Here is an English translation (by M.S.) of part of a book by Fernando Rueda, a chapter on Spain's secret service operation in Catalonia, from the early 1990s. The publishers gave their permission.
"Actions against the independence of Catalonia", by Fernando Rueda. 30 years of Spain's Secret Service operations inside Catalonia.
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, if need be, to read the full text Extract from La Casa II: El CNI: Agentes, operaciones secretas y acciones inconfesables de los espías españoles.
By Fernando Rueda Actions against the independence of Catalonia
At the beginning of the 90s, with its sights set on the holding of the Olympic Games in Barcelona in the summer of 1992, CESID1 sent Mikel Lejarza El Lobo (the Wolf) to the city with the mission of infiltrating a mole into the terrorist group Terra Lliure to try to disable it completely. When he had started the mission, he was commissioned to search for information on the corrupt business schemes operating in Catalonia, the movements to acquire private television stations and the interference in these affairs by the banker Mario Conde.
As Lejarza was an obscure agent - he was not on the official payroll of the service, although he worked exclusively for them - and so as to live in Barcelona without attracting attention, he had to set up his own cover. He created "General Consulting and Communications", from which he controlled and promoted the infiltration of his mole, Chema, into the Catalan terrorist gang. Later, with the help of a well-known journalist living in Madrid, he got in touch with Count Godó [La Vanguardia owner], and managed to convince him that he was the man he needed to get him the high-value information he was looking for.
He set up a monitoring and wiretapping network for him that delivered high-quality results. During those years of frantic espionage, he and his collaborators spied on numerous figures related to the Catalan establishment, such as Lluís Prenafeta and Maciá Alavedra, whose phones had been tapped, or Judge Pascual Estevill and banker Isidro Fainé.
As Lejarza was an obscure agent - he was not on the official payroll of the service, although he worked exclusively for them - and so as to live in Barcelona without attracting attention, he had to set up his own cover. He created "General Consulting and Communications", from which he controlled and promoted the infiltration of his mole, Chema, into the Catalan terrorist gang. Later, with the help of a well-known journalist living in Madrid, he got in touch with Count Godó [La Vanguardia owner], and managed to convince him that he was the man he needed to get him the high-value information he was looking for.
He set up a monitoring and wiretapping network for him that delivered high-quality results. During those years of frantic espionage, he and his collaborators spied on numerous figures related to the Catalan establishment, such as Lluís Prenafeta and Maciá Alavedra, whose phones had been tapped, or Judge Pascual Estevill and banker Isidro Fainé.
At the same time, Lejarza delivered a copy of all the material obtained, breaking the law, to the Internal Intelligence Division of the secret service: El Lobo repeatedly denied this relationship in court when at the end of 1993 he was arrested and his identity made public. What did not transpire at any time is that this team of shady spies carried out an investigation to try to show what was a growing rumour in Catalan political circles: that Jordi Pujol had a hidden account in Andorra.
Lejarza commissioned one of his men, José Manuel Trujillo, to travel to the Principality [Andorra] and obtain the evidence, based on previous data provided by another of his collaborators, Juan G., who had a relative working in the Private Bank of Andorra. In addition, Trujillo hooked up with an Argentine who was dating one of Pujol's sons and accompanied them on some trips to Andorra. In this way, El Lobo was able to safely inform the secret service that Jordi Pujol had an account outside Spain, in a country like Andorra, which was on the black list of tax havens, in which it was not a crime to accept money from tax evasion.
Since it was such relevant information, it was logical that director Alfonso Manglano should pass it on to President Gonzá1ez and, without a doubt, years later Director Calderón would have acted in the same way with President Aznar. However, its content has slept peacefully in the files of the CNI without anyone doing anything to take advantage of it or to put it in the hands of a judge. It had to be the Police, also involved in the fight against independence, which by their own means discovered and brought to light the accounts that implicated the Pujol family in murky affairs.
The story that leaves to one side the question of why the CNI did not use the information on Pujol for twenty years begins a few months after the arrival of Mariano Rajoy to the presidency of the Government, after his open confrontation with the president of the Generalitat Artur Mas and the beginning of the independence process by the nationalist forces.
Lejarza commissioned one of his men, José Manuel Trujillo, to travel to the Principality [Andorra] and obtain the evidence, based on previous data provided by another of his collaborators, Juan G., who had a relative working in the Private Bank of Andorra. In addition, Trujillo hooked up with an Argentine who was dating one of Pujol's sons and accompanied them on some trips to Andorra. In this way, El Lobo was able to safely inform the secret service that Jordi Pujol had an account outside Spain, in a country like Andorra, which was on the black list of tax havens, in which it was not a crime to accept money from tax evasion.
Since it was such relevant information, it was logical that director Alfonso Manglano should pass it on to President Gonzá1ez and, without a doubt, years later Director Calderón would have acted in the same way with President Aznar. However, its content has slept peacefully in the files of the CNI without anyone doing anything to take advantage of it or to put it in the hands of a judge. It had to be the Police, also involved in the fight against independence, which by their own means discovered and brought to light the accounts that implicated the Pujol family in murky affairs.
The story that leaves to one side the question of why the CNI did not use the information on Pujol for twenty years begins a few months after the arrival of Mariano Rajoy to the presidency of the Government, after his open confrontation with the president of the Generalitat Artur Mas and the beginning of the independence process by the nationalist forces.
It was one of the most important missions that the government entrusted to director Sanz through deputy primer minister Soraya Sáenz de Santamaría. It was one of those jobs that required taking the utmost precautions to prevent someone from discovering their activities beyond reasonable doubt. The aim was to obtain the highest quality information on the independence process in Catalonia and, at the same time, to adopt the necessary mechanisms to try to reverse the situation.
Sanz, who knew that the Ministry of the Interior was also going to work on the matter, decided to personally organize the deployment. In August 2012, he had appointed Beatriz Méndez de Vigo as general secretary of the CNI. This appointment entailed new powers that until then had only been in the hands of the director: the top responsibility for the Intelligence and Operations directorates, that is, to assume command of all the actions of the service. Well, not all of them. In some, as in the subject of Catalonia, Sanz kept the designing for himself.
The plan to cope with the independence claims was based on two points. The first was to obtain as much information as possible about people and projects using all the means at their service. And the second was an operation of influence, supporting all those people capable of overturning the situation in Catalan public opinion, as long as they were not directly linked to the service. The operational agents in charge of obtaining information were controlled by Méndez de Vigo and the actions aimed at creating a climate of opinion contrary to the plans of the President of the Generalitat were laid on by Sanz.
In order for the arguments in favour of the unity of Spain, of a Catalonia integrated in Spain, to be heard in Catalan society, the first thing the director did was to get in touch with two former heads of the service who had stood out during the democratic transition in the work of contacting the Catalan social leaders. The first was Andrés Cassinello, director of Seced, who played a decisive role in convincing Josep Tarradellas, president of the Generalitat in exile, to return to Spain. Along with Cassinello, a man always ready to help the intelligence service, were other former agents who collaborated with him in this arduous task and who at the time dealt with politicians like Jordi Pujol.
Sanz, who knew that the Ministry of the Interior was also going to work on the matter, decided to personally organize the deployment. In August 2012, he had appointed Beatriz Méndez de Vigo as general secretary of the CNI. This appointment entailed new powers that until then had only been in the hands of the director: the top responsibility for the Intelligence and Operations directorates, that is, to assume command of all the actions of the service. Well, not all of them. In some, as in the subject of Catalonia, Sanz kept the designing for himself.
The plan to cope with the independence claims was based on two points. The first was to obtain as much information as possible about people and projects using all the means at their service. And the second was an operation of influence, supporting all those people capable of overturning the situation in Catalan public opinion, as long as they were not directly linked to the service. The operational agents in charge of obtaining information were controlled by Méndez de Vigo and the actions aimed at creating a climate of opinion contrary to the plans of the President of the Generalitat were laid on by Sanz.
In order for the arguments in favour of the unity of Spain, of a Catalonia integrated in Spain, to be heard in Catalan society, the first thing the director did was to get in touch with two former heads of the service who had stood out during the democratic transition in the work of contacting the Catalan social leaders. The first was Andrés Cassinello, director of Seced, who played a decisive role in convincing Josep Tarradellas, president of the Generalitat in exile, to return to Spain. Along with Cassinello, a man always ready to help the intelligence service, were other former agents who collaborated with him in this arduous task and who at the time dealt with politicians like Jordi Pujol.
Sanz reserved an even more prominent role than the one played by Adolfo Suárez's former henchman for another former director, Javier Calderón. His mission was to mobilize assets close to the defence of the unity of Spain and contrary to independence in such a way as fror them to contribute ideas to make a voice heard in Catalan society that they considered was being silenced.
After receiving the commission, Calderón got in touch with personalities from various fields who enjoyed prestige in the community. One of the clear conclusions they reached was the need for influential Catalans, with credibility and prestige, until that moment silent, to use renowned forums to give lectures or participate in round tables in which they would explain the benefits of staying in Spain and the inconvenience of breaking. Also for them to write articles and take part in radio and television chat shows with a prominent audience in Catalonia, to help create an opinion that confirmed that "it's worth living together."
The first steps were tough. Once the work had been undertaken by various influential agents, they detected that there was a great fear in the community to express opinions that were against the proposal defended in the Parliament by Convergència - later PDeCAT -, Esquerra Republicana de Cataluña and the CUP. That is why they posed the challenge of breaking that fear of soeaking out loud. This task needed to be carried out intensively with journalists who were unwilling to express themselves openly about it.
With this objective, CNI agents of influence supported some initiatives in favor of the unity of Spain, such as the demonstration "We're Catalunya, we are Spain", held in October 2013 in the Plaza de Cataluña, in Barcelona, which featured a attendance of tens of thousands of people, a smaller number than the secessionists usually congregated.
In 2013 they also launched a campaign to counter the numerous criticisms of the Spanish State that were being formulated on the web, together with the innumerable supports for independence. As in other areas, the groups in favour of separation from Spain had taken over social networks with their messages, leaving no room for the supporters of a united Spain, who barely dared to enter discussion forums, where they were being massacred by their opponents.
After receiving the commission, Calderón got in touch with personalities from various fields who enjoyed prestige in the community. One of the clear conclusions they reached was the need for influential Catalans, with credibility and prestige, until that moment silent, to use renowned forums to give lectures or participate in round tables in which they would explain the benefits of staying in Spain and the inconvenience of breaking. Also for them to write articles and take part in radio and television chat shows with a prominent audience in Catalonia, to help create an opinion that confirmed that "it's worth living together."
The first steps were tough. Once the work had been undertaken by various influential agents, they detected that there was a great fear in the community to express opinions that were against the proposal defended in the Parliament by Convergència - later PDeCAT -, Esquerra Republicana de Cataluña and the CUP. That is why they posed the challenge of breaking that fear of soeaking out loud. This task needed to be carried out intensively with journalists who were unwilling to express themselves openly about it.
With this objective, CNI agents of influence supported some initiatives in favor of the unity of Spain, such as the demonstration "We're Catalunya, we are Spain", held in October 2013 in the Plaza de Cataluña, in Barcelona, which featured a attendance of tens of thousands of people, a smaller number than the secessionists usually congregated.
In 2013 they also launched a campaign to counter the numerous criticisms of the Spanish State that were being formulated on the web, together with the innumerable supports for independence. As in other areas, the groups in favour of separation from Spain had taken over social networks with their messages, leaving no room for the supporters of a united Spain, who barely dared to enter discussion forums, where they were being massacred by their opponents.
To try to reverse this situation, they contacted Alejandro de Pedro, one of the most prominent specialists in online reputation, or, to put it another way, in gaining support and sympathy for conflictive people or issues. De Pedro was to program support on social media for all those ideas that would help to explain the advantages of Catalonia remaining united with Spain. At the same time, it was to counter pro-independence ideas and its arguments against Spain.
For more than a year De Pedro worked intensely for the CNI, which paid him out of reserved funds. This system requires the recipient to sign a sheet specifying how much and for what jobs they are going to charge, but without the possibility of keeping a copy to justify that income that does not have to be declared to the Treasury. The only problem can arise if the recipient is involved in a crime of any kind and the Security Forces find the cash in his or her possession, making him or her a suspect of having participated in some kind of crime of corruption.
This was precisely what happened to Alejandro de Pedro. While working for the CNI, he also did other online reputation jobs for the Popular Party that were considered illegal, and this led to his arrest in 2014 as the Civil Guard found €82,250 in cash at his home, making him a suspect of having participated in some kind of corruption crime.
From what has been seen since 2012 and to date, the result of the CNI's work in this field of influence has been quite poor and unsatisfactory. The results fell far short of the objectives that had been set.
After Madrid, Catalonia is by far the community with the largest number of secret agents, more than seventy. A few years ago they had their main headquarters at the confluence of Carrer Balmes with Ronda Universitat, in Barcelona. This heavy deployment was motivated at first by the Islamist attacks of 11-M, after which the director Alberto Sanz turned the then delegation into a Division, with the priority mission of looking for confidants in mosques, associations and Muslim groups to detect possible terrorists.
For more than a year De Pedro worked intensely for the CNI, which paid him out of reserved funds. This system requires the recipient to sign a sheet specifying how much and for what jobs they are going to charge, but without the possibility of keeping a copy to justify that income that does not have to be declared to the Treasury. The only problem can arise if the recipient is involved in a crime of any kind and the Security Forces find the cash in his or her possession, making him or her a suspect of having participated in some kind of crime of corruption.
This was precisely what happened to Alejandro de Pedro. While working for the CNI, he also did other online reputation jobs for the Popular Party that were considered illegal, and this led to his arrest in 2014 as the Civil Guard found €82,250 in cash at his home, making him a suspect of having participated in some kind of corruption crime.
From what has been seen since 2012 and to date, the result of the CNI's work in this field of influence has been quite poor and unsatisfactory. The results fell far short of the objectives that had been set.
After Madrid, Catalonia is by far the community with the largest number of secret agents, more than seventy. A few years ago they had their main headquarters at the confluence of Carrer Balmes with Ronda Universitat, in Barcelona. This heavy deployment was motivated at first by the Islamist attacks of 11-M, after which the director Alberto Sanz turned the then delegation into a Division, with the priority mission of looking for confidants in mosques, associations and Muslim groups to detect possible terrorists.
After the launch of the anti-independence plan, a large group of agents changed their work objective to devote themselves to the new threat. One part works in the street looking for sensitive information and another group, the analysts, convert the data provided by their colleagues and other sources into intelligence about what is happening in Catalan cenacles to try to discover the next steps of the nationalist parties.
The work of obtaining information on the activities of pro-independence parties and groups has offered much more positive results for the government than the field of influence. The task consisted from the very start of exercising the closest possible monitoring of the activities of PDeCAT, ERC and CUP leaders that were related to the subject.
The leaders of the parties, especially the first two, were on alert from the first moment, after the experiences of previous years, in which they had verified the espionage of the secret service. It would be of little use to them. Most of the leaders of Mas' and Junqueras' parties adopted primary security measures when speaking on the phone, including not giving details of future plans they were working on.
During the first years of the process, those most unhappy with the pro-independence line also chose not to use the telephone to transmit to other people their disagreements with the official line and to not even make comments about their heads that could be taken out of context and used against them. This same behaviour was followed by politicians with an unwavering adherence to the president of the Generalitat, who believed that the same divergence could be manipulated by those who were listening to their conversations so as to confront them with their boss.
Over the course of the first years of Rajoy as prime minister, the annoyance of the pro-independence leaders stopped affecting the CNI alone and they expanded it against Police officers investigating the illegal financing of CiU, coining the nickname of The Patriotic Police.
The modernization of current telematic espionage, compared to that of years ago had been demonstrated with the legal interventions in the Gürtel case. Those involved in this plot recognized in the recordings made by the Police that they had heard suspicious noises while talking on their mobile phones, so when mentioning the lurid details they used keywords to avoid being understood. They were completely wrong: with current media it is almost impossible to detect that a telephone is tapped.
The work of obtaining information on the activities of pro-independence parties and groups has offered much more positive results for the government than the field of influence. The task consisted from the very start of exercising the closest possible monitoring of the activities of PDeCAT, ERC and CUP leaders that were related to the subject.
The leaders of the parties, especially the first two, were on alert from the first moment, after the experiences of previous years, in which they had verified the espionage of the secret service. It would be of little use to them. Most of the leaders of Mas' and Junqueras' parties adopted primary security measures when speaking on the phone, including not giving details of future plans they were working on.
During the first years of the process, those most unhappy with the pro-independence line also chose not to use the telephone to transmit to other people their disagreements with the official line and to not even make comments about their heads that could be taken out of context and used against them. This same behaviour was followed by politicians with an unwavering adherence to the president of the Generalitat, who believed that the same divergence could be manipulated by those who were listening to their conversations so as to confront them with their boss.
Over the course of the first years of Rajoy as prime minister, the annoyance of the pro-independence leaders stopped affecting the CNI alone and they expanded it against Police officers investigating the illegal financing of CiU, coining the nickname of The Patriotic Police.
The modernization of current telematic espionage, compared to that of years ago had been demonstrated with the legal interventions in the Gürtel case. Those involved in this plot recognized in the recordings made by the Police that they had heard suspicious noises while talking on their mobile phones, so when mentioning the lurid details they used keywords to avoid being understood. They were completely wrong: with current media it is almost impossible to detect that a telephone is tapped.
Some think that obtaining information about the intentions of PDeCAT and Esquerra to promote an illegal referendum justified the monitoring of many telephones of Catalan politicians and high officials. Even if this were the case, this type of violation of privacy would require prior authorization from the Supreme Court magistrate attached to the CNI. To do this, this judge must first verify that the issue - an attack on the integrity of the territory - is included among the objectives of the Intelligence Directive drawn up by the government. And secondly, he must know who are affected by that measure; being members of legal political formations, the judge would tend not to grant their authorization ... if it had been requested. In any case, wiretapping and home entrances must be authorized in writing, even if no one ever knows the content of those court orders.
There is a precedent. In 1998, when microphones were discovered at the headquarters of the Herri Batasuna political group in Vitoria, a great scandal arose, with serious repercussions in the Congress of Deputies. The then Minister of Defence and direct head of CESID, Eduardo Serra, circumscribed it to the fight against terrorism, but he made no mention of the independence of the Basque Country.
Another of the CNI's ways of obtaining information is the use of personnel not directly related to La Casa to carry out this tapping of telephone calls. Dark agents work under the cover of corporate executives or private detectives, although in reality they seek information for the service.
There are also moles. The secret service works permanently to equip itself with informant sources in all possible organizations. They are people who have access to the information that the CNI seeks and do what it asks of them for not very large amounts of money. This activity is known to the various bodies of the Generalitat, who on various occasions have denounced the presence of infiltrators even among political parties such as the CUP.
Another of the CNI's ways of obtaining information is the use of personnel not directly related to La Casa to carry out this tapping of telephone calls. Dark agents work under the cover of corporate executives or private detectives, although in reality they seek information for the service.
There are also moles. The secret service works permanently to equip itself with informant sources in all possible organizations. They are people who have access to the information that the CNI seeks and do what it asks of them for not very large amounts of money. This activity is known to the various bodies of the Generalitat, who on various occasions have denounced the presence of infiltrators even among political parties such as the CUP.
In 1993, the Catalan Government dismissed the operational head of the Mossos d'Esquadra, the corps deputy inspector and Air Force commander Josep Peris, suspecting that he was leaking information to the intelligence service about the then president of the Generalitat Jordi Pujol, whom in code they called The Lion. The proof was that they discovered him entering the Catalan headquarters of the service with a folder full of papers.
On various occasions in the last twenty years, those responsible for the security of the presidents of the Generalitat have discovered the suspicious presence of people following in their bosses' footsteps. Sometimes they themselves have said that they thought they belonged to Spanish espionage, though sometimes they were private investigators serving private interests.
In addition to the moles infiltrated in various organizations, there are actions taken by the operative agents to control specific people and their meetings, and this has made it possible to obtain very valuable information on the movements of senior Generalitat officials and members of the apparat of political parties, with a view to achieving independence.
Another of the capabilities used by the CNI in this battle has been technological espionage related to the web. It has the most modern means and highly qualified personnel to enter any fixed or mobile device and access the information that may be of interest. Officially, it has turned its efforts to this issue to protect the State against dangerous attacks from other secret services, terrorists and hackers that intend to steal data and attack all kinds of facilities. However, once the necessary technology is available, it can be used against any objective, including the fight against independence.
There is a very discreet type of intervention that is hard to detect, and if it is, it is almost impossible to identify the person responsible. It is the use of computer viruses, once installed in the phones, they turn them into zombies ready to transmit all the conversations and information stored there. No case has been uncovered.2
On various occasions in the last twenty years, those responsible for the security of the presidents of the Generalitat have discovered the suspicious presence of people following in their bosses' footsteps. Sometimes they themselves have said that they thought they belonged to Spanish espionage, though sometimes they were private investigators serving private interests.
In addition to the moles infiltrated in various organizations, there are actions taken by the operative agents to control specific people and their meetings, and this has made it possible to obtain very valuable information on the movements of senior Generalitat officials and members of the apparat of political parties, with a view to achieving independence.
Another of the capabilities used by the CNI in this battle has been technological espionage related to the web. It has the most modern means and highly qualified personnel to enter any fixed or mobile device and access the information that may be of interest. Officially, it has turned its efforts to this issue to protect the State against dangerous attacks from other secret services, terrorists and hackers that intend to steal data and attack all kinds of facilities. However, once the necessary technology is available, it can be used against any objective, including the fight against independence.
There is a very discreet type of intervention that is hard to detect, and if it is, it is almost impossible to identify the person responsible. It is the use of computer viruses, once installed in the phones, they turn them into zombies ready to transmit all the conversations and information stored there. No case has been uncovered.2
The great capacities that the CNI has managed to develop in the cybernetic war (see chapter VIII) made the Generalitat look of mistrust turn towards it on November 8, 2014. The following day the poll on the political future of Catalonia was to be held, a consultative referendum banned by the Constitutional Court and against the will of the Rajoy government.
Various organizations of the Generalitat began to receive cyber attacks that Saturday, and these continued on Sunday, the voting day. Cesicat, the body in charge of cyber security, proceeded to repel the attack, although it was of the "denial of service" type, whereby thousands of computers wanted to connect to its network at the same time and managed to block it. They immediately thought of an attack originating from the CNI to boycott the vote, although their investigations were unable to prove anything, something that is common in this type of aggression.
Specialists of proven reputation and experience, such as Vicente Diaz, an engineer at Kaspersky Lab., one of the most prestigious cybersecurity companies in the world, was clear about it: «It would seem very strange to me if the CNI carried out attacks of this kind, because it is very simple from a technological point of view. Groups of citizens, dissatisfied with something that is happening, often do it at their own initiative».
That this time it was not the secret service does not mean that with the discretion with which it is supposed to act, it has not used these capacities to obtain information. With all these means, it is easy to prepare extensive dossiers on the people they want to investigate to find out their movements and position on independence. This is very useful information if you later want to split parties like PDeCAT or put pressure on ERC.
In this latter party they are more used to CNI investigations. What happened to its historic leader Carod Rovira is a good example. Control over his activities began in the 90s due to the proximity of his independence theses to those of the terrorist group Terra Lliure. The surveillance was often personal, but also indirect when it was directed at ERC as a party and others of its leaders. Imagining he was being monitored, Carod Rovira took the utmost precautionary measures to avoid surveillance. But it is very difficult to avoid the inquisitive eyes of La Casa operatives.
On January 3, 2004, when he had reached the post of First Minister of the Generalitat, he traveled to Perpignan to meet with members of the ETA leadership. He wanted to reach an agreement whereby the terrorists would not attack Catalonia in exchange for a declaration of support. The spies followed him, confirmed his meeting with Antza and Josu Ternera, and a subsequent leak to the newspaper ABC did the rest. Carod Rovira had to resign due to the negative repercussions of his meeting with terrorists.
Specialists of proven reputation and experience, such as Vicente Diaz, an engineer at Kaspersky Lab., one of the most prestigious cybersecurity companies in the world, was clear about it: «It would seem very strange to me if the CNI carried out attacks of this kind, because it is very simple from a technological point of view. Groups of citizens, dissatisfied with something that is happening, often do it at their own initiative».
That this time it was not the secret service does not mean that with the discretion with which it is supposed to act, it has not used these capacities to obtain information. With all these means, it is easy to prepare extensive dossiers on the people they want to investigate to find out their movements and position on independence. This is very useful information if you later want to split parties like PDeCAT or put pressure on ERC.
In this latter party they are more used to CNI investigations. What happened to its historic leader Carod Rovira is a good example. Control over his activities began in the 90s due to the proximity of his independence theses to those of the terrorist group Terra Lliure. The surveillance was often personal, but also indirect when it was directed at ERC as a party and others of its leaders. Imagining he was being monitored, Carod Rovira took the utmost precautionary measures to avoid surveillance. But it is very difficult to avoid the inquisitive eyes of La Casa operatives.
On January 3, 2004, when he had reached the post of First Minister of the Generalitat, he traveled to Perpignan to meet with members of the ETA leadership. He wanted to reach an agreement whereby the terrorists would not attack Catalonia in exchange for a declaration of support. The spies followed him, confirmed his meeting with Antza and Josu Ternera, and a subsequent leak to the newspaper ABC did the rest. Carod Rovira had to resign due to the negative repercussions of his meeting with terrorists.
As every time similar espionage is discovered, ERC and the other main nationalist parties commissioned sweeps of their headquarters, but did not detect any tapped phones. The event planted a permanent doubt in both Convergència and ERC, and from that moment on they established a system to "sweep" their main headquarters and to discover if some outsider had placed all-
Generalitat bodies and the CNI have not always clashed. There are some areas in which mistrust has given way to the necessary collaboration. The most representative case is the fight against jihadist terrorism. Catalonia is the region that suffers most from the problem of the presence of elements suspected of Islamist radicalization. This threat in the first instance affects the citizens who live there, but also all Spaniards. Being a global problem, it is very difficult to combat it without connecting what happens in Catalonia with other regions and countries.
Thanks to these efforts, the CNI has carried out various operations that have prevented the commission of attacks in Catalonia, though their work to discover the plot does not often come to light because others are in charge of carrying out the arrests. A specific case was Operation Caronte, carried out in April 2015 by the Mossos d'Esquadra in different towns, in which the eleven detainees had made plans to kidnap the director of a bank branch, attack a Jewish establishment and cut the throat of a Catalan citizen, to disseminate the video on the web later. The Mossos scored the goal, but the CNI agents had put the operation on a platter for them, once the entire investigation had finished.
Generalitat bodies and the CNI have not always clashed. There are some areas in which mistrust has given way to the necessary collaboration. The most representative case is the fight against jihadist terrorism. Catalonia is the region that suffers most from the problem of the presence of elements suspected of Islamist radicalization. This threat in the first instance affects the citizens who live there, but also all Spaniards. Being a global problem, it is very difficult to combat it without connecting what happens in Catalonia with other regions and countries.
Thanks to these efforts, the CNI has carried out various operations that have prevented the commission of attacks in Catalonia, though their work to discover the plot does not often come to light because others are in charge of carrying out the arrests. A specific case was Operation Caronte, carried out in April 2015 by the Mossos d'Esquadra in different towns, in which the eleven detainees had made plans to kidnap the director of a bank branch, attack a Jewish establishment and cut the throat of a Catalan citizen, to disseminate the video on the web later. The Mossos scored the goal, but the CNI agents had put the operation on a platter for them, once the entire investigation had finished.
1 Spain’s Higher Defence Information Centre was an intelligence agency that operated from 1977 to 2002.
2 In 2019, Pegasus software sold by an Israeli firm, NSO Group, was found in several Catalanm politicians’ smartphones. https://www.elconfidencial.com/tecnologia/2020-07-17/shalev-hulio-espionaje-nso-group-torrent-cni-jeff-bezos_2685316/
Extract from La Casa II: El CNI: Agentes, operaciones secretas y acciones inconfesables de los espías españoles.
Por Fernando Rueda
Roca Editorial (2017) See also:
* El plan del CNI para evitar la independencia de Cataluña, Fernando Rueda. (24/1/2013) http://www.tiempodehoy.com/espana/el-plan-del-cni-para-evitar-la-independencia-de-cataluna/
* Guerra bruta. Operació Catalunya. (21/2/2013). http://www.elpuntavui.cat/canals/series/catalunya-vol-viure-en-llibertat/guerra-bruta-operacio-catalunya.html?start=54 (2013 overview)
* Diez millones contra la independencia. 5/4/2013. Daniel Montero / Luis Rendueles (“Horizonte Después”). http://www.interviu.es/reportajes/articulos/diez-millones-contra-la-independencia
* Els vincles ocults de l’extrema dreta amb Societat Civil Catalana, Jordi Borràs (21/1/2015). http://www.elcritic.cat/investigacio/els-vincles-ocults-de-lextrema-dreta-amb-societat-civil-catalana-2365
* Les claus de la guerra bruta contra el procés independentista (30/6/2016) http://directe.larepublica.cat/noticia/512252/les-claus-de-la-guerra-bruta-contra-el-proces-independentista
* El comisario Villarejo revela ante el juez la existencia de una ‘Operación Catalunya’. (6/7/2016) http://www.lavanguardia.com/politica/20160706/403005854115/comisario-villarejo-juez-operacion-catalunya.html
* El CNI pagó a un imputado de la Púnica para que se infiltrara en foros independentistas. Los servicios secretos españoles le contrataron para difundir noticias positivas sobre la sociedad y la economía españolas a través de páginas web y redes sociales. (20/12/2016) http://www.lavanguardia.com/politica/20161220/412753175477/cni-imputado-punica-independentistas-catalunya-alejandro-de-pedro.html
* El CNI i el Rainbow Warrior català. Iu Forn. (21/12/2016) http://www.elnacional.cat/ca/opinio/iu-forn-cni-operacio-dialeg_127725_102.html
(enlaces de la página parodia http://www.wikicfp.com/cfp/servlet/event.showcfp?eventid=56032)
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