Qui està a favor de la independència?

El Centre d'Estudis d'Opinió de la Generalitat de Catalunya encarrega Baròmetres quadrimestrals d'Opinió Política. El darrer Baròmetre, publicat a finals d'octubre de 2017,  ("3a onada 2017) té la referència REO863, i la pàgina web permet fer taules de contingència o encreuaments que donen una visió molt més rica dels resultats globals. Recordem que la mostra consisteix en adults amb ciutadania espanyola, és a dir, es basa en el cens electoral dels residents a Catalunya.

En aquest breu estudi mirarem quines variables expliquen més bé el posicionament de la població davant la independència de Catalunya (apartats 4, 5 i 6).

Primer però (apartats 1,2 i 3), unes dades que descriuen aspectes de la mostra. Hi trobem que:

1. Lloc de naixement dels enquestats, per grups d'edat
Si mirem els nascuts a la resta de l'Estat (que suposen el 24,5% del conjunt) trobem que més de la meitat tenen 65 anys o més, i un terç més tenen de 50 a 64 anys. Es tracta doncs d'un segment de la mostra (i població, si el mostreig s'ha fet bé) de gent relativament gran.

GRUPS D'EDAT	Catalunya	Resta de l'Estat
De 18 a 24 anys	9,6%	0,3%
De 25 a 34 anys	15,9%	4,4%
De 35 a 49 anys	34,5%	11,7%
De 50 a 64 anys	22,0%	32,3%
Més de 64 anys	18,1%	51,4%
Total	100,0%	100,0%

2. Nombre d'avis (dels enquestats) nascuts a Catalunya, per grups d'edat
Els grups més joves, de fins a 35 anys, tenen un, dos o tres avis nascuts a Catalunya (és a dir que són fills i/o néts de matrimonis geogràficament mixtos) en una proporció molt més elevada (36-37%) que entre els més grans de 65 anys (només 12%), on trobem la proporció més alta de néts de quatre nascuts a Catalunya (29,5%). És també entre els grans (més de 50 anys) que trobem més entrevistats que no tenen cap avi nascut a Catalunya, començant és clar pels de la primera generació de la immigració espanyola.
Fixem-nos de tota manera que un 54,8% del conjunt dels enquestats no té cap avi nascut a Catalunya: una xifra segurament insòlita, per alta, en la història de les migracions mundials. (Més de la meitat d'ells són ells mateixos nascuts fora de Catalunya). Per contra, menys del 22% tenen els quatre avis nascuts a la terra on viuen.

GRUPS D'EDAT	Cap	Un	Dos	Tres	Quatre	No ho sap	Total
De 18 a 24 anys	42,0%	12,5%	20,0%	4,8%	19,9%	0,8%	100,0%
De 25 a 34 anys	47,3%	11,7%	19,2%	5,6%	13,6%	2,7%	100,0%
De 35 a 49 anys	55,0%	8,2%	14,4%	5,5%	16,8%	0,2%	100,0%
De 50 a 64 anys	59,1%	3,0%	10,0%	3,1%	24,3%	0,5%	100,0%
Més de 64 anys	58,2%	2,1%	6,8%	2,9%	29,5%	0,5%	100,0%

Com seria d'esperar hi ha una correlació molt alta entre l'origen familiar i el sentiment de pertinença, com veurem ara.

3. Autoubicació a l'escala de sentiment de pertinença (C700) en funció del nombre d'avis nascuts a Catalunya (C130).
Entre els que no tenen cap avi nascut a Catalunya trobem que la opció majoritària és d'autodefinir-se com a "Tan espanyol/a com català/ana"*. A mesura que mirem els enquestats amb més avis nascuts a Catalunya (quasi tots aquests enquestats podem suposar que han nascut a Catalunya) augmenta progressivament l'opció "Només català/ana", que és clarament majoritària entre els que en tenen 3 o 4**.

	Només espanyol/a	Més espanyol/a que català/ana	Tan espanyol/a com català/ana	Més català/ana que espanyol/a	Només català/ana	No ho sap	No contesta	Total
Cap	9,1%	6,5%	52,4%*	16,2%	9,7%	4,0%	2,2%	100,0%
Un	3,0%	3,8%	28,6%	30,3%	33,2%	1,1%	0,0%	100,0%
Dos	0,0%	1,9%	20,2%	32,5%	42,2%	2,0%	1,2%	100,0%
Tres	0,0%	1,6%	1,5%	31,9%	62,9%**	0,0%	2,1%	100,0%
Quatre	0,3%	0,6%	9,6%	27,6%	61,2%**	0,0%	0,7%	100,0%
No ho sap	8,4%	9,1%	17,3%	47,2%	9,1%	8,9%	0,0%	100,0%

Aquestes dues variables (origen, segons diferents ítems, i autoubicació territorial), molt més que qualsevol altra, configuren el posicionament polític dels enquestats.

Mirem-ho amb més deteniment. Primer, l'origen, d'acord amb dos ítems diferents.

4. Voluntat d'independència (P31), segons el Lloc de naixement de l'enquestat/ada (C100)
Quan creuem Lloc de naixement de l'enquestat/ada (C100) amb les respostes a l'ítem P31. "i més concretament, ¿Vol que Catalunya esdevingui un Estat independent?" trobem una clara diferenciació. 
Entre els nascuts a Catalunya guanys el 'Sí' per 30 punts, mentre que entre els nascuts en altres llocs (amb dret a vot) guanya clarament el 'No'. Recordem que els nascuts a Catalunya representen el 61,5% de la mostra.

	Sí	No	No ho sap	No contesta	Total
Catalunya	61,5%	31,4%	6,2%	1,0%	100,0%
Resta de l'Estat	20,3%	72,4%	6,4%	1,0%	100,0%
Unió Europea	25,9%	69,4%	4,6%	0,0%	100,0%
Resta del món	21,9%	62,7%	10,0%	5,4%	100,0%

Chi quadrat	240,5998
df	9
Valor P	9,6031

5. Voluntat d'independència (P31), segons el nombre d'avis [dels enquestats] nascuts a Catalunya (C130).
La correlació entre les dues variables és molt alta, i és molt evident la tendència: però no es pot fer cap regla de tres, perquè hi ha minories substancials en cada categoria.

	Sí	No	No ho sap	No contesta	Total
Cap	25,8%	64,9%	7,5%	1,8%	100,0%
Un	53,5%	32,9%	12,1%	1,6%	100,0%
Dos	73,7%	21,6%	4,6%	0,0%	100,0%
Tres	90,0%	7,9%	2,1%	0,0%	100,0%
Quatre	81,9%	13,0%	4,1%	0,9%	100,0%
No ho sap	73,5%	17,5%	8,9%	0,0%	100,0%

Chi quadrat	425,8239
df	15
Valor P	2,5591

Trobem la mateixa diferenciació entre els fills de pare català (Sí 73,9%; No 20,2%) i de pare nascut a la resta de l'Estat (Sí 30,8%; No 61,2%).

6. Voluntat d'independència (P31), segons el sentiment de pertinença (C700)
La gradació és molt clara, revelant una correlació molt forta entre les dues variables. En el grup "Només català" -que suma una mica més de la quarta part de la mostra-, hi ha un posició gairebé unànime, al revés dels dos grups d'identitat "Només" o "més espanyola" (que representen, però, una proporció molt més petita de la mostra). Els altres dos grups, fonamentalment conformats per nascuts a Catalunya, però amb pocs avis autòctons, suposen amb tota certesa els segments més fluïds, que poden decantar el conjunt cap a una posició o una altra. 
 

	Sí	No	No ho sap	No contesta	Total
Només espanyol/a (N=79)	4,0%	94,4%	1,6%	0,0%	100,0%
Més espanyol/a que català/ana (N=64)	3,6%	91,2%	5,1%	0,0%	100,0%
Tan espanyol/a com català/ana (N=529)	11,5%	77,5%	8,9%	2,1%	100,0%
Més català/ana que espanyol/a (N=337)	72,3%	20,5%	6,8%	0,3%	100,0%
Només català/ana (N=429)	94,5%	2,9%	2,0%	0,6%	100,0%
No ho sap (N=39)	20,3%	51,9%	24,2%	3,7%	100,0%
No contesta (N=24)	29,4%	39,4%	17,8%	13,4%	100,0%

Chi quadrat	948,1626
df	18
Valor P	8,2755

21D Resultats oficials definitius

Divendres, 29 de desembre de 2017. Palau del ParlamentCiutadans ha guanyat les eleccions al Parlament del 21 de desembre, amb 36 diputats, segons els resultats definitius publicats avui al 'Diari Oficial de la Generalitat de Catalunya'. JXCat és la segona força, amb 34 diputats; ERC, la tercera, amb 32; el PSC, la quarta, amb 17; Catalunya en Comú-Podem, la cinquena, amb 8; la CUP, la sisena, amb 4, i el PPC, la setena, també amb 4.
Font: https://www.parlament.cat/web/actualitat/noticies/index.html?p_id=270292616

 

Dades per demarcació

Font:  https://www.parlament.cat/document/actualitat/239160.pdf

	Barcelona		Girona		Lleida		Tarragona			TOTAL
Nombre d'electors:	4.156.306		521.313		313.928		566.354			5.557.901
Nombre de votants:	3.297.008	79,3%	409.966	78,6%	242.057	77,1%	444.068	78,4%		4.393.099	79,0%
Nombre de vots en blanc:	14.163		1.833		1.341		2.094			19.431
Nombre de vots nuls:	10.925		1.863		1.002		2.302			16.092
Nombre de vots a favor de candidatures:	3.271.732		406.270		239.714		439.672			4.357.388

Nombre de vots obtinguts per cada candidatura:

Ciutadans-Partido de la Ciudadanía:	868.365	26,5%	79.634	19,6%	40.908	17,1%	120.825	27,5%		1.109.732	25,5%
Junts per Catalunya:	624.261	19,1%	149.638	36,8%	78.303	32,7%	96.031	21,8%		948.233	21,8%
Esquerra Republicana-Catalunya Sí:	678.030	20,7%	88.582	21,8%	64.417	26,9%	104.832	23,8%		935.861	21,5%
Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya (PSC-PSOE):	497.650	15,2%	35.197	8,7%	21.795	9,1%	52.017	11,8%		606.659	13,9%
Catalunya en Comú-Podem:	276.810	8,5%	16.482	4,1%	9.415	3,9%	23.653	5,4%		326.360	7,5%
Candidatura d'Unitat Popular:	143.711	4,4%	21.708	5,3%	12.140	5,1%	17.687	4,0%		195.246	4,5%
Partit Popular / Partido Popular:	142.934	4,4%	11.646	2,9%	10.902	4,5%	20.188	4,6%		185.670	4,3%
Partit Animalista contra el Maltractament Animal:	31.330	1,0%	2.582	0,6%	1.186	0,5%	3.645	0,8%		38.743	0,9%
Recortes Cero-Grupo Verde:	8.621	0,3%	560	0,1%	312	0,1%	794	0,2%		10.287	0,2%
Per un Món Més Just		0,0%	241	0,1%	336	0,1%		0,0%		577	0,0%
		100%		100%		100%		100%			100%

 

	Barcelona		Girona		Lleida		Tarragona			TOTAL
Vot republicà	1.446.002	44,2%	259.928	64,0%	154.860	64,6%	218.550	49,7%		2.079.340	47,7%
Vot unionista	1.508.949	46,1%	126.477	31,1%	73.605	30,7%	193.030	43,9%		1.902.061	43,7%
Altres	316.761	9,7%	19.865	4,9%	11.249	4,7%	28.092	6,4%		375.967	8,6%

"Por qué el aumento de participación no cambió la mayoría independentista".

Font / Source:
https://politica.elpais.com/politica/2017/12/23/actualidad/1513985798_835913.html

Espot

This is my translation of a newspaper article, with a piece of advice added: Catalans could boo at the King in 2009, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014...* without any legal action being taken against anyone. 

Logical: it's freedom of speech!

But inviting people to do the same in 2015 got Santiago Espot in trouble!

Yet Catalans booed the King again (always for political, not personal reasons!) in 2016 and 2017 without any further legal action being taken.

The conclusion is obvious: Sr. Espot is a scapegoat for Spain's Establishment.

So jeering at the King could get you a hefty fine.

Is this the same in other democratic countries?

http://m.europapress.es/nacional/noticia-audiencia-nacional-condena-santiago-espot-pago-7200-euros-multa-pitada-himno-20171222113811.html

The National Court orders Santiago Espot to pay a fine of € 7,200 for National Anthem booing affair.

The National Court has found the president of Catalunya Acció, Santiago Espot, guilty of the offence of insulting the Crown and Spain, and has imposed a €7,200 fine, having considered that the manifesto published in the social networks in which he proposed jeering at the Spanish national anthem and the King at the 2015 Copa del Rey (football) final is not covered by the right to freedom of expression.

The chair of the Central Criminal Court, José María Vázquez Honrrubia, considers proven that the defendant, for whom the Public Prosecutor requested a €14,600 fine for these facts, published on May 28 of that year in the Facebook profile of the pro-independence organisation a manifesto entitled 'For the Spanish hymn and King Philip of Bourbon' within the framework of a "preconceived and planned" plan that was intended to "offend and disparage" the King and the Spainish national anthem.

The magistrate rejects in the sentence that the content of the manifesto, which called for a general jeer during the course of the Cup final between FC Barcelona and Athletic Bilbao, is covered by the right to freedom of expression and reminds the offender that the protected legal good is the Institution of the Crown, which forms part of the constitutional structure.

During the hearing held on December 12 Espot denied that he or the association he chairs bought or distributed whistles before the final and said he did not attend the match, which was held at the Camp Nou (Barcelona). He did recognize that he is a "political activist" in favour of the independence of Catalonia.

* See http://estudiscatalans.blogspot.com/2017/06/copadelrey.html for videos of cup final booings when Barcelona plays. No-one was prosecuted on these other occasions.

Ensuring The Rule Of Law

This is an urgent appeal to the European institutions, by a private European citizen.

As soon as can I shall add links to each of my affirmations to back my arguments and claims.

Why urgent?

Because in the case of the treatment by Spain of the Catalan independence process, fundamental rights have been violated, as well as non-compliance and/or grotesques interpretation of Spanish laws.

Because two presidents of the collegiate boards of civil society organisations working through transparent, radically democratic and non-violent means towards an independent Catalonia were arrested and are being held without bail in Soto del Real prison, 600 km from their homes, under accusations of crimes which a host of legal specialists (including drafters of the articles of the criminal code now being applied) regard as proposterous. They face up to 15 years in gaol if found guilty.

Because eight regional ministers were also detained, by the same judge and are being held without bail in two other prisons, likewise 600 km from their homes, after being denied any space of time for their defence strategy to be discussed, simply for having implemented their electoral commitments with a parliamentary mandate, again on charges which a host of legal specialists (for the same reasons as before) regard as proposterous. Bail has been turned down on grounds which specialists regard as equally flimsy.(see here and here: http://www.juecesdemocracia.es/2017/11/03/garantias-y-derechos/ ).

Because international search warrants, and a request for extradition, have been issued against the President of Catalonia and four other regional ministers who have received no summons, and who have stayed in Brussels (Belgium) in order to inform the International community of the gravity of the situation, and such time as they receive assurances that, if the charges are not simply dropped on account of their political motivation, they will receive a fair trial.

Because the vengeful tone of the Prosecutor-General is evident by the (hidden) metadata file name of the press communiqué: "Más dura serà la caída" (the harder they fall) (ref).

Because among other things, "sedition" and "rebellion" under Spanish law require violent uprisings which have by no stretch of the imagination taken place. Not a hair of a single official has been touched, far less at the behest of any of the 20 politicians involved in this case.

Because the Speakers of the Parliament and five members of the Bureau are to appear before the Supreme court after being given a week for their defence strategy to be discussed. Again, the charges against them are flagran violations of the rights of political representatives.

Because all of this could have been avoided if on any single one of the dozens of attested occasions - right up to the very last minute - on which dialogue and negotiation have been called for from the Catalan side, the Spanish government had not spurned the offer, often in an arrogant way.

Because my appeal to Mr. Tusk went unheeded and unanswered (link). Appeals at this late stage for "dialogue", after seven years of flat refusal to seek a solution to the 2010 institutional crisis on the part of the Spanish government, do not seem at all appropriate. As early as 2012 there were plenty of authorized voices inside and also outside Catalonia calling for a solution to be sought (link).

Because in a number of cases young children are being deprived of their mothers or fathers. Every day counts.

Some details

Spain, an EU Member State, has taken drastic measures against the Government of Catalonia, having refused since 2010 to politically address a serious constitutional crisis (deriving from a highly controversial Constitutional court decision that led to an immediate reaction in the form of a vast demonstration in July). Since then it has fined, barred from office, and now imprisoned leading politicians and social leaders for seeking to exercise article 1 of UN International human rights instruments ratified by Spain. It has taken over the regional administration and curtailed the regional Parliament, against Spain's own laws, by an application of Article 155 through a set of measures many of which legal specialists regard as totally illegal and unconstitutional in themselves.

These measures have been adopted in a State of Spanish public opinion in which almost anything goes. A tweet by a Spanish police union, treated Catalan politicians, the police chief, the head of public TV, as if they were hunting trophies to be achieved.

L'amenaçador tuit del sindicat de la policia espanyola UFP https://t.co/m84La4mdiF pic.twitter.com/kTyhUzBkWR

— 324.cat (@324cat) 3 de novembre de 2017

Given the uproar it caused, it has been deleted. What have not been deleted are many videos of Spanish Police contingents being sent off by crowds to chants of "A por ellos!" ("Go get 'em!", #APorEllos). Many videos be found on YouTube. Here's one example, from Huelva: link. Nor have literally hundreds of hate messages broadcast in the past few years by Spanish politicians (and a few Catalan ones), opinion leaders, journalists, military officers, clergymen... Latest batch: link. For years the media have been giving a monolithic, biassed, one-sided view of what is happening in Catalonia (for 2014, see link). A more recent study on hatred discourse analysed dozens of cases of "catalanophobia" (link). I claim that the intensity of propaganda about the Catalan problem, based on prejudici and stereotypes, makes it inconceivable for any Spanish judge without first hand familiarity with what is really going on to be able to be neutral in the issue.

Very few Spaniards really know why and when the conflict started. 

I really fear that the popular indignation of what was till now the "smiling revolution" may well overflow into uncontrolable violence. This would ideally suit Spain (that has over 10,000 policemen in ships in Barcelona and Tarragona ports itching to go into action). Groups of fit looking young men with nothing better to do (presumably on a tip-off, turn up at midnight to meet two Catalan ministers returning discreetly to Barcelona from Brussels - to be incarcerated a couple of days later - with Spanish flags and offensive chants. (link)

A scenario of violence is what many observers think it has been angling for for several months. This would allow a state of siege to be announced, and would allow it to postpone the 21 December election (the guarantees of which are already extremely unsure), that all surveys foresee would if held yield another majority for independence. Hardly surprising given the millions of toughened voters that despite all the threats, actually voted in the epic 1 October referendum.

In the meantime, the detainees are to my mind in serious danger in prison. They have been jeered at by policemen hoping the vicepresident will get raped in prison (ref). They have been vexed by being handcuffed behind their backs, and stripped naked as if they were traffickers (ref). Inmates have shouted "Bloody separatists, we'll kill you!" (ref). These same sources explain that one at least of the ministers was played the Spanish national anthem 17 times on a Mobile phone. They were driven at over 100 kph, without their seat belts being buckled.

Further reading

1. I recommend this:

Upholding the Rule of Law in the European Union

ALBENA AZMANOVA, BARBARA SPINELLI, and CO-SIGNATORIES 4 November 2017

An open letter concerning the upholding of the Rule of Law in the European Union, co-signed by 188 scholars, politicians, public intellectuals and members of the European Parliament and sent on November 3, 2017.

https://opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/barbara-spinelli-et-al/upholding-rule-of-law-in-european-union

2. And also this:

"Leading specialists in constitutional and criminal law raise serious doubts about the decision to imprison the Catalan ministers" (video)

3. Jami Tanner (ed.) . Contributions by Maya Waterland, Kyle Chong, Austin Meek, Annie Zhao, Matt Salah, and Abe Fraifeld.
Resolved: "Spain should grant Catalonia its independence."January 2018 PF Brief
https://www.philasd.org/centralhs/wp-content/uploads/sites/235/2017/12/Victory-Briefs-January-2018-Catalonia-1.pdf

Annex

Extracts from "EU Framework to strengthen the Rule of Law",
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/effective-justice/files/com_2014_158_en.pdf

"[C]ase law of the Court of Justice of the European Union ("the Court of Justice") and of the European Court of Human Rights, as well as documents drawn up by the Council of Europe, building notably on the expertise of the Venice Commission, provide a non-exhaustive list of these principles and hence define the core meaning of the rule of law as a common value of the EU in accordance with Article 2 TEU. Those principles include legality, which implies a transparent, accountable, democratic and pluralistic process for enacting laws; legal certainty; prohibition of arbitrariness of the executive powers; independent and impartial courts; effective judicial review including respect for fundamental rights; and equality before the law". (p. 4)

" Article 7 TEU aims at ensuring that all Member States respect the common values of the EU, including the rule of law. Its scope is not confined to areas covered by EU law, but empowers the EU to intervene with the purpose of protecting the rule of law also in areas where Member States act autonomously. As explained in the Commission's Communication on Article 7 TEU, this is justified by the fact that "if a Member State breaches the fundamental values in a manner sufficiently serious to be caught by Article 7, this is likely to undermine the very foundation of the EU and the trust between its members, whatever the field in which the breach occurs". (p. 5)

"The Framework would not prevent the Commission from using its powers under Article 258 TFEU in situations falling within the scope of EU law. Nor would it prevent the mechanisms set out in Article 7 TEU being activated directly, should a sudden deterioration in a Member State require a stronger reaction from the EU". (p. 7)

"Where there are clear indications of a systemic threat to the rule of law in a Member State, the Commission will initiate a structured exchange with that Member State. The process is based on the following principles:
  - focusing on finding a solution through a dialogue with the Member State concerned;
  - ensuring an objective and thorough assessment of the situation at stake; 
  - respecting the principle of equal treatment of Member States;
  - indicating swift and concrete actions which could be taken to address the systemic threat and to avoid the use of Article 7 TEU mechanisms." (p. 7)