Es jutja si existeix una trama internacional de blanqueig de capitals. https://www.ccma.cat/324/primer-judici-del-cas-de-banca-privada-dandorra-intervinguda-ara-fa-gaireb-3-anys/noticia/2831540/

26/4/2019: Drets amplia a l’exministre Fernández Díaz la querella a Andorra per extorsió a la BPA
L'excomissari Villarejo va testificar que la cúpula del Ministeri va ordenar pressionar els germans Cierco per obtenir dades bancàries de polítics independentistes. https://www.vilaweb.cat/noticies/drets-amplia-a-lexministre-fernandez-diaz-la-querella-a-andorra-per-extorsio-a-la-bpa/

16/7/2019: Higini Cierco es querella contra l’ex-cap de govern d’Andorra i dos ex-ministres pel cas BPA. El màxim accionista de l'entitat bancària fins a la seva nacionalització els porta a la justícia perquè considera arbitràries les decisions que van adoptar. https://www.vilaweb.cat/noticies/cierco-querella-cas-bpa/


FinCEN Names Banca Privada d’Andorra a Foreign Financial Institution of Primary Money Laundering Concern 
Contact: Steve Hudak (703) 905-3770
Immediate Release
March 10, 2015
WASHINGTON, DC - The U.S. Department of the Treasury's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) today named Banca Privada d'Andorra (BPA) as a foreign financial institution of primary money laundering concern pursuant to Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act (Section 311) and issued a related Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM). This finding and NPRM are based on information indicating that, for several years, high–level managers at BPA have knowingly facilitated transactions on behalf of third–party money launderers acting on behalf of transnational criminal organizations.
“BPA's corrupt high–level managers and weak anti–money laundering controls have made BPA an easy vehicle for third–party money launderers to funnel proceeds of organized crime, corruption, and human trafficking through the U.S. financial system,” said FinCEN Director Jennifer Shasky Calvery. “Today's announcement is a critical step to address this compromised financial institution's egregious conduct and send a message that the United States will take strong measures to protect the integrity of its financial system from criminal actors.”
Today’s action also highlights the threat posed by third-party money launderers to financial institutions. Transnational criminal organizations often encounter obstacles in achieving direct access to financial institutions internationally and in the United States because of their illicit activities. To obtain access to financial institutions, some transnational criminal organizations use the services of third-party money launderers, including professional gatekeepers such as attorneys and accountants.
BPA's activity of primary money laundering concern occurred largely through its Andorra headquarters. BPA is one of five Andorran banks and is a subsidiary of the BPA Group, a privately–held entity. The activity involved the proceeds of organized criminals in Russia and China, foreign corruption, and other criminal activity. BPA accesses the U.S. financial system through direct correspondent accounts held at four U.S. banks, through which it has processed hundreds of millions of dollars. BPA's high–level managers established financial services tailored to its third–party money launderer clients to disguise the origins of funds. In exchange for some of these services, BPA's high–level managers accepted payments and other benefits from their criminal clients.
FinCEN has delivered to the Federal Register a notice of its finding that explains the basis for this action. In addition, FinCEN has delivered to the Federal Register an NPRM that, if adopted as a final rule, would prohibit covered U.S. financial institutions from opening or maintaining correspondent or payable–through accounts for BPA, and for other foreign banks being used to process transactions involving BPA. The NPRM also proposes to require covered financial institutions to apply special due diligence to their correspondent accounts maintained on behalf of foreign banks to guard against processing any transactions involving BPA. These measures are subject to a 60–day comment period, beginning the day the NPRM is published in the Federal Register.
As part of the notice of its finding, FinCEN's action describes a high–level manager at BPA in Andorra who provided substantial assistance to Andrei Petrov, a third-party money launderer working for Russian criminal organizations engaged in corruption. In February 2013, Spanish law enforcement arrested Petrov for money laundering. Petrov is also suspected to have links to Semion Mogilevich, one of the FBI's “Ten Most Wanted” fugitives.
FinCEN's action also describes the activity of a second high–level manager at BPA in Andorra who accepted exorbitant commissions to process transactions related to Venezuelan third–party money launderers. This activity involved the development of shell companies and complex financial products to siphon off funds from Venezuela's public oil company Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA). BPA processed approximately $2 billion in transactions related to this money laundering scheme.
FinCEN's action also describes the activities of a third high-level manager at BPA in Andorra who accepted bribes in exchange for processing bulk cash transfers for another third–party money launderer, Gao Ping. Ping acted on behalf of a transnational criminal organization engaged in trade–based money laundering and human trafficking and established a relationship with BPA to launder money on behalf of this organization and numerous Spanish businesspersons. Through his associate, Ping paid exorbitant commissions to BPA bank officials to accept cash deposits into less scrutinized accounts and transfer the funds to suspected shell companies in China. Spanish law enforcement arrested Ping in September 2012 for his involvement in money laundering.
Director Calvery recognized the important coordination in this matter with the Department of Justice, Criminal Division, Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section; the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Texas; U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Homeland Security Investigations; and the Internal Revenue Service Criminal Investigation.
“We are seeing an increasing trend where businesses and business professionals are being recruited by transnational criminal organizations to facilitate corrupt practices, such as creating shell corporations and fronts for money laundering and other illegal activity,” said HSI Executive Associate Director Peter Edge. “These corrupt individuals and institutions put profits at a premium and serve as connections between the licit and illicit worlds. Today’s action addresses the vulnerability created by BPA and helps protect the integrity of the international financial system.”
“International financial institutions are welcome to provide a conduit for their customers to utilize American banks, as long as they abide by our laws that govern those transactions,” said Richard Weber, Chief, IRS Criminal Investigation. “However, when senior managers of these institutions turn to corruption and bribery to enrich themselves, they should not be surprised when special agents from IRS CI come knocking at their door. IRS Criminal Investigation will continue to work with law enforcement and financial partners to investigate these institutions and senior officials who misuse their positions of trust to facilitate third-party money launderers acting on behalf of transnational criminal organizations.”
Director Calvery praised the contributions of the Andorran authorities in this investigation and appreciates their commitment to investigating this activity fully.

Notice of Finding that Banca Privada d’Andorra is a Financial Institution of Primary Money Laundering Concern
Notice of Finding that Banca Privada d’Andorra is a Financial Institution of Primary Money Laundering Concern       

Release Date
March 10, 2015

Imposition of Special Measure against Banca Privada d’Andorra as a Financial Institution of Primary Money Laundering Concern
Release Date March 10, 2015

Withdrawal of Finding Regarding Banca Privada d`Andorra 
Release Date
March 01, 2016

Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Regarding Banca Privada d`Andorra
Release Date
February 29, 2016 /March 01, 2016

Notice Regarding the Withdrawals of Findings and Proposed Rulemakings under Section 311
Issued Date February 19, 2016 Banca Privada d’Andorra

FinCEN is withdrawing its finding and proposed rulemaking under Section 311 regarding Banca Privada d’Andorra (BPA), a bank headquartered in Andorra, as BPA no longer operates in a manner that poses a threat to the U.S. financial system. Authorities in Andorra assumed control of BPA management and operations, arrested the chief executive officer on money laundering charges, and are in the final stages of implementing a resolution plan that is isolating the assets, liabilities, and clients of BPA that raise money laundering concerns. Under the resolution plan, the assets, liabilities, and clients of BPA that do not raise money laundering concerns (i.e., the “good assets”) will be transferred to a bridge bank, known as Vall Banc, that is currently under the control of an Andorran government agency, Agència Estatal de Resolució d’Entitats Bancàries (AREB).
FinCEN believes that the steps taken by the Andorran authorities sufficiently protect the U.S. financial system from the money laundering risks previously associated with BPA. Accordingly, FinCEN has determined that BPA is no longer a primary money laundering concern and, therefore, it is not imposing any special measures under Section 311 with respect to BPA. FinCEN also notes that, given the withdrawal of the finding and proposed rule, no special measures under Section 311 would apply with respect to Vall Banc’s financial operations or with respect to the transfer of the good assets from BPA to Vall Banc or AREB.

Withdrawal of Finding and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Regarding Banca Privada d’Andorra


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