I have found an internet transcription of a book which includes a chapter on the activities of the Gestapo in Spain, from
the second half of 1934 to 1936, during which the German Nazi regime meticulously planned the right-wing revolution: the coup d'état by General Franco that started the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939).
Click here
if need be to read the whole post
Inside the Gestapo: Hitler's Shadow Over the World
Hansjürgen Koehler
Pallas Publishing Company Limited, 1940
INSIDE
the GESTAPO
BY
HANSJURGEN KOEHLER
CHAPTER
XVII.
Gestapo
in Spain.
It is
far from my intention to maintain that my activities in Spain from
the second half of 1934 to 1936 had an essential importance in
preparing the Spanish insurrection. I had been acting on behalf of
the Gestapo as usual, holding a special appointment from Heydrich
himself. But I think that the following pages offer a true sketch, a
series of irrefutable episodes, facts and personalities which may
help to prove that the idea of the Spanish Civil War was first
conceived in Berlin and directed for years from Germany. Perhaps some
later historian will find some useful data in this chapter if he
wants to write an un- biased account of the tragedy in the Spanish
arena. . .
When in
1934 I sent my first report about my experiences in Spain I viewed
the situation of the German organisation on the Iberian Peninsula
rather pessimistically. The different German institutions and
agencies were in a very bad state.
Gil
Robles, who came to power in 1933, had helped the German interests,
as he was a dyed-in-the-wool Fascist. Their leaders had an easy time
and earned huge sums. But for this very reason they intrigued against
each other and fought like wolves. For every good job there were
dozens of self-appointed candidates who schemed against each other.
The man who had good connections progressed rapidly. Hardly had he
filled some job, when he flew out again, however—unless he had had
the necessary pull and skill.
To cite
an example: Consul Rehmann lost his job in San Sebastian through the
intrigues of Group Leader
Beisel because the latter was a friend of Zuchristian, chief of the
whole organisation. Rehmann was followed by Leistert—and the first
act of the new consul was to dismiss the man (Beisel), who had
intrigued against his predecessor and whom, after all, he had to
thank for his own promotion. A similar fight-for-all-comers was going
on everywhere.
For
clever men such a confusion was simply an advantage. Herr Steffin,
for instance, who conducted the German secret group in Madrid,
embezzled huge amounts, whereupon an investigation was started
against him. But he simply bribed the investigators and was—promoted
and transferred to the Madrid Labour Front. Here he again embezzled
some money, another investigation followed; and the result? He was
again promoted and transferred to an important post of the South
American organisation.
Denunciation.
Even
dirtier and more scandalous things happened in Barcelona, Madrid,
Malaga and Saragossa. The leaders denounced each other secretly. If
they did not succeed in blackening their rival’s character in
Germany, they turned to the Spanish authorities. There was hardly one
among them who had not something to hide and this method of intrigue
and counter-intrigue proved very effective. In the worst cases the
Nazis, in order to avoid scandal, were forced to shield or help the
victim to escape. Naturally all this damaged the work of German
penetration and propaganda.
The
German organisations in Spain were—up to 1936—under the authority
of the Hamburg Political Police. The agents of the Gestapo were
placed everywhere in offices and agencies, working under the cover of
the “Harbour Service.” Now the foreign organisation of this
“Harbour Service” demanded the right to conduct the whole work as
the Spanish representative of the Nazi Party, supervising all
activities; even tried to claim the right of appointments and
promotions for those Gestapo agents who were detailed for duty within
its territory.
In
Madrid I found a number of Gestapo agents who were almost desperate;
they felt they were only puppets of the “Harbour Service.” Of
course Himmler and Heydrich were far away in Berlin, while this
organisation was on the spot. Whether it was the kidnapping of a
Communist worker or espionage against some factory, everything had to
be reported to the “Harbour Service” and its instructions taken
into consideration. Koerner, the leader of the Madrid branch of the
Gestapo, did not know what to do.
A
Sudden Change.
We had
to go about the thing cautiously. I visited the leaders of this rival
organisation and explained my anxiety about the dangers of double
correspondence. All the secret letters went on two different routes
to Germany, through the “Harbour Service’s” foreign
organisation to Hamburg and through the Gestapo to Berlin. They
accepted my objections and offered to simplify matters. All
correspondence should go through the diplomatic couriers and they
would send on the copies from Hamburg to the Berlin Gestapo centre. I
avoided giving a decision, saying that this was Koerner’s business.
Next day Koerner received a polite note demanding that all
correspondence should be thereafter sent to the
“Auslandsorganisation.” Koerner asked my advice. I told him that
I would not interfere with administrative matters, but it was better
not to provoke the anger of the Party—and the “Harbour Service”
did represent the Party. This was Koerner’s opinion, too, and he
acted according to it.
But
only for a short time. Heydrich became furious when a few days later
he noticed the meddling of the “Auslandsorganisation” and that it
was remitting the correspondence of the Gestapo. The first victim was
Koerner, who was dismissed at once.
But his
successor received strict orders that the only instructions which he
was to follow must come from the Gestapo. I was sorry to have
sacrificed Koerner, but there was no alternative. But thereafter work
went on smoothly. At last the Gestapo became independent in Spain.
This
was the situation in 1934—but it changed suddenly. All the
organisations were headed by energetic, efficient men who had the
full confidence of the Party. Nobody could suspect the things which
were brewing; but everybody knew that these large-scale preparations
were
not
inspired by purely commercial reasons. It was no longer our task to
cover the Spanish market and to silence a few meddlesome refugees;
all of us felt that it was something bigger, something more
important. Yes, something was brewing...
About
this, time—it was my second trip to Spain—the Gestapo sent a
whole “general staff” to the Iberian Peninsula to organise the
well-tried network of the Gestapo in the country. The main task was
to hide the Secret State Police in the different organisations,
firms, associations, where it could not be discovered. The most
important institution was the so-called “Harbour Service.”
There
was hardly a German merchant, firm, or enterprise in Spain which had
not something to do with shipping, and a German organisation serving
this purpose could not raise any objection among the Spanish
authorities.
The
Terror Brigade.
This
was an excellent method not only in Spain, but in many other
countries. The chief of all these “Harbour Services” was Kurt
Wermke, highly valued collaborator of Himmler and Heydrich. His
Berlin office was the centre for the activity of the Gestapo in
Spain. Our organisation was under his administrative authority except
the special branches.
The
outward structure of the “Harbour Service” was very complicated.
Only the main departments figured in it, because there was no serious
danger even if they were unmasked.
But the
most important work was done in the sub-departments which were
independent units and belonged to the territory of the local “Harbour
Service” centres. These subdepartments which did all the dangerous
jobs (espionage, etc.) were masked by private firms or innocent
associations. One of the most important was the Academic Exchange
Service (Akademischer Austauschdienst) which, under the cover of
scientific exchanges, conducted part of the industrial espionage.
Military espionage was pursued by an engineering firm called
“Windkraft Centrale” (Aircraft centre) which had branches and
representatives all over the country. But our men worked in a great
many other private firms.
The
five main departments of the “Harbour Service” did the
supervision, the observation of its own association, refugees,
suspected persons, and that of the Spanish political parties. Even
our highest party members, the consuls and the members of the
legation had to be watched. The rest of the work consisted in spying
at the postal communications and the supervision of the S.A. men who
had already been introduced secretly. The real espionage was the task
of a special subdepartment.
The
most important fighting organisation was the so-called Public
Security Branch, whose members were the toughest and strongest S.A.
men. I might almost call it also the “terror-brigade.” Often
rebellious or suspicious people had to be sent to Germany. Sometimes
dangerous refugees had to be dealt with who could have easily
demoralised the Germans in Spain by describing the situation at home.
Again sometimes from here German smugglers directed the illegal
removal of currency and property still locked up in Germany.
Sometimes the withdrawal of a passport sufficed. At other times we
had to use stronger methods, as, for instance, in the case of Ludwig
Felsenstein.
Felsenstein
had got into hot water in Berlin, where he commanded an S.A. group.
But he succeeded in escaping to Switzerland and from there to Spain.
The Gestapo ordered his return. But this man was possessed of
devilish cunning; we did not succeed in luring him to a German ship.
Then two Gestapo men became acquainted with him in Barcelona. They
went to a harbour inn and began to drink. A nearby motor boat was
waiting to take him to a German ship. But Felsenstein could carry his
drink very well; in the end the two Gestapo agents “passed out,”
while their victim remained more or less sober. But even he felt the
effect of alcohol: he paid for the drinks from the money in the
wallet of one of the Gestapo men and replaced it by an ironical note
stating the fact. Then he left in high spirits.
Slander!
Next
day the Spanish police arrested him—for theft. The two Gestapo men
had denounced him for felony and slander because he had called them
German agents. Felsenstein was sentenced to six weeks’
imprisonment. But while he was sitting in a Barcelona prison, an
employee of the consulate appeared and demanded his extradition,
proving with documents that Felsenstein had embezzled seven hundred
and fifty marks in Berlin from the firm where he was employed. In
truth Felsenstein had never worked for the firm. But he protested in
vain; the court believed the well-dressed and suave attorney of the
consulate and not the ragged tramp who hardly knew any Spanish and
who was also proved to have been an S.A. man in Berlin. He was
extradited and Spanish gendarmes took him to a German ship. Sometimes
a man had to be taken on shipboard by force. There were innumerable
methods for this. A dangerous refugee would roam the harbour trying
to find work. A Spanish boat which was unloading would offer him a
job. He would go on deck, where he was hit with a rubber truncheon;
he lost consciousness. Charitable Germans put the “poor sick man”
into a motor boat and hurried to the German ship waiting in the outer
harbour. Nobody ever asked for him.
Another
refugee met a jovial Portuguese gentleman who on a Sunday afternoon
invited him to a little sailing trip. When they were far enough from
shore a motor boat appeared and gunmen forced him to follow them...
Next day the Spanish building firm which employed him received a
letter in his handwriting; his affairs had called him unexpectedly to
Norway. There could be no doubt about the authenticity of the letter.
His Spanish chief had no reason to run to the police.
Of
course sometimes a kidnapped man never arrived in Germany. If scandal
had to be avoided, he vanished silently somewhere in the Bay of
Biscay, weighted with a sack of coal or some scrap iron; and if the
log had to contain his name he was accounted for as a victim of
appendicitis who had died suddenly.
Observation
and supervision work was much simpler. I have always found that most
people are too comfortable to be cautious and they trust everybody—or
at least suspect very few strangers. Let us take a well-frequented
cafe. Nobody could imagine how much information the lady who sits in
the telephone exchange, or even the guardian of the cloakrooms, could
supply. . . Not to mention an elert waiter!
In
families we often succeeded in “planting” a modest, quiet,
diligent German nurse who had wonderful references and took care of
the children for a ridiculously small sum. After a few weeks she
proved herself so loyal that she was trusted completely. The master
of the house did not hide his letters or business papers, as the
nurse “didn’t know any Spanish,” except the little she had
picked up during her short stay. It was so much better for the
children; they were certain to learn German. But three months was
quite enough; the reports of the “nurse” gave an exact picture of
the whole life and secrets of the Spanish businessman, industrialist,
or politician. He would be most amazed to see it. The report included
everything; sometimes even his wife’s lover, with all the proofs
and photos which might force the lady to serve the Gestapo if
necessary.
And now
the “nurse” suddenly receives news of urgent and tragic family
affairs. With tears in her eyes she asks permission to leave. She is
certain to receive the very best references and will have no
difficulty in getting another position in a different city with a
distinguished Spanish family to whom some rich German friend, priest,
or the Consul himself recommends her independently.
The
Gestapo was interested in every confidential matter and secret; not
only among the German subjects, but also among the Spanish. Several
thousand workmen, business employees, engineers, agents, and other
people, had found jobs in Spain. All of them were members of some
German association: the German Labour Front or the League of German
Business Employees; at other times it was the Association of German
Engineers, some insurance club, cultural league, scientific
corporation, or the German church.
The
Gestapo had one or two men in every such institution. These gave the
different members the necessary instructions and drew up
questionnaires to which the German employees in Spain had to supply
answers. Very few masters could have secrets from their bookkeepers,
shop assistants, or engineers. Often such an employee was even able
to give information of rival or associated firms. All these clubs and
associations collected thousands of such questionnaires, followed by
the preparation of extracts and graphs which gave a precise picture
of economic life in Spain.
Double
Lives.
The
same work was done by the German business men and the branches of big
German firms who were in contact with hundreds of Spanish enterprises
and factories. All the branches of the great electrical, chemical,
hardware factories of Germany became a highly efficient source of
industrial espionage for the Gestapo. Then there were the German
banks which could ask and receive information unobtrusively just like
the chambers of commerce. Soon in the files of the “Harbour
Service” everything was collected which was worth knowing about
Spain. Our work began on the basis of these details.
The
first organisation I must mention was the Foreign Trade Post
(Auslandshandelstelle) which was founded to help German exports and
kill the rivalry of foreigners, rob them of big orders, and chase
them off the market. But this Foreign Trade Post could be useful in
betraying the secrets of rivals. The selected victim began to notice
that strange rumours were being spread about him, destroying his
credit; his offers were refused; when he went bankrupt nobody
suspected that he was not a victim of depression, but that of the
German economic war. He had been “eliminated” so that a German
firm or one with overwhelmingly German control could take his place.
In 1935
and 1936 there were several business failures in Spain which
attracted attention even abroad. Huge concerns closed their doors on
account of the “economic crisis.” Out of the nineteen large
bankruptcies, twelve were the immediate result of German activity,
while in the case of the rest it sufficed to “help to bit” by
secretly destroying credit and exercising unfair competition. Their
places were taken by firms well under German control. During these
months the German organisation was completely finished in Spain and
had stood its trial.
Almost
every German in Spain led a double life, his peaceful private
existence and his work for the Nazi Party. If someone was not a
member either because he was a Jew or unreliable he was exposed to
the most tenacious persecution, expelling, kidnapping, etc. Every
German and Germanophile door was closed to him. But most of the
Spanish doors, too, because if such a man found work, he was soon
slandered, his name blackened; reduced to the direst poverty he
either committed suicide or left the country. Every German
association, club, or league, whether official or not, worked
feverishly and collected all necessary data.
Lavish
Propaganda.
At the
same time the most stubborn propaganda went on against any Communist,
Socialist, Liberal, or Freemason movement, and for the right-wing,
loyalist, and monarchist parties. Everybody was labelled a Jew,
Freemason, or Communist if he was not a friend of the Spanish Fascist
Parties. The German Ministry of Propaganda sent millions of pamphlets
to Spain; the agents of the “Harbour Service” smuggled these
papers from German boats into the country. The hand- bills and
pamphlets were distributed by German workers and clerks everywhere;
on trams, in cafes, restaurants, streets. Every right-wing Spanish
Party received as much of this material as it wanted. There were
unselfish German gentlemen who even covered the cost of distribution.
There was no post box, open window, or door, into which such a
printed sheet was not slipped; slowly they poisoned the minds of the
Spaniards, making them hate their own Government, their own Liberal
and Labour Parties.
Slowly they were recruited for the Fascist Parties, and these
gratefully accepted the “unselfish help” of the Germans in their
campaign against the “Reds” and were willing to return the
service. This service was only “information” about the
“Jewish-Communist-Freemasonic” Spanish enterprises. The most
patriotic Spanish firms rivalled each other in industrial espionage
for Germany—without suspecting it.
At
the same time various other activities were pursued, but in the first
place military espionage. As I said, there was a separate department
for this in the “Harbour Service,” and the German General Staff
sent a great many secret agents to Spain.
I
belonged to the very few who had been told quite early what Germany
was doing in Spain; but I must confess that I had no idea of any
object beyond the enlarging of German commercial influence. It was
only later that I understood: military espionage was needed on the
distant Iberian Peninsula for the purpose of helping insurrection to
a swift victory.
The
“Cell” System.
The
special centre for military espionage was in Barcelona, under the
cover of an engineering firm, the Aircraft Centre (Windkraft
Zentrale). The Barcelona branch of the Berlin Wilhelm Teubert firm
worked here under the name of Central de Fuerza Motric Aerea W.
Teubert, its leader was the former Lieutenant, Hans Gunz. In parallel
Captain Konrad Heerdt pursued his activities; if anything should
happen to Gunz he would take charge. The Madrid branch was headed by
Wilhelm Gefaell, in Alicante Joachim Knobloch, in Malaga
ship-chandler Petersen, in Morocco Heinrich Hoffman (the latter at
Ceuta) was responsible for the work.
The
leaders of the different centres had all some more or less important
position in the Nazi Party. They did not know anything about each
other’s secret work, and could not betray each other in a tight
spot.
This
method had the advantage that Gunz and Heerdt; could give the same
task to two different groups who supervised each other unconsciously.
Every group formed several small “cells.” The chiefs and members
of these cells did not know each other. If the Spaniards caught an
agent it did not matter much. The other groups could continue their
work without danger.
Two
independent sections of the“Aircraft Centre” pursued naval and
aerial espionage; these two were connected not only with the
Barcelona centre but directly with Berlin.
Of
course we were not satisfied with the work of German agents only; we
had a great many Spaniards and South Americans employed.
The
“Windkraft Zentrale” worked most efficiently. But it had another
important task which made its activity even easier; it supplied war
material to the Spaniards, took part in every important State order,
and did immense service for the German armament industry.
Inside
Information.
Captain
Heerdt, the deputy chief of the “Aircraft Centre” in Barcelona,
had married the daughter of a Spanish general whose father was the
leader of the artillery section in the Ministry of War. His
father-in-law took good care that his son-in-law’s firm should be
given a fat share of State orders and notified him of every movement
of his rivals. But even he did not suspect that his daughter’s
husband thus acquired the most important military and engineering
secrets.
Lieutenant Gunz also succeeded in getting into the Ministry of War
through distinguished patrons, where he formed his connections under
title of a supplier of armaments. A wellknown Barcelona lawyer, Juan
Salvo, helped Gunz not only to obtain important orders, but also
essential military secrets. Even more useful was the friendship which
Gunz formed with Alvares Malibran and his brother, a very
distinguished member of the Spanish General Staff. The two brothers
were familiar in the highest circles of Spain. Through them Gunz was
always notified of the changes in the Spanish garrisons, of every
manoeuvre, of the exact placing of war materials and munitions.
As
for naval secrets, Enrico Fricke did the good work. He had a huge
export and import business in Carthagene. During the war Fricke had
served in the Naval Intelligence Service of Germany; for a time he
worked in the Kiel Admiralty. Carthagene was one of the most
important Spanish naval bases. The naval officers sent from Berlin
were all employed by Fricke, and in his office was collected the
necessary data. Fricke took over the Carthagene agency of the Bremen
Neptune shipping line, and this made his work very easy. Fricke knew
Spain very well, having worked there for part of the Great War. His
dangerous job had been to plant bombs in the ships of the Allied
Powers which arrived in the neutral ports.
It
is an interesting addition to Fricke’s portrait that during the war
he had been imprisoned by the Spaniards for espionage. When they
released him, he returned to Germany and demanded his pay. As he was
refused, he simply sued the German Republic. This was the first case
of which I know when a spy dared to do this. The German War Office
was forced to pay as Fricke proved his services. When he got his
money he found it advisable to vanish from Germany. He returned to
Carthagene, and when Hitler came to power Fricke was one of the first
who offered his services to the Nazis in Spain.
A
Social Success.
Fricke used extremely simple methods. In and around Carthagene lived
a great many high naval officers. Politically they were all rather
“right wing.” They were almost swamped with Nazi propaganda.
Everybody was glad to receive a finely bound volume as a gift; was
glad to read how thoroughly the “Reds,” the common enemy, had
been routed in Germany. Fricke, who in the meantime became German
Consul, was naturally invited to every social function and fiesta;
his acquaintance with the leading officers slowly developed into
friendship; the great, ornate German ladies and gentlemen were often
invited to the lavish banquets. Few Spanish naval officers could
withstand a “distinguished” and pretty lady. These women agents
of the Gestapo procured a large number of naval secrets; they looked
over the coastal defences and were shown whatever they wanted to see.
The
Spanish Civil War showed what a thorough work Fricke and his men had
done in the navy; the Government was practically left without naval
officers. All of them joined Franco right at the beginning and made
possible his rule in Morocco.
Among the preparations we had to draw up the plans of army movements.
This was a much more difficult thing than to worm out secrets of
unsuspecting Spaniards.
At
the beginning of our work we had little connection with the local
military authorities of the country. But there was also nothing to
spy out as in other matters. The Spanish Army had never evolved a
plan which would serve it against an internal enemy. Therefore we had
to create these plans ourselves. But here we met an unexpectd
obstacle. For every such plan, manoeuvres were necessary to try out
the different theories.
We
were sitting in Madrid with the officers of the General Staff sent
from Berlin, discussing the problem. Major von Hinze was rather
gloomy; bursting out at last, he said:
“Damn it all, I can’t ask the Span- ish Army to lend me a few
regiments.”
“Perhaps some of the S.A. men...” someone offered, but I
protested.
The
Spanish authorities would have swooped down on us at once if they had
found out about the S.A. in their country and its military
manoeuvres.
Captain Guertler then had a brain-wave. The S.A. could not hold
open-air manoeuvres—but what about the Hitler Youth? Could not they
“play soldiers”? This plan was soon realised. On Sundays and
holidays—of which there were many in Spain—the officers of the
General Staff took part in the “outings” of the Hitler Youth
organised from the German boys in Spain. As they were not very
numerous, we soon recruited a number of Spanish children; in the
first place those who were pupils of German schools. These received a
decorative uniform cheaply and were happy about the excursions. Thus
we could try out every military movement, the isolation of barracks,
the occupation of important strategical points; we could examine
every point without raising the suspicion of Spanish authorities.
Later on General Franco received these plans which he executed with
small variations and which for the most part brought swift success.
How we had to ascertain the strength of armaments and spy out the
equipment of the future enemy...
The
largest Spanish munitions factory, the Sociedad Espanola de Armas y
Municiones, was the biggest contractor of the Spanish State. There
were some Germans among the proprietors and shareholders of the
company, among them the most important Adolf Thieme who was also a
prominent member of the Nazi Party.
Through him it was easy to get the most important data about the arms
possessed by the Spanish Government; a great many of the storage
places were also betrayed. The rest was procured by the agents of the
“Harbour Service,” and later the Spanish officers supplied data
when they joined General Franco.
Air
Propaganda.
Spanish aviation was a difficult problem. Most of the young flyers
were loyal to the Government.
Therefore the Madrid branch of the Lufthansa and the Junkers Company
were appointed to train new pilots. Junkers were especially glad to
do this because they hoped that the rich young Spaniards would not
only take part in the training, but later buy Junkers planes for
private use and thus patriotism could be combined with a little
business.
The
propaganda for aviation started on a large scale, trying to recruit
enthusiasts for civil aviation.
Junkers had their connections with the Spanish private aero-clubs,
these they tried to enlarge and develop. It was comparatively simple:
a few members had to be selected to whom Junkers made a discreet
offer of a very cheap plane which could be bought on long credit;
they only had to find new followers for flying and put their machine
at the club’s disposal for training purposes. Most of them were
happy to accept.
In
this way a great many young men—of course all scions of
“right-wing” families—were gathered together and taught flying
on Junkers planes by German instructors. All of them became great
friends of Germany and were easy prey, to well-conducted propaganda.
When General Franco started his revolts, these young men were almost
without exception ready to join him; they sat in the cockpits of the
planes which Junkers supplied and which bombed Spanish cities and
villages.
The
Spanish Government was not suspicious; they were even glad that youth
was becoming interested in aviation. In Saragossa and later in
Barcelona private airfields were built; it was not at all difficult
for the German instructors to work out plans from these bases which
later were used by the insurgents. Of course we could not hope to
train all the pilots whom Franco would need. Most of these young
Spanish amateurs would probably perish in aerial battles fought with
the superior pilots of the Government; especially as there was no way
to teach them bombing and machine-gunning.
This
was a point we had to take into consideration and therefore we had to
count on German flyers who would have to be added to the rebel air
force. Therefore it was highly important to smuggle as many German
pilots into Spain as possible. They were exchanged for others after a
few weeks. We also prepared photographs from the air of every
possible strip of territory.
A
photographic study was installed in the office of the Madrid Siemens
branch where the aerial photos were copied and filed. Work went on
very diligently; thousands of shots had to be taken, not only from
the vicinity of barracks, but of harbours, more important factories,
and different cities. We had to prepare for regular air-raids against
the cities where Government resistance would be especially strong. In
the possession of photographs it was not difficult to fix the
objectives for bombing.
The
most trusted Spanish youths were sent to Germany, where their
training was completed. Here, of course, they could learn freely the
handling of bombs and machine-guns. But their number was necessarily
limited because we had to take great care. The young Spaniards were
delighted at this German generosity. Of course they had no idea that
they would be able to use their knowledge against their own
countrymen.
Naivete.
Frankly, the naivety with which the Spaniards viewed all these
problems was almost amazing. They believed and accepted everything
with childish gullibility. We could hardly avoid the young Spanish
aviators talking about the large-scale photography. Sometimes even
the original prints came into their hands, but nothing happened.
At
the beginning of 1936 the Barcelona “Harbour Service” sent us two
photos of the Barcelona port. These pictures had been taken by the
German aviation experts. The “Harbour Service” started to
investigate at once. We found out that the photos had been procured
by Spanish sporting flyers.
One
of these gentlemen who took part in such an aerial survey, received
two prints which he had reproduced by a Barcelona photographer.
An
agent of the “Harbour Service” visited the photographer, had some
pictures taken, and began to talk to him. It was easy to steer the
conversation around to photography and aerial photos. The
photographer soon showed the prints he had made. Our agent asked him
what purpose they served.
“The
pilots must know the lay of the city,” the photographer replied
with perfect seriousness, “otherwise they would easily lose their
way. After all, you can’t put signposts or traffic policemen into
the air.”
This
reassured us. The Spaniards apparently did not think of suspecting us
of any serious purpose. Nor did they have any good reason to fear any
danger. They were living at peace with their neighbours. They did not
dream that distant countries had designs on their land. For centuries
they had become used not to fearing any external enemy and if a
scaremonger spoke of such a possibility he was rewarded with mockery.
I
remember the article of a newspaper discussing the question just
before the insurrection. There was nothing to fear, the journalist
wrote, not only because there was no great power which would have
territorial aspirations in Spain. It was the paramount interest of
both France and Great Britain that no other power outside Spain and
Portugal should have a foothold on the Iberian Peninsula. That was
the reason for Portugal being Great Britain’s oldest ally. Even if
Spain had no such agreement with England, a silent appreciation of
common interests and the knowledge of Great Britain’s protection
was just the same. That knowledge compensated Spain for Gibraltar
which Great Britain had to guard—and on account of which she could
not let foreign soldiers invade Spanish soil. This great feeling of
security was shown everywhere. The Spanish Government gave all its
attention to the internal enemy which threatened its home policy from
the monarchists and the extreme left. This occupied them too much to
notice any foreign threat. (p. 252)
I Guard
Hitler.
To
return to the problem of aviation, we had to know what air fleet the
Government possessed and its capacity. In this question the chief of
the Madrid branch of Junkers offered us the greatest help. Carlo
Rodatz played an important part in von Bohle’s
“Auslandsorganisation” and was entrusted with confidential tasks
right from the beginning. Rodatz had himself been a flyer whom
Junkers trusted implicitly. He was one of the best armament
“salesmen,” and whoever knew these gentlemen knew that they would
stop at nothing. It was Rodatz’s doing that for a long time the
Italians were unable to compete in Spain with Junkers. He always
found some way to annihilate his rivals. He knew perfectly well what
the other firm wanted and offered. When “Fiat” or another company
had a new model, keeping its details strictly secret, Rodartz had the
exact plans in his drawer.
We
could trust Rodatz and were never disappointed. He supplied us with
comparative ease with the most important data. Through him we found
out the precise details of the Government’s air bases. Later he got
for us the data on tanks and the description of the anti-aircraft
guns at Minorca.
It
would be difficult to enumerate the work of all the German
organisations, but a few examples might serve just as well. Some time
ago a scientific exchange had been installed, sending young students
and scientists from Spain to Germany and vice versa. In Berlin its
centre was in the Neue Friedrichstrasse, called “Deutscher
Akademischer Austauschdienst” (German Academic Exchange Service),
while in Spain its headquarters were at 18 Calle Aribau in Barcelona.
This office sent young Spanish students and engineers to Germany
where they could study at the universities, were shown the German
industrial plants.
The
Spanish Government was always grateful for this help and supported it
in every way. The German students and engineers were welcome in
Spanish universities and factories.
We
sent only picked men. The official chief of the exchange was Karl
Supprian, Professor at Barcelona University, but its real direction
was in the hands of General Faupal who later figured as official
German Ambassador to General Franco.
An
Amazing Personality.
Faupal had had an amazing career in Spain. At the end of the war he
was a Brevet-Captain, and as many others of his comrades, he fought
in a Free Corps against left-wing movements and took part in the
punishment of “traitors.” He joined the Nazi movement fairly
early and proved to be a very useful man in the brawls which the S.A.
man had during and after the Nazi meetings. He also turned out to be
a good organiser. Himmler became his patron. I noticed this man; his
suave, brilliant manners did not betray the incredible energy which
moved him.
Brevet-Captain Faupal did such brilliant work in this “scientific
exchange” that he soon became a general. But his achievement was in
a distinct relation to his quick promotion. His men did excellent
work in every aspect. His young engineers visited the Spanish
factories and mines, showing keen interest. If there was some
especially difficult job in industrial espionage, Faupal and Supprian
could always manage it. The collection of data on the organisation of
armament plants was wholly Faupal’s work.
When
revolution started in Spain, a great many important plants had to
stop work. A series of acts of sabotage incapacitated them. Often a
bomb exploded at a cardinal point; sometimes the electric centre, the
factory’s heart was destroyed by powdered iron which had been put
into the turbines. All this damage could not be repaired for weeks,
sometimes even months. Causing short-circuits, they burnt cables and
set fire to whole factories.
The
preparation, planning, and execution of all this was carried out by
Faupal’s and Supprian’s men. If they had failed, Franco could not
have attained his success in spite of systematic military
preparations. But this prevented the Government from getting quick
supplies of armaments while Franco received plenty of whatever he
needed.
Economic
Espionage.
Faupal’s organisations, co-operating with the espionage departments
of the “Harbour Service,” obtained valuable military information.
There were some territories to which he could not send his men
without attracting attention; for instance they had nothing to seek
in the military garrisons. But Faupal had his brainwaves. He got into
touch in Berlin and had the Hagenbeck Circus sent to Spain. For
months it roamed the country.
Such
a circus has hundreds of employees and the agents of the Gestapo
could easily be placed among them. Before the circus arrived in some
garrison, its pioneer workers and publicity men could be sent ahead;
they could gain access to almost any place. On the lorries of the
circus they could drive across districts which were important from a
military point of view and could take measurements and photos.
The
propaganda which the circus made must not be overlooked. They took
tons of pamphlets with them and distributed them chiefly in the south
into which part the other German organisations had some difficulty in
penetrating. The purely Spanish landed class which would have been
susceptible to Nazi propaganda, was very difficult to approach. Of
course our salesmen of agricultural implements and artificial manure
worked diligently. But for mass-propaganda Hagenbeck’s Circus was
the most suitable and fulfilled its task amazingly well.
About the end of 1936 the Gestapo had cleared Spain almost completely
of dangerous or harmful German elements. The Party controlled all the
German subjects through the Secret State Police; they were willing to
fulfil any command. The counter-espionage departments of the Gestapo
had acquired through their agents and the German associations all the
important data on Spanish economic and industrial units and were able
to influence them strongly. The main details of the navy, army,
aviation, railways, high roads, and shipping were all in our hands.
The Gestapo not only watched closely its own Nazi members, but had
its men planted in every important place of both friendly and
inimical Spanish Parties who reported every movement.
We
had a decisive influence on the most important newspapers. The huge
advertisements of great German firms were handled by the German
chambers of commerce. If news uncomplimentary to Germany was printed,
advertisements were withdrawn at once. Thus we were assured that they
would be wary of printing anything detrimental; they were even ready
to do us any favour.
Nazi
Discipline.
I
must mention that the German living in Spain did not put themselves
at the Party’s disposal so easily as might be imagined. We had to
overcome considerable resistance in many cases. But the Gestapo and
the Nazi Party were well experienced in such matters. A very
important and simple method was that the Party members were made to
believe that almost a hundred per cent of Germans in Spain were in
their ranks. Thus nobody dared to lag. Every organisation was
forbidden to give information about its roll of members. If some
doubting soul wanted to have a look at it, they gave him a list
containing the names of all the Germans living in the district,
whether members or not. If two non-mambers met, each of them believed
that the other was denying his membership on purpose; he became
suspicious, afraid of some trap and hastened to join. I could not say
that the German colony in Spain joined the Nazi Party through
conviction. But I can safely state that practically everybody became
a member, sometimes in spite of his convictions, being afraid of
consequences and for the sake of his own interests.
This
belief and this fear welded the Party into a single, huge machine
which worked obediently under the touch of its masters, just as in
Germany. But I found that people slowly became used to the situation
and excused themselves by believing that they were following the
Fuehrer out of conviction and faith.
At
the end of 1935 I had to prepare a detailed report about the progress
of our work in Spain. I returned to Berlin. During one of my
discussions at the Gestapo Rudolf Hess, the Fuehrer’s Deputy, was
also present. He seemed to be much interested in all I had to say. He
put a great many questions to me, then took a list from his pocket
and followed them up with other inquiries, to which I tried to give
answers ac-cording to my best knowledge.
Hess, in spite of his frail physique, was an extremely thorough man.
I saw from his notes that he had already put the same questions to
someone else. He had the answers noted; but it was no news to me that
my work was supervised by secret, watchful eyes, although I had the
fullest confidence of my superiors. My replies seemed to give
satisfaction. One of the most important inquiries was whether we
could count on the Spanish Parties of the right and what they would
be prepared to undertake against the Government? Before I could reply
to this question of Hess, he interrupted:
“Consider well before you answer. I’m willing to wait a little.”
There was no need for consideration.
“The
Spanish right wing isn’t united, it’s divided into four parties,
and they hate each other more than they hate their opponents... this
is the only reason why Spain has a left-wing Government.”
And
now the word “revolution” was mentioned for the first time.
“What would they do in the case of an armed revolution?” Hess
asked.
Without waiting for my reply, he began to talk, like a man possessed.
A revolution was being prepared in Spain.
In
Terror.
I
felt a cold thrill; to be quite frank, I did not think of the dead
and wounded of a probable rising, nor about the flames which such a
rebellion would cause to break out in peaceful Spain; I was thinking
of myself. Drawing all the necessary conclusions from my past
experiences, I took good care not to know too much about the plans of
my employers. I tried to remain the self-effacing, unsuspecting
instrument even when I saw everything clearly. That was the reason
why I was able to serve the Gestapo for such a long time.
In the
moment when I was “officially” told such an important secret I
felt that the “beginning of the end” had arrived for me. I knew
too much to be safe. I had two courses open to me: either I must make
myself useful, or begin the inexorable fight for the favour of the
“boss,” betray and stab in the back everyone whom I had reason to
fear; to be on my guard day and night that they should not be able to
intrigue against me.
If I
could carry on this game, I could attain anything. But even then I
could not live in safety, just as there was no safety for anyone in
the Third Reich. Goering, Goebbels, Himmler, Heydrich, even the
Fuehrer himself were constantly walking on a very tight rope. The
number of great men I saw smiling while there was death in their
hearts! I thought of General von Epp and Kaufmann, the Hamburg Gau
Leader, who I have seen trembling for their lives, weeping maudlin
tears, half intoxicated...
I
knew that I was unable to play this game, even if my nerves were
strong. One must be born for it, and I wasn’t. In this case I had
only one road, just as Hanfstaengl and the most skilful of the others
had done. To continue the gamble with my whole soul and in the
opportune moment—jump out of the line, vanish, hide, try to find a
refuge somewhere abroad.
It
only depended on whether I should succeed. Hanfstaengl had escaped in
time although he knew everything about the Reichstag Fire. He knew
that this secret could be fatal. But Edmund Heines and Karl Ernst
died—for the same secret.
Von
Alvensleben also died, although he had opened the first financial
resources for Hitler. All those who had brought Hitler foreign money
were killed. Rummler and Stein had risked their lives a thousand
times in Russia to contact the General Staff, but when they had done
their work, Heydrich considered them too dangerous. Both died, for
“dead men tell no tales.”
But
now I had no other choice. From the moment when I became a recipient
of this secret, I did not cease to seek for the road of escape,
because I knew that every achievement was another step towards my
grave, while failure meant quick death.
I
wanted to explain all this because it might shed light on a great
many things I did; on the other hand it was this realisation which
has enabled me to set down my memories—instead of rotting in a
nameless grave. I now understood the gigantic gamble. Germany was
preparing the armed revolt of the Spanish right wing. A Spanish
politician or soldier had to be selected who was willing to
defy—under German guidance—the Liberal Government and proclaim a
dictatorship. This Spanish politician would grant any concession to
Germany for the help he received. He would also form a military
alliance with the Third Reich.
About
this time discussions had been proceeding well with Italy in this
matter. Germany had to be assured of the Duce’s consent; alone she
would not be strong enough to defy English and French opposition.
Mussolini was prepared to offer support, but he demanded a heavy
share of the spoils. Not only Germany, but Italy as well, needed the
raw materials of Spain, especially copper and quicksilver. Mussolini
asked too much. In the first place he protested that no other country
except Italy should get a foothold on the Spanish islands of the
Mediterranean; he raised no objection to Germany taking anything from
the Spaniards west of Gibraltar. Bargaining went on slowly and for a
long time.
...
See also