5 de set. 2021

A Twitter thread by Xavi Domenech on Spain's new offensive against the Catalan independence movement, using the NYT (4 SEPT 2021)

An English translation (by M. Strubell, woth the author's permission) of a Twitter thread by Xavi Domenech on Spain's new offensive against president Puigdemont's entourage (especially Prof. J. L. Alay) Catalan independence movement, using the NYT  (4 SEPT 2021)

Click here  if need be to access the whole text.



@xavidomenech99. (Source: https://threader.app/thread/1434189036936105988)

1) We are facing a new "operation" by the Spanish state to discredit and criminalize the Catalan independence movement, an operation that has only just started, but that in this case does not target the "domestic market" but rather the EU, as inferred from the @nytimes article. 

 2) The [New York] Times article aims to present Catalan independence movement as an "enemy" of the EU, an enemy that will not hesitate to give and receive support from those who seek to destabilize it and harm its interests, such as the alleged "pact" with Russia. 

 3) The other goal of the state is to discredit as much as possible the foreign action that is being carried out in exile, led by President @KRLS, who has become an obsession for the state, which has failed miserably in all attempts to neutralize it, him and his entourage. 

 4) This operation will be "tough" and possibly not limited to trying to influence through the media, but will go further, in this sense nothing can be anticipated, we can only move in the field of hypotheses, so the best strategy, I think, is to stay alert ... 

 5) ... and anticipate the opponent's movements which, fortunately for us, can be seen coming from an mile off, as has happened in Germany, for example, with the "studies" on "emotional damage that the  independence movement has caused", the origin of which you will soon have information.

6) You may be wondering what this “new operation” ifs for. Always moving in the field of the most likely hypotheses, I would say that it is realizing that a brutal defeat in the EU is imminent, with which the bad practice of judicializing political conflicts may have much to do. 

 7) It is clear that since 2010 it has played all its cards transferring to the judiciary all kinds of democratic conflicts that it has been faced with, conflicts that in any moderately decent law-abiding state would have been resolved through politics. 

 8) And this, which gives such good results in repressing discrepancies and uncomfortable demands, has a price, which is often unbearable. The Spanish governments have not have had to put pressure on the courts in their decisions, and they did not have to because they were already undr pressured from within. 

 9) They knew perfectly well the way the top levels of the courts were (and are), how they think, and they could foresee their reactions especially in everything related to "territorial integrity", but they underestimated the fact that one day the decisions would stop being in the hands of "loyal" courts... 

 10) ...and would pass into the hands of European courts that could respond in a very different way than expected. And here the problems began. And they started losing their heads. "It's Hungary's turn today, who's it going to be tomorrow?" PP MEP González Pons moaned ...

11) after the Eureopean Parliament vote to activate Article 7 of the Lisbon Treaty against Viktor Orban's government. The man was upset because what Orban had done was very similar to what Rajoy had done, or what Rajoy intended to do. And he saw it coming that the next ones could well be them. 

 12) Some time ago, González Pons himself, in an attack of patriotism, sent all MEPs a pathetic letter full of uncouthness against the Schleswig-Holstein High Court, protesting against the decision not to extradite President @KRLS for the crimes of rebellion and sedition. 

 13) As the letter did not have the desired effects, uite the opposite, he did not hesitate to threaten that Spain might leave the Schengen space, but they did not pay much attention to him either, they possibly came to the conclusion that he was nothing more than a drooling, deranged Francoist. 

 14) But maybe the "boiling-over" of Gonzalez Pons, and other boiling-overs starring other Spanish politicians of his kin or similar kins did have an effect after all. Germany called for the removal of the "unanimity rule" at the proposal of its foreign minister ...

 15) that laid down the need for EU decisions on foreign policy to be taken unanimously by all member states, which meant that the unfavourable vote of a state was enough for a decision to be paralyzed. This rule was the "holy grail" ...

16) ...for the EU's ultra right to boycott decisions contrary to their interests and impose their criteria. These were timid steps in an anti-authoritarian direction, and there have been more. And there have also been devastating EU court judgments for the prestige of the "Grande y Libre" [Spain]. 

 17) A Spanish state that, even with 'the most progressive government in the history of humanity', cannot avoid the authoritarian drift and the survival of institutions that have nothing to envy those of the Franco regime (even when it comes to changing street names) ... 

 18) ...sees an unforeseen situation coming that it will not be able to control, and it has decided to react. And it will react as always. And I guess I don't have to explain much about how the Spanish state usually reacts! So stay alert and pay close attention to what may happen from now on.


See also Lawyer Gonzalo Boye's article on the illegal dissemination of the contents of Prof. Alay's mobile phone (5 SEPT 2021) https://estudiscatalans.blogspot.com/2021/09/lawyer-gonzalo-boyes-article-on-illegal.html


...ooo000ooo...

https://threader.app/thread/1434189036936105988

via @threader_app

1) Ens trobem davant d'una nova "operació" de l'Estat espanyol per desacreditar i criminalitzar l'independentisme, una operació q no ha fet més q començar, però que en aquest cas no té com a destinatari el "mercat domèstic" sinó l'UE, tal com es dedueix de l'article del @nytimes.

2) L'article del Times, té com a finalitat presentar l'independentisme català com a "enemic" de l'UE, un enemic que no dubtarà en donar i rebre suport dels q pretenen desestabilitzar-la i perjudicar els seus interessos, com és el suposat "pacte" amb Rússia.

3) L'altre objectiu de l'Estat és desacreditar al màxim l'acció exterior que està portant a terme l'exili encapçalat pel President @KRLS, que s'ha convertit en una obsessió per l'Estat, que ha fracassat amb estrèpit en tots els intents per neutralitzar-lo, a ell i al seu entorn.

4) Aquesta operació serà "dura" i possiblement no es limiti a intentar influir a través de mitjans, sinó que anirà més enllà, en aquest sentit no es pot anticipar res, només ens podem moure en terreny de les hipòtesis, per tant, la millor estratègia, crec, és mantenir-se alerta...

5) i anticipar-se als moviments de l'adversari, que, per sort per nosaltres, es veuen venir d'un hora lluny, tal com ha passat a Alemanya, per exemple, amb els "estudis" sobre "danys emocionals q ha provocat l'independentisme", de l'origen dels quals tindreu informació pròximament,

6) Potser es preguntareu el pq d'aquesta "nova operació". Sempre movent-nos en terreny de les hipòtesis més probables, jo diria q s'està adonant de la imminència d'una derrota brutal a Eu, en la qual pot tenir molt a veure la mala pràctica de judicialitzar conflictes polítics.

7) És evident que des del 2010 ha jugat totes les seves cartes traslladant al poder judicial tot tipus de conflicte democràtic que se l'hi ha presentat, uns conflictes que en qualsevol estat de dret mitjanament decent s'haurien solucionat mitjançant la política.

8) I això, q tan bons resultats dona a l'hora de reprimir discrepàncies i demandes incòmodes, té un preu, sovint inassumible. Als governs espanyols no els hi calgut pressionar el poder judicial en les seves decisions, i no els hi ha calgut perquè ja venien "pressionats" de casa.

9) Sabien perfectament com era (i és) la cùpula judicial, com pensen, i podien preveure les seves reaccions sobre tot en tot allò que fa referència a la "integritat territorial", però van menysprear el fet q algun dia les decisions deixarien d'estar en mans de tribunals "lleials"

10) i passarien a mans de tribunals europeus que podrien respondre d'una forma molt diferent a la prevista. I aquí van començar els problemes. I van començar a perdre els papers. "Avui li toca a Hongria, a qui li tocarà demà?" gemegava l'eurodiputat PP González Pons...

11) després de la votació del #EuParl per activar l'art 7 del Tractat de Lisboa contra el govern de Viktor Orban. L'home estava esverat pq el que havia fet Orban era molt similar al q havia fet Rajoy, o el que pretenia fer Rajoy. I veia venir que els propers podien ser ells.

12) Temps enrere, el mateix González Pons, en un atac de patrioterisme, va enviar a tots els eurodiputats una carta impresentable plena de grolleries contra el TSR Schleswig-Holstein protestant per la decisió de no extradir el President @KRLS pels delictes de rebel·lió i sedició.

13) Com la carta no va tenir els efectes desitjats, ans tot el contrari, no va dubtar en amenaçar amb la sortida d'Espanya de l'espai #Schengen, però tampoc li van fer gaire cas, possiblement van arribar a la conclusió que no era més que un franquista bocamoll i desquiciat.

14) Però potser si q va tenir conseqüències la "bullida" de González Pons, i altres bullides que van protagonitzar altres polítics espanyols de la seva corda o de cordes similars. Alemanya va demanar, a proposta del seu ministre d'exteriors l'eliminació de la "regla d'unanimitat"

15) que establia la necessitat q les decisions UE sobre política exterior les prenguessin de forma unànime tots els estats membres, fet que comportava que n'hi havia prou amb el vot desfavorable d'un estat pq una decisió quedi paralitzada. Aquesta regla era el "sant grial"...

16) de l'extrema dreta eu per boicotejar decisions contràries als seus interessos i imposar els seus criteris. Van ser passos tímids en una direcció antiautoritária, n'hi ha hagut més. Com també hi ha hagut decisions de tribunals Eu demolidores pel prestigi de la Grande y Libre.

17) na Estat espanyol que ni amb el govern més progressista de la història de la humanitat no pot evitar la deriva autoritària i la pervivència d'institucions q no tenen res que envejar a les del franquisme (fins i tot a l'hora de canviar els noms dels carrers)...

18) veu venir una situació imprevista que no serà capaç de controlar i ha decidir reaccionar. I reaccionarà com sempre. I suposo que no cal explicar gaire com acostuma a reaccionar l'Estat espanyol, oi? Doncs alerta i molta atenció al que pugui venir a partir d'ara.


 (Source: https://threader.app/thread/1434189036936105988)

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