* A collection of digital resources to get to know the Catalan people better.
* Une collection de ressources numériques pour mieux connaître le peuple catalan.
* Una colección de recursos digitales para conocer mejor al pueblo catalán.
Coincidint
amb els actes del Centenari de l’Easter Uprising (Aixecament de Pasqua)
de 1916 que se celebren enguany a Irlanda, la Comissió de la Dignitat
ha convidat el professorCathal Brugha, nét de l’alcalde Cork Terence MacSwiney, a visitar Catalunya. La mort de Terence MacSwiney en vaga de
fam, el mes d’octubre de 1920, va provocar una profunda onada de
solidaritat i condol a Catalunya. Una d’aquestes mostres de condol va
ser la gran manifestació celebrada a la Plaça de Catalunya de Barcelona
en els dies posteriors a la seva mort. Es van produir protestes a
diferents llocs del país, com a molts llocs del món. John Borgonovo, investigador
post-doctoral de l’Escola d’Història del University College Cork,
considera les produïdes a Catalunya les de més importància. La
solidaritat catalana la van liderar entitats com el CADCI i la Unió Catalanista. Van fer arribar una nina de porcellana a la seva filla
Máire, peça històrica que avui es conserva al Museu de Cork (vegeu fotos
adjuntes). L’exemple d’Irlanda, introduïda inicialment per Josep Narcís Roca i Ferreras, va ser un referent per al nacionalisme català. I en
especial per a Francesc Macià.
La visita del Sr. Cathal Brugha
* Dijous 3 de març, 21h – Assistirà a la Nit de la Memòria, un sopar organitzat per la Comissió de la Dignitat al Restaurant Núria de Canaletes. (Més info al telèfon 625370661 i mail comunicació@comissiodeladignitat.cat )
* Divendres 4 de març (hora per concretar) – Recepció a càrrec de la M.H. Presidenta del Parlament de Catalunya.
* Divendres 4 de març, 12.30h – Ofrena floral al monument de Francesc Macià a la Plaça de Catalunya – i trobada amb la premsa. Telèfon de contacte 627412083 imail
* Divendres 4 de març – Acte públic a la Universitat de Barcelona (acte a concretar).
At the end of his court-martial on August
16th, 1920, Terence MacSwiney, the Lord Mayor of Cork, greeted his
sentence of two years in jail by declaring: ‘I have decided the term of
my imprisonment…I shall be free, alive or dead, within a month.’ Four
days earlier, British troops had stormed the City Hall in Cork and
arrested MacSwiney on charges of possessing an RIC cipher and documents
likely to cause disaffection to his Majesty. He immediately began a
hunger strike that sparked riots on the streets of Barcelona, caused
workers to down tools on the New York waterfront, and prompted mass
demonstrations from Buenos Aires to Boston. Enthralled by MacSwiney
breaking all previous records for a prisoner going without food, the
international press afforded the case so much coverage that Ireland’s
War of Independence was suddenly parachuted onto the world stage, and
King George V was considering over-ruling Prime Minister Lloyd George
and enduring a constitutional crisis. As his wife, brothers and sisters
kept daily vigil around his bed in Brixton Prison, watching his strength
ebb away hour by hour, MacSwiney’s fast had Michael Collins preparing
reprisal assassinations, Ho Chi Minh waxing lyrical about the Corkman’s
bravery, and rumours abounding that he was being secretly fed via the
communion wafer being given to him each day by his chaplain. It was one
man’s courageous stand against the might of an empire.
Glossa en la mort de MacSwiney, per Ventura Gassol.
Authors: Miquel Strubell Imma Cabotí Eva Riera Carol
From
time to time political analysts write about events in Catalonia and Spain,
which is welcome, and specially so given that before the vast pro-independence
marches and rallies that started in September 2012 (with their massive precursor in 2010 following the
Constitutional court's ruling which cut back the already maimed 2006 regional
constitution - or Statute of Autonomy) and captured the imagination of those who hold
freedom to be a supreme ideal, Catalonia was almost completely unknown to the
general public worldwide.
Yet
time and again the same old clichés keep cropping up. Describing Catalans as
«fiercely» separatist or «rebellious» might lead an outsider to believe that
they spend all day marching around with earnest frowns on their faces. The
truth is (most) Catalans simply want to be able to solve their own political,
social, economic and cultural problems without (constant) interference from a
hostile, self-perpetuating central power apparatus in Madrid. A State like
Slovenia, Lithuania or Denmarkis their aim, peoples whose «desire
for nationhood» has been attained in recent decades.
Another
cliché is that Catalonia, following a period of independence in the early
middle ages, was «engulfed» first into Aragon and then, thanks to the Catholic
Kings, into a “united” Spain. The truth is that up until the end of the war of Spanish succession
in 1714, Catalonia retained control of its civil laws,
taxation, currency, military rights and import tariffs and each incumbent King
reaffirmed the Catalan
«Constitutions». Similarly, in the 17th century, despite sharing a monarch, Scotland and England were separate kingdoms until the
1707 Act of Union. In Spain, during that
same century, officials in Madrid, the seat of the royal court, in the heart of
Castile, began to develop a plan for a Spain which was to become unified but
achieving the assimilation of the “peripheral” nations in the Kingdom: chiefly,
the Basques, the Catalans and the Galicians. For nearly four centuries there
have been wars and coups, from Catalonia's Reapers’
War (or War of Secession, 1640-1652) to the failed coup d'état in 1981, basically on the territorial issue and the closely
related difference between those backing the development of a productive
economy and those happy to live off the pickings of an extractive economy. In between, General Franco's regime (1936/9 – 1975)
not only «abrogated agreements» but also abolished political institutions, and
shot political leaders such as President Lluís Companys (deported from occupied
France), the Christian democrat Manuel
Carrasco i Formiguera and numerous
mayors and local councillors. Each time, Catalonia has
been on the losing side.
Spain
has been loath to deal with the «Catalan problem» for at least 150 years, and
Spanish parliamentary debates in the early
20th century were mirrored in the 1930s, again in the 1970s, and equally since 2003. But this goes beyond «political administrations»: it
is a matter of deeply-rooted unitary or Jacobin, nationalist feelings on left and right. At least
since about 1870, at the time of the First Republic, a federalist political
movement tried to build a federal Spain. However, its leaders and followers were
Catalans (Francesc Pi i Margall and Valentí Almirall,
among others), and it failed then (and has done so ever since) in
the rest of Spain. And with who can one federate, when one is alone? It was the
political confrontation with Madrid at the turn
of the last century that led all parties except for the People's Party (whose election results in Catalonia have
always been poor, never exceeding 13%, thus reflecting its image as an
anti-Catalan, centralist party) to decide to replace the 1979 Statute of
Autonomy. The closest that Catalonia came to a federal model was in the
resulting 2005 draft
Statute of Autonomy, which received 89% support in the Catalan parliament (in the belief that it
fitted within the terms of the “ambiguous” Constitution), but was then severely
maimed in the Spanish parliament... before being further crippled by the June
2010 Constitutional court ruling (thus revealing how
“exquisite” ambiguity is for those in power. There is nothing exquisite in
ambiguity, unless the parties share equal power, and over the years the
Constitution court has increasingly interpreted the law to suit Spanish
governments in their conflicts with, especially, Catalonia and the Basque
country). Catalan federal dreams basically ended in 2010, though both before
and since, from positions of power, Catalans and others have been jeeringly
accused of «acting as victims of an oppressive central government».
A third
cliché attributes the recent rise in the independence feeling in Catalonia to financial issues. To be true, Catalonia accounts for 16% of Spain's
population, 19% of gross domestic product and 21% of all taxation, so it is
considerably more productive than the average for Spain. However the cost of living there is above the average for Spain, and in terms of
per capita purchasing power Catalonia falls from 4th to 7th place(in
terms of disposable income, to 9th place); and it has a disturbingly high proportion of people below the poverty line.
Our
view is that for most citizens of Catalans extraction, until recently
independence was desired deep at heart, but was seen as unattainable. Now, and
not just as a matter of dignity and right, it is seen as the only way out, the
only way ahead. There are many, many examples of Barcelona, Catalonia and the
Catalans losing out because of decisions made in Madrid (or not made at all),
and the growing conviction that a federal Spain that could accommodate (or
appease) the Catalans, is quite impossible. The rise of pro-independence
sentiment is partly a reaction to the humiliation that the Catalans have been subjected to, and partly
to the collective self-esteem recovered by witnessing and taking part in the
largest demonstrations in the country's history, including the “participative process” that brought several
million people to the ballot boxes to express their opinion, in the face of the
dire threats of the Spanish government. It was undoubtedly the largest display
of civil disobedience in recent European history.
Another
cliché describes the level of Catalonia's “autonomy” as extremely high. This is
blatantly untrue, given the increasing narrow and biassed interpretation of the
Spanish Constitution by the Spanish authorities and the Constitutional Court.
Catalonia's policies in terms of immigration, retail commerce, consumers’ rights, education, supporting poor families, raising new taxes, foreign policy, and many others, have been blocked in the courts by
central government. The Catalan government has residual tax-raising powers and
its own social and economic policies are dwarfed by those of the Spanish government.
The
current institutional clash is undeniable, but it is totally unfair to attach
the blame one-sidedly to the Catalans or to apply another cliché, that claims
that the Catalans have been dragged, as an indoctrinated or misinformed flock, into an impossible adventure,
by mad, improvising leaders. Thus, for instance, Catalonia's White Paper on National Transition to
independence is an extremely thorough set of documents, and – for instance -
outlines a number of ways an official referendum could have been held (binding
or otherwise). No-one in Madrid, to our knowledge, congratulated the winners of
the election held on September 27, 2015, which most voters took part in as if
it were a plebiscite (we do not know what the results would be in case of a
clear Yes-No referendum, for the Spanish government has used all its tools to
prevent such a democratic exercise). That probably explains the historically high
turnout, 75% (the «Junts pel Sí» alliance won 39% of the vote and 62 out of 135
seats, six short of an outright majority; 47·8% voted for independence,2
39·1% against, while the remaining 12·5% of voters - mostly Unió Democràtica's
103,000 votes, and Catalunya Sí Que Es Pot's 367,000 - refused to take a stance
on the subject). The former king abandoned his constitutional role as being
politically neutral, in trying to call the Catalans to order, and
this might explain why the portrait of the previous king in the Saló de Sant
Jordi - the hall in the building the Catalan government (or Generalitat) chose as its seat in 1400 – has been covered for some years now, to our knowledge. The
current king did the same even before refusing to receive the Speaker (who,
to be fair, had said «Visca la República» in Parliament); he also signed a decree on president
Mas' resignation which, breaking with protocol, did not thank him for his services; and
Puigdemont received no formal congratulations from Spanish authorities
after his swearing-in, again a break with tradition. So it was hardly
surprising - and especially given his political mandate and objective, an independent
republic -, that when president Carles Puigdemont legally swore office as the
130th President of Catalonia he promised loyalty to the people of Catalonia,
and not to the King or to the Spanish constitution. Incidentally, he did not
follow the existing oath of office, which had been devised by president Tarradellas in 1980, and
was therefore hardly «traditional», and certainly not laid down legally.
With a
parliamentary mandate for independence obtained in September 2015, the Catalans
now enter a political minefield. However, it is quite misleading to believe
that «Scotland’s independence referendum is the source of inspiration for the
Catalans». They had been wanting to vote on independence since at least September
2009, when hundreds of unofficial polls began
to take place. Having said that, the refusal of Spain to allow a referendum is
in stark contrast to the UK's government's position. Spain's response has not
been political: it has shown no willingness whatsoever to sit down and discuss
Catalonia's claims. It has refused to appease the Catalans in any way at all.
On the contrary, it has only fuelled the flames, time and again. Parliamentary resolutions, and even committees have been deemed unconstitutional. Several leading
politicians, including former president Mas, could be politically debarred or even sent to prison. Among
other threats, the Spanish Constitution has a widely-quoted article, 155, which
does not however contemplate the «cancelling» of Catalonia's regional
constitution; while Spain's media archives are full of voices calling on the
Spanish government to put an end to Catalonia's claims – and moves - to
nationhood, by the use of force if necessary.
On the
economic scene, the Spanish government would seem to be following a scorched earth policy in terms of investment in
essential infrastructures, some of which are missing, while others (such as the
interstitial railway network) are completely obsolete. Spain has been
financially starving the regional government and Catalonia as a whole for at
least 30 years. There is a systemic outflow of public money equivalent to 8% of Catalonia's GDP, which is crippling
Catalonia's economy. Part of this outflow is due to serious direct
under-investment by Spanish ministries in infrastructures in Catalonia.
To cope
with the coming roller-coaster months, the «separatist alliance», holds 62 out
of 135 seats, six short of an outright majority. The other separatist group,
the radical left CUP has 10 seats, while the other parties (not all of which
are openly hostile to independence) hold 63 seats. This is why three months of
negotiations led to a last-minute agreement for a stable legislature during which the
state structures and legislation will go through Parliament. This included
president Mas' personal decision to stand down, (he
was certainly not «unceremoniously dumped»!), to ensure the support of the CUP
and thus avoid new elections.
However,
to say that "the members of the government are working at
cross-purposes" or that "the alliance hangs by a thread" is
false, unfair and ridiculous (even wishful thinking, we venture to speculate),
as the government was constituted just sixteen days before Professor
Encarnación’s article was published, and at that moment there was no evidence
whatsoever of that. And of course, in Catalan politics one can expect to find
the same type of internal tensions within parties and alliances as in any other
part of the world. But Catalonia is different in that, leaving history to one
side, the movement towards independence is driven by its grass-roots, not by
political parties. And the main NGO, the «Assemblea Nacional Catalana», will certainly settle
for nothing less than independence.
Is
there an alternative to independence? The widespread feeling in Catalonia is
that there is no turning back, and the boats have been burnt (by the
opponent!). Most Catalans have, after 150 years of seeking a federal solution
for Spain, simply given up. The “enough
is enough” feeling that has swept across the country explains why the
Catalan independence movement has grown so much. Catalans want problems to be
solved, while those in power in Madrid (and by no means just the government)
seem to want the Catalans to
be crushed.
It is
easy from afar to claim that now is the time for federalism. But what does
«federalism» mean, beyond a fairly vague statement of distribution of power
among equals? How much power would the federated states agree that Madrid
should have? A leading specialist on federal systems, Prof. Ferran Requejo,
concludes (2011)
that the lowest level of federalisation that most Catalans would (grudgingly)
accept is well above the highest level of federalisation that most Spaniards
would (grudgingly) accept. Ne'er the twain shall meet, especially given what
all polls
say.
Fundamental
changes to what is not a federal Constitution require such an elaborate
process and such large majorities that no-one in their right mind can
honestly believe that this is a feasible option (the amendments made up to now
have affected secondary issues only). Has «unequal autonomy» increased since
1982? Every Tom, Dick and Harry now has his public
regional TV channel; all regions are now responsible for the running of the
schools; some have commercial offices and delegations abroad (and spend considerably more than Catalonia on them!).
True, only Catalonia runs its prisons, but that has been the case since 1984!
And other than traffic
policing, which was taken over by Catalonia in 1997, we can't see any
«increase in recent years» in the differential. Had the 2005 draft
Statute prospered, things might have been different. But even there, other
regions have levelled the playing field by copying
the 2006 Catalan statute… without their text being taken to the
Constitutional Court.
Our
view (and Brussel's, according to one report) is that the long-standing “Catalan problem” is really, essentially a
“Spanish problem”, and we are convinced that Catalonia and Spain will in the
near future get along much, much better as (equal) neighbours.
M'ha aparegut aquest cromo de l'ABC, d'agost de 2015. Segons el Diccionari de la Llengua Catalana, de l'IEC, el titular pixa fora de test notòriament. No es el primer cop.
bel·licisme
m. [SO] Tendència a resoldre els conflictes per mitjà de la guerra.
bel·licista
1 adj. [SO] Relatiu o pertanyent al bel·licisme. 2 adj. i m. i f. [SO] Partidari del bel·licisme.
maría jesús cañizares
-
Barcelona
- 06/08/2015 a las 12:10:58h. - Act. a las
13:33:50h.
"¡Es la guerra!", sostiene el independentismo catalán. O al menos es lo que se desprende del discurso utilizado por los dirigentes y activistas del secesionismo, jalonado de expresiones bélicas. Estos son algunos ejemplos:
-"Nos han dado palizas de arriba a abajo, con leyes injustas y regresivas, multas millonarias solo por ejercer el derecho de expresión" (Raül Romeva, cabeza de lista de Junts pel Sí)
-"La respuesta será tan beligerante por parte del Estado hacia Catalunya que simplemente la opción de quedarnos como estamos es inimagibable". (Raul Romeva)
-"Cuando se ataca sistemáticamente a la autonomía se tiene derecho a la legítima defensa" (Artur Mas, presidente de la Generalitat)
-"No descarto que haya guerra sucia por parte del Gobierno, pero nosotros no la haremos" (Artur Mas)
-"El adversario al cual nos enfrentamos es mucho más poderoso que nosotros; pero David no venció a Goliat porque fuese más fuerte, sino porque era muy astuto y muy hábil». (Artur Mas)
-"Si atacan al Gobierno catalán por defender la democracia, nos atacan a todos» (Oriol Junqueras, líder de ERC)
"Pues el 11 de septiembre de 1714, hace 300 años, hubo una guerra en Barcelona y en Cataluña, y ganaron, no los catalanes, ganaron los otros" (Núria de Gispert, presidenta del Parlamento catalán)
-"Aspiramos a una Cataluña libre y gloriosa, cuya supervivencia depende de su capacidad de derrotar a sus poderosos enemigos» (Josep Rull, coordinador de Convergència)
-"No solo se está haciendo una ofensiva irresponsable contra el autogobierno de Cataluña, sino contra la nación, contra las personas, contra la sociedad civil" (Josep Rull)
-"Ha llegado la hora de los valientes, de la verdad y del vértigo y hay que llenar las calles para llenar las urnas". (Alfred Bosch, concejal de ERC en el Ayuntamiento de Barcelona)
Please go here to read the latest post, which is a response to a paper by Omar G. Encarnación.
Note that the editors of Foreign Affairs "found it an interesting take [sic]. We're overstuffed [sic] with content and commitments at the moment, though, so we'll pass [sic]".
1 http://fortune.com/2016/01/11/spain-catalonia-secession/ New Government in Catalonia Looks to Speed up Secession From Spain by Ian Mount @ianmount JANUARY 11, 2016, 4:58 AM EST The pressure is now on the national politicians to form a government in Madrid. On Sunday night, after more than two months of failed negotiations, bitter public recriminations, and a supposed do-or-die vote that ended in a 1,515-1,515 tie, the two secessionist parties in the parliament in the Spanish region of Catalonia managed what seemed impossible only days before: they agreed on a new prime minister and, just two hours before hitting the midnight deadline that would have forced new elections, formed a government. “The [independence] process is saved. The Parliament will begin to function immediately,” Artur Mas, the outgoing Catalan Prime Minister, said when the preliminary agreement was reached on Saturday evening. And with that, the already unstable Spanish political situation got even more complicated.
In Sept. 27 regional elections, the two pro-independence groups—the anti-capitalist leftist party Candidatura d’Unitat Popular (CUP), and Junts pel Sí (Together for the Yes, or JxSí), a coalition of center-right, center-left, and civil society groups—won a majority of 72 out of 135 parliamentary seats with about 48% of the vote. But the two quickly deadlocked over who would be prime minister, as the CUP refused to support another term for Artur Mas, who pushed austerity policies during Spain’s economic crisis and who heads a political party (Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya, or CDC) that is the focus of multiple corruption investigations. Mas, in turn, refused to back down. On Saturday afternoon, however, the groups reached an agreement: Mas, 59, would step aside and be replaced by Carles Puigdemont, 53, the mayor of the Catalan city of Girona. In return, the CUP agreed to vote for Puigdemont and declared that it would not vote against JxSí in any situation where parliamentary “stability” was at stake. “Next stop, Independence!” Oriol Junqueras, the leader of the Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (Republican Catalan Left) party, which forms part of JxSí, tweeted minutes later.
After the 1975 death of dictator General Francisco Franco, the birth of Spain’s democracy was midwifed by the Pacto del olvido—the Pact of Forgetting. In what Omar Encarnación, the director of the political studies program at Bard College, calls “Democracy Without Justice,” political leaders both left and right informally agreed to move forward by ignoring the atrocities committed during and after Spain’s Civil War. A comprehensive amnesty law was passed; there would be no truth and reconciliation committees, no wrestling with the past.
This willing refusal to look in the rearview had gone a long way to help Spain build a vibrant democracy and modern society in the ensuing 40 years. But it has also saddled Spain’s political class with an unfortunate unwillingness to address problems directly.
The challenges of this willful ignorance became clear when two secessionist parties in the wealthy region of Catalonia formed a government over the weekend, just hours before a deadline would have sent the region to new elections. Immediately, pressure heightened on lawmakers in Madrid—who have been bickering since December elections left the country without a ruling party or coalition—to form a national government and deal with Catalonia.
Until the two opposing Catalan pro-independence parties came to their unlikely eleventh-hour agreement, it seemed like the national parties might be able to again join in a pacto del olvido. The odds had been that Catalonia would go to new elections and that support for the secessionist parties would recede.
If that happened, the thinking went, the future would be clear. Afraid to face new elections amid his own declining support, Pedro Sánchez, the leader of the center-left PSOE party—the second group in parliament with 90 of the 350 seats—would feel obliged to tragarse el sapo (make a painful decision; literally, “swallow the frog”) and allow the re-election of current Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy of the arch-rival center-right Partido Popular (PP), which controls 123 seats. And Spain would return to its regular programming.
The deal in Catalonia has killed that potential scenario.
Now, the independence movement in Catalonia does not have majority support. In September regional elections, the two secessionist groups received just short of 48% of the vote (or, viewed more broadly, the support of 36% of the electorate). That’s not enough to claim a mandate for secession. But because of election rules, the parties received 72 of the 135 seats in Catalonia’s parliament. With seats in hand and no government in Madrid, the opportunity was too good to let percentages stand in the way. And so, on Sunday evening, new Catalan Prime Minister Carles Puigdemont declared that his government was embarking on an 18-month roadmap to a Catalan republic.
It didn’t have to be this way.
Tensions have risen in recent years in part because Prime Minister Rajoy and the PP have exhibited a mix of antipathy towards the regional government and an almost pathological inability to address the Catalan issue openly. When the region negotiated an autonomy statute with the government of Prime Minister Zapatero in 2006, Rajoy and his party responded by appealing—successfully—to have Spain’s Constitutional Court strike down large parts of it. He did the same when the Catalan government tried to hold a regional referendum-opinion poll on independence in 2014.
These moves made Rajoy’s later suggestion that the Catalan government should stop complaining and seek more autonomy through constitutional reform—which would have required support from the PP—seem disingenuous, to put it mildly.
Rajoy’s strategy has inflamed tensions. While, by all measurements, most Catalans do not support secession, a clear majority wants more regional autonomy and the right to be heard. As a Catalan friend — who is no fan of secession — asked me recently, “Why are they so afraid of a referendum?”
Faced with the increasing possibility of a political train wreck, Spanish intellectuals have floated solutions. Political scientist Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca, a professor at Madrid’s Carlos III University, has pushed for a two-step process of constitutional reform, then referendum.
First, Spain’s Parliament would negotiate a constitutional reform that would give more powers to the nation’s regions, and Spanish voters as a whole would vote on it. If the reform passed nationally and in Catalonia, the issue would be considered closed. But if the reform failed, or if it passed nationally but a majority of Catalans voted against it, Catalonia would go to the polls and vote on a binding referendum with a clear question (in or out), a high threshold (half the electorate, as a proxy for a true majority), and limited repeatability (no sooner than 10 years).
While this may seem logical, it does not benefit those who are currently in power. The PP appeals to its core conservative supporters as a defender of national sovereignty. And the best, albeit small, chance that Catalan secession parties have for independence lies not in negotiation but in taking provocative steps—by creating an independent tax authority, for example—that could inspire the central government to respond with heavy-handed measures, such as eliminating the region’s self-government powers, that might move the international community to get involved.
There are obstacles beyond the political. Constitutional reform requires an ample majority in both the Parliament and the Senate, which means that the PP would have to be somehow convinced, however grudgingly, to let it pass. But it is worth the effort. While another 18 months of inflexible standoff probably won’t lead to independence for Catalonia, it will almost certainly lead to more bitterness, recrimination, and pain.
Farewell to Catalonia?
Spain Confronts a Rebellious[1] Region
Omar G. Encarnación
In mid-January, Catalonia inaugurated a new government that promised to bring independence to this fiercely [2] separatist region of 7.5 million people sandwiched between Spain and France. Perhaps only the Basque Country, where separatist politics are intermingled with violence, terrorism, and even racism (Basque nationalism is rooted in the idea that the Basques are a separate race[3]), matches Catalonia’s desire for nationhood among the regions of Spain, and maybe in all of Europe[4]. Ironically, although the Basque independence struggle is the one that usually captures international headlines, the Catalans have the stronger historical claim for statehood. Catalan nationalism [5] dates to the Middle Ages, when the region existed as the Principality of Catalonia, before it was engulfed [6] into the Kingdom of Aragon and later into the Kingdom of Spain, when the crowns of Aragon and Castile were united [7] in the fifteenth century. Basque separatism, by contrast, dates only to the late nineteenth century, when the Basque nationalist movement was founded, although Basque nationalists tend to dispute this view by tying the contemporary Basque nationalist movement to the fueros, rights and privileges granted by the Spanish monarch to the Basque people going back to feudal times. For Catalonia’s newly inaugurated government, the stakes could not be higher. It is likely now or never for the proponents of Catalan independence. For the first time since Spain became a democracy in 1978, after four decades of dictatorship under the regime of Generalissimo Francisco Franco (a regime so profoundly antiregional[8] that it banned all symbols of Catalan culture, such as the Catalan language and flag), a political movement laser-focused on independence has won the majority of seats in the Catalan parliament. Junts pel Sí (Together for Yes), a coalition of Catalan parties supportive of independence, won last September’s Catalan regional elections. Upon assuming power, Catalonia’s new premier, Carles Puigdemont, announced plans for the creation of the Republic of Catalonia within 18 months. To underscore the seriousness of his intentions, Puigdemont, in open defiance of tradition and the law[9], did not pledge loyalty to the Spanish constitution or the Spanish crown. Adding insult to injury, the portrait of King Felipe, which hangs in the chamber where Puigdemont’s swearing-in took place, was covered with a veil during the ceremony[10].
For the central administration in Madrid, the standoff with Catalonia, which accounts for 20 percent of Spain’s economic activity and represents about the same percentage of the Spanish population[11], could not have come at a worse time. Spain is politically deadlocked after the inconclusive results of the December 20 national elections, which generated a fragmented parliament. Neither of the two parties that have ruled Spain for decades won a sufficient number of parliamentary seats to form a government without needing alliances with other political parties. Led by incumbent Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy, the conservative Popular Party (PP) won 28.7 percent of the vote to emerge as the winner, and the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) won 22 percent of the vote, enough to become[12] the second most important party in the new parliament. Together, two new upstarts, the left-wing Podemos (We Can) and the center-right Cuidadanos (Citizens), got a third of the vote, a testament to the dissatisfaction of the electorate with the traditional parties. The PP and PSOE’s share of the electorate fell from 80 percent in 2011 to 50 percent in 2015.
Two options for a coalition government in Spain — which would be the first government of this kind for the country since the tumultuous Second Republic, the interwar regime that ushered in the Spanish Civil War — are generating the most buzz. The first one is a grand right-left coalition between traditional opponents PP and PSOE. It would be modeled on Germany’s current government, which incorporates former rivals Christian Democrats and Social Democrats. The second option is a leftist “coalition of the losers”, similar to the one currently in power in Portugal, encompassing the PSOE, Podemos, and Izquierda Unida (United Left), an assortment of left-wing parties including the once mighty[13] Spanish Communist Party and the Verdes (Greens). If neither option materializes, Rajoy will be forced to call new elections. Polls suggest that the majority of Spaniards want the parties to agree to a coalition rather than to holding a new election.
PROTECTING THE HOMELAND
As might be expected, all the talk of independence in Catalonia brings to mind last year’s epic struggle for independence in Scotland. Despite the heartbreaking outcome for Scottish ationalists, Scotland’s independence referendum is the source of inspiration for the Catalans[14]. Yet there are many compelling reasons to believe that the Catalans face a considerably steeper struggle for independence than the Scots ever did. For one thing, a legally binding referendum, the main vehicle to potential independence for Scotland, is not a realistic option for Catalonia. Madrid has at its disposal a large arsenal of tools to block any referendum on Catalan independence, including, most notably, the Spanish constitution, which explicitly forbids any region in Spain from exercising self-determination.
Indeed, last fall, the Constitutional Tribunal, Spain’s highest court, ruled that any unilateral move by Catalonia toward independence would be unconstitutional. In making this determination, the tribunal relied on section two of the constitution, which asserts that the Spanish national territory is “indivisible” while acknowledging the right to regional self-governance. Since the transition to democracy, this concession has opened the way for the growth of regional home rule, especially in the so-called historic regions — Catalonia, the Basque Country, and Galicia — which had secured an autonomy arrangement (or were in the process of securing one, as in the case of Galicia) from the central government in Madrid during the Second Republic. Franco abrogated these agreements at the end of the Civil War in 1939[15].
Madrid can also block an independence vote in Catalonia by working through the national parliament[16], which would have to approve any referendum on independence in Catalonia or any other region. There is a history[17] of Spanish political administrations, from both the left and the right, using the parliament to block separatist movements. During the middle of the first decade of the 2000s, the socialist administration of Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero used a series of parliamentary votes to derail a drive for independence[18] in the Basque Country. Last fall, the Rajoy administration secured a vote in the parliament declaring any Catalan referendum illegal and nonbinding[19]. That vote enjoyed the support of all the political parties represented in the parliament, save for the Basque and Catalan nationalist ones.
Additionally, the central government in Madrid could always force Catalonia into abandoning its independence ambitions. It could financially starve the regional government by, among other things, moving state resources[20] outside of Catalonia. It could move the national military into the region to intimidate the local government and secure pledges from foreign nations and the European Union not to recognize an independent Catalonia. If all else fails, Madrid could pick the nuclear option: canceling outright Catalonia’s regional self-governance charter, something permitted under the constitution[21]. Of course[22], no one in Spain expects the present standoff to come to any of this, but Rajoy has made it clear that he will use any means necessary to protect the integrity of the nation. “I will not allow anything that could harm the unity and sovereignty of Spain,” said Rajoy as the Catalans were about to vote in a new separatist leader. A BYZANTINE[23] WORLD
A bigger obstacle to Catalan independence rests within the byzantine world of Catalan politics. The recent bitter fight for political control of the region, which nearly derailed the current effort for independence, broadly illustrates the point. In the Catalan 2015 regional elections, the separatist alliance, which comprises four different parties from both the right[24] and the left, fell short of a handful of parliamentary seats to form a government[25], forcing it into a pact with the Popular Unity Candidacy (CUP), a small, far-left party whose platform is so out of the political mainstream that it calls for Spain’s withdrawal from NATO and the European Union. The CUP is also at odds with the separatists’ mostly conservative economic program[26].
To entice support from the CUP, the separatists embraced some of the party’s economic program, such as assistance to those struggling to pay their mortgages. But even that did not do the trick. What the CUP wanted most was the resignation of Artur Mas as Catalonia’s top chief executive. Mas had led Catalonia since 2010 and had been expected to lead the independence struggle beyond 2015, but the CUP viewed him as corrupt, untrustworthy, and too cozy with the local and external actors that brought Spain to the brink of economic ruin in 2011. To prevent the CUP from walking away from the coalition, which would have triggered new elections, at the eleventh hour, the separatist alliance unceremoniously dumped Mas[27]. They[28] replaced him with Puigdemont, at the time the mayor of Girona, a city north of Barcelona that is generally regarded[29] as the most separatist of Catalan cities, who had no experience in dealing with Madrid[30].
The drama over the leadership of the Catalan government reveals broader instability within the coalition, since its various members often[31] work at cross-purposes. Indeed, the alliance hangs together by a thread[32]. In the vote that brought Puigdemont to power, 70 were in favor, 63 were against, and two abstained. Moreover, Puigdemont is an independence hard-liner, quite in contrast with the pragmatist Mas. This might do more harm than good since it is not a foregone conclusion that the majority of Catalans favor independence. Polls show that the majority of Catalans wish to remain part of Spain, although they favor greater autonomy[33]. So, as the separatists are the first to admit, any successful effort toward independence hinges on persuading those currently sitting on the fence[34]. Puigdemont’s tactics, such as the disrespect shown for the crown at his swearing-in ceremony, could well serve to undermine that effort[35].
Podemos and Ciudadanos, the new stars in the Spanish political firmament, add another layer of complexity and unpredictability to Catalan politics. These parties channel the anticorruption movement that has rocked Spain’s political establishment, including the Catalan nationalist movement, since the financial crisis. Jordi Pujol, the father of Catalan nationalism in the post-Franco era (he and his Convergence and Union coalition ruled Catalonia from 1980 to 2003 and often worked with the national parties in Madrid to expand regional autonomy), recently admitted to hiding millions of euros in offshore accounts after prior denials that such accounts existed[36]. Both newcomers are power players in Catalan politics: Podemos controls[37] electorally rich Barcelona, Catalonia’s glittering capital city, and Ciudadanos is the second political force in the Catalan parliament (after the separatists), where it controls 25 seats. Neither party is an advocate of Catalan independence.
The Madrid-based Podemos is committed only to supporting a referendum on Catalan independence, not to independence itself. This support will likely be sacrificed on the altar of political expediency should Podemos join the PSOE to form a new government in Madrid. Ciudadanos, which is based in Barcelona, actually opposes independence for Catalonia. This stance, alongside the party’s center-right political profile, makes it an ideal force to join in a government led by either the PP or the PSOE. Ciudadanos’ potential for playing the role of power broker on the national political stage was demonstrated at the reopening of the Spanish parliament on January 11. The party joined the PSOE in a pact to elect Patxi López, an old socialist hand who served as the president of the Basque Country from 2009 to 2012, as the next Speaker. The PP abstained from putting forth its own candidate, implicitly supporting the PSOE-Ciudadanos Speaker’s pact. This is the first time since democracy was restored that the Speaker is not from the party in possession of the majority of parliamentary seats.
AN ASYMMETRICAL UNION
Finally, Catalan independence seems unlikely because separatist battles in Spain have historically been driven less by the desire for independence than by the more realistic goal[38] of expanded autonomy — especially in Catalonia. During Pujol’s long reign at the helm of the Catalan government, Catalan politics was all about keeping the separatists at bay and securing the best autonomy deal from Madrid. Even though the current impasse between Madrid and Catalonia can be traced to the enactment in 2006 of the Nou Estatut, or New Statute, a revamping of the Catalan autonomy charter that referred to Catalonia as “a nation,”[39] it was the reluctance[40] of the Rajoy administration to accommodate the Catalans’ request for greater control over their finances that brought the current crisis to a boiling point[41].
If anything, the constant drive for autonomy is fed by the imperfections and shortcomings of Spain’s existing system of autonomous governments. When the system was set up, following Franco’s death, the country struck an exquisitely[42] ambiguous constitutional compromise between the regions demanding autonomy, led by the Basque Country and Catalonia, and a central administration that, still imbued with Francoist visions of a culturally homogenous Spain, was fiercely opposed to federalism. At the heart of the compromise was that Spain would retain its traditional structure of a unitary state (the 1978 constitution studiously avoids the term “federalism”) but that the regions would be entitled to individually petition autonomy from the central government, a process concluded in 1981 with the creation of a system of 17 autonomous regions[43]. Cementing the compromise was a long history of failed attempts to decentralize Spain. In the nineteenth century and during the Second Republic, this effort led to civil wars. After Franco, a similar outcome seemed likely[44]. The granting of autonomy to the Catalans and the Basques triggered an aborted military coup in February 1981, the most serious threat to Spanish democracy since Franco’s passing.
Spain’s piecemeal decentralization has resulted in a process that is dictated more by politics than by logic, with each region having its own autonomy charter with the central government and its own range of regional powers. Thus, certain regions, especially the Basque Country, enjoy an extraordinary level of autonomy, which they have secured over the years by coercing and even bribing the central government[45]. For instance, alone among the regions, the Basques are allowed to collect and administer their own taxes. The majority, including Andalusia, Spain’s most populous region, have limited autonomy and are administered by Madrid like colonial possessions[46]. This asymmetry in autonomy among the various regions encourages constant bargaining with the state for greater autonomy as well as confrontational stances between regional leaders and Madrid, with regional leaders often acting as victims of an oppressive central government. From this perspective, the recent eruption[47] of separatist demands in Catalonia is hardly unexpected. In fact, it is what Spaniards have come to expect.
TIME FOR FEDERALISM[48]
A full jump to federalism, which would allow each region in Spain significant administrative responsibilities and the same level of autonomy[49] from the central government, makes the most sense for the country, especially now that the ghosts of civil war and the Franco dictatorship have been fully exorcised. But major obstacles stand in the way. For one thing, the constitution will need to be amended[50] before a federal structure can be imposed. Since 1978, this has happened only twice: to allow EU citizens the right to participate in local elections and to introduce a cap on the public deficit. Moreover, there is a dearth of political will by the major political parties to pursue federalism. The PP, which barely tolerates the current system of regional autonomies, will do everything in its power to stop any attempt at federalization, which it views as one step closer to the disintegration of Spain. Although a historic advocate of federalism, the PSOE has taken no steps to push for it in the many years it has ruled the country in the post-Franco years.
Oddly enough, in the topsy-turvy world of Spanish separatist politics, the biggest obstacles to federalism are the regions themselves. In 1982, when the socialist administration of Felipe González Márquez[51] tried to even out the differences in autonomy among the regions, with the Law on the Harmonization of the Autonomy Process, the Catalan and the Basque governments took the central government to court, arguing that equality in autonomy among the regions would violate their constitutional status as “historic” regions. They reasoned that if every region in Spain had the same level of autonomy, their uniqueness would be rendered unrecognizable. The Constitutional Tribunal apparently agreed with this reasoning, allowing unequal autonomy to persist and actually increase in subsequent years[52].
But the time has come for Spanish regional and national leaders to rethink their aversion to federalism, since it is clear that the current system of regional autonomies, although a useful arrangement for getting the nation out of the Franco dictatorship and through the post-transition years, no longer serves the regions or the central state. In fact, as the current standoff in Catalonia suggests, it undermines both. See also
